RAISUDDIN vs The STATE
The petitioner, convicted under Section 304, Part II read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and sentenced to five years' rigorous imprisonment, sought special leave to appeal against the High Court's refusal to grant bail pending appeal. The petition was filed four days beyond the limitation period. The Supreme Court found the explanation for this delay—difficulty in obtaining an attested vakalatnama from jail authorities—wholly unconvincing. On the merits, the Court declined to interfere with the High Court's discretionary order denying bail. Addressing the petitioner's argument that the appeal might not be heard before the sentence is served, the Court held that criminal appeals are typically prioritized and disposed of within one to one and a half years. The Court affirmed that while a five-year sentence is not short, there is no presumption that an appeal will remain pending for the entire duration of the sentence. The petition was dismissed, with liberty granted to the petitioner to renew the bail application before the High Court if the appeal remains pending for an unreasonable duration.
- Is a delay in filing a petition for special leave to appeal excusable based on the time taken to obtain an attested vakalatnama from jail authorities?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with a High Court's discretionary order denying bail pending appeal without sufficient grounds?
- Does the potential for a long delay in the disposal of a criminal appeal by the High Court automatically entitle a convict to bail?
- Section 304, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
1. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.-The petitioner was tried along with 7 others by the Additional Sessions Judge, First Court, Dacca. He and six others were found guilty under section 304, Part II read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code arid were sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years each. They all preferred an appeal to the High Court. The appeal was admitted for hearing on the 6th of January 1970. Subsequently an application for bail was filed on the 23rd of January 1970, on behalf of four persons, not including the present petitioner. The High Court enlarged co-accused Abu Baker on bail but rejected the application of the others. A second application for bail was made on the 20th of February 1970, in respect of four other persons, including the petitioner. This was also rejected. The petitioner alone has now come up for special leave to appeal. His application is barred by 4 days and the explanation for the delay is that although he had entrusted the papers to the learned Advocate-on-Record on the 13th of April 1970, he could not produce the vakalatnama attested by the Jail Authorities as required by the learned Advocate until the evening of the 17th of April 1970. Hence the petition could only be filed on the 18th of April 1970.
2. The petitioner is lodged in the Dacca Central Jail and it is difficult, therefore, to appreciate as to how it took him four days to get the vakalatnama attested by the Jail Authorities at the Dacca Central Jail. The explanation for the delay is wholly unconvincing.
3. There is nothing also on merits to induce us to interfere with a discretionary order of the High Court.
4. The petitioner has already been convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprison--ment for five years. The sentence is, therefore, not a short sentence. Learned counsel appearing in support of the petition, however, contends that since the Dacca High Court now takes unduly long time to dispose of even criminal appeals, it may well happen that the petitioner will serve out his sentence before the appeal is taken up for hearing.
5. We find it difficult to accept that a criminal appeal would not be disposed of in five years. Criminal matters are invariably given priority in the High Court and can normally be disposed of within a year or year and a half. In case it takes the Dacca High Court longer to dispose of the appeal of the petitioner, the petitioner would be justified in renewing his application for bail before the High Court on that ground. For the present, however, we see no reason to interfere. This petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
Cited by 1 case
- MURAD BUX Versus State 2016 YLRN 36