FAZAL HUSSAIN Versus State
SHEHRAM SARWAR CH., J.--- Fazal Hussain (appellant) along with his co-accused namely Rasool Bakhsh was tried by the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court. Dera Ghazi Khan in case FIR 156 dated 08.04.2006, offence under sections 365-A, 392, 109, P.P.C. read with section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 registered at Police Station Kot Chutta District Dera Ghazi Khan. Vide judgment dated 02.06.2010 passed by the learned trial court, the appellant has been convicted under Section 365-A, P.P.C. read with Section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and sentenced to imprisonment for life. The appellant was acquitted of the charge under Section 392, P.P.C. Benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended to the appellant. Through the same judgment, Rasool Bakhsh, co-accused of the appellant was acquitted of the charge by extending him benefit of doubt and no appeal against his acquittal was filed either by the State or the complainant, as conceded by learned Deputy District Public Prosecutor. Assailing the above conviction and sentence, the appellant has filed the appeal inhand.
2. Prosecution story, as set out in the FIR (Ex.PA/1) registered on the statement (Ex.PA) of Muhammad Hussain, complainant (PW.1) is that on 7.4.2006, he along with his brother Talib Hussain and maternal nephew Aurangzeb was going to his land situated at Chah Mochi Wala carrying meal and milk pot on motorcycle CD-70 model 2004. At about 10:00 p.m., when they reached at unpaved road near Chah Rakhy Wala within the area of Mouza Abrind, four persons namely Fazal Hussain, Allah Ditta both armed with Kalashnikovs, Abid Hussain and Mureed Hussain both armed with pistols emerged there who were identified in the light of motorbike. One motorcycle CG-125 was parked alongside the accused. The accused intercepted the complainant party on gunpoint and threatened them that they would be done to death if they raised alarm and due to fear, complainant and others did not make any noise. The accused pinned down the complainant party with the strings of their Shalwars. Allah Ditta and Fazal Hussain led complainant and others on gunpoint ahead whereas other two accused took motorbike without starting towards east where the complainant side was personally searched and brought out Rs.650/- as well as receipt of motorbike from complainant's Wallet and taken a wrist watch Casio. Similarly, the accused snatched wrist watch of Citizen company from Aurangzeb. The accused confined complainant and his companion Aurangzeb in a room of abandoned house of Inam Shah and then bolted the room from outside. The complainant and Aurangzeb saw through the hole of wall that Talib Hussain was tied from behind whose eyes were also closed by the accused with a safa and he was taken on motorbikes towards east on paved road known as Bund Shero Road wherefrom they took a turn towards north. The complainant and Aurangzeb released themselves and broke lock of the door. They made hue and cry which attached massive crowd from surrounding Abadi. It was alleged in the FIR that the accused has abducted Talib Hussain.
3. After completion of investigation, report under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure was submitted in the case. The appellant along with Rasool Bakhsh, co-accused was summoned by the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, D.G. Khan to face the trial. Copies of relevant documents were provided to them, as required under section 265-C, Code of Criminal Procedure and formal charge was framed against them on 06.11.2009, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. After the closure of prosecution evidence, statements of the appellant and his co-accused under section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded on 27.04.2010, wherein they refuted all the allegations of prosecution and professed their innocence. In answer to a question as to why this case against him and why the prosecution witnesses had deposed against him, the appellant stated as under:--
"I have been falsely involved in this case on the asking of police."
The appellant neither opted to appear as his own witness in disproof of the prosecution allegations as provided under Section 340(2) Code of Criminal Procedure nor did he produce any evidence in his defence. However, after conclusion of the trial, the learned trial court convicted and sentenced the appellant and acquitted his co-accused, as detailed above. Hence this appeal.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant, in support of this appeal contends that the appellant has falsely been implicated in this case; that there was a delay of about one hour and fifty minutes in reporting the matter to the police without there being any satisfactory explanation; that there is nothing on record as to from which source the complainant came to know about the name of the appellant; that no evidence is available on record which could show that the act done by the appellant had created sense of fear or insecurity in public and as such provisions of section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 are not attracted in this case; that prosecution has failed to prove the charge of abduction Talib Hussain (PW.2) for the purpose of ransom against the appellant; that nothing was recovered from the appellant during the course of investigation; that viewing from all angles the prosecution case is doubtful in nature and the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt not as a matter of grace but as of right.
5. On the other hand, learned Deputy District Public Prosecutor opposes this appeal on the grounds that there was no conscious or deliberate delay in reporting the matter to the police; that the appellant is nominated in the FIR; that the appellant has committed heinous offence by abducting Talib Hussain (PW.2) for the purpose of ransom; that there is sufficient evidence available on record which could show that the act done by the appellant created panic and insecurity amongst the people of vicinity and as such provisions of section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act are fully attracted in this case; that the prosecution has successfully brought home guilt against the appellant beyond any shadow of doubt and there is no merit in this appeal.
6. Arguments heard. Record perused.
7. As per contents of FIR, Fazal Hussain (appellant) along with his co-accused overpowered Muhammad Hussain complainant (PW. 1), his brother Talib Hussain (PW.2) and maternal nephew Aurangzeb when they were going to their fields on motorcycle situated at Chah Mochi Wala. They took out a purse having Rs.650/- and a receipt of motorcycle, from the pocket of complainant. Thereafter, the accused persons took them to the dera of Inam Shah and confined complainant and Aurangzeb in a room and bolted the door and subsequently took away Talib Hussain (PW.2) with them who were traced out by the complainant party with the help of foot prints of accused persons and got Talib Hussain released from their clutches. Admittedly, there is no mention in the FIR or brought on record as to from which source the complainant came to know about the name of appellant. It is also not mentioned in the FIR that Talib Hussain (PW.2) was abducted by the appellant and his co-accused for the purpose of ransom. Moreover, no amount of ransom allegedly demanded by the appellant from the complainant party was written in the FIR. In the FIR as well as before the learned trial Court it was the case of prosecution that on the fateful night the appellant and his co-accused stopped the complainant party when they were going to their fields on motorcycle and snatched a purse from complainant having Rs.650/- and a receipt of motorcycle. Charge under section 392, P.P.C. was framed against the appellant but he has been acquitted from the said charge by the learned trial Court and no appeal against his acquittal to that extent was filed either by the State or the complainant. The story of prosecution qua abduction of Talib Hussain (PW.2) by the appellant and his co-accused for the purpose of ransom does not appeal to a prudent mind because no demand was made by the appellant and his co-accused from the complainant party for the release of the alleged abductee. It was also the claim of complainant that Talib Hussain (PW.2) was traced out with the help of foot prints of accused persons on the same night but no evidence in that regard was produced by the prosecution during the trial. Moreover, Talib Hussain the alleged abductee was not recovered at the instance of the appellant. Nothing was recovered from him during the course of investigation. Talib Hussain (PW.2) has stated in his examination that the accused persons asked him that they will receive ransom amount Rs.50,00,000/- from his relatives for his release but neither the appellant nor his co-accused made any telephonic call to the relatives of Talib Hussain qua ransom. Moreover, if the intention of the appellant and his co-accused was to extort money for the release of Talib Hussain then there should have been made demand from the complainant soon after his abduction but same was not done so which fact also creates doubt about the veracity of prosecution story.
8. As far as the defence plea taken by the appellant in his statement under Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned, since the prosecution evidence is doubtful in nature, therefore, there is no need to discuss the same which is exculpatory in nature.
9. We have considered all the pros and cons of this case and have come to this irresistible conclusion that the prosecution could not prove its case against the appellant beyond any shadow of doubt. It is, by now well established principle of law that it is the prosecution, which has to prove its case against the accused by standing on its own legs and it cannot take any benefit from the weaknesses of the case of the defence. In the instant case, the prosecution remained failed to discharge its responsibility of proving the case against the appellant. It is also well established that if there is a single circumstance which creates doubt regarding the prosecution case, the same is sufficient to give benefit of doubt to the accused, whereas, the instant case is replete with number of circumstances which have created serious doubt about the prosecution story. In "Muhammad Akram v. The State" (2009 SCMR 230), the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, at page 236, was pleased to observe as under:--
"13. ...It is an axiomatic principle of law that in case of doubt, the benefit thereof must accrue in favour of the accused as matter of right and not of grace. It was observed by this Court in the case of Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 that for giving the benefit of doubt, it was not necessary that there should be many circumstances creating doubts. If there is circumstance which created reasonable doubt in a prudent mind about the guilt of the accused, then the accused would be entitled to the benefit of doubt not as a matter of grace and concession but as a matter of right."
10. For the foregoing reasons, Criminal Appeal No.25-ATA of 2011 filed by Fazal Hussain (appellant) is allowed, conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant vide judgment dated 02.06.2010 passed by the learned Judge ATC, DG Khan are set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the charges levelled against him while extending him benefit of doubt. Fazal Hussain, appellant is in jail. He shall be released forthwith if not required to be detained in any other case.
11. It is clarified that the observations made in this judgment are relevant only for the disposal of this appeal, which shall not prejudice the case of Allah Ditta, co-accused of the appellant, still absconding.
SA/F-20/L Appeal allowed.
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2019 Y L R Note 84
[Sindh (Hyderabad Bench)]
Before Salahuddin Panhwar, J
MUHAMMAD RAMZAN---Appellant
Versus
The STATE---Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. S-121 of 2012, decided on 5th January, 2018.
Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---
----Ss. 193, 365-B, 494 & 34---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 195---Prosecution for giving false evidence---Procedure---Accused-appellant, who was a prosecution witness in a criminal case, after having been found guilty for fabricating and giving false evidence, had been convicted by the same Trial Court---Validity---Trial Court was competent to file complaint in writing but it could not try such offence which, as per its view had been committed---No one could be judge of his own cause---In the present case, Trial Court never filed any written complaint rather took cognizance after issuance of show-cause notice---Trial Court could competently issue a notice under S. 193, P.P.C., however, if the court had come to a conclusion that offence was committed, court was required to follow the procedure as provided by S. 195, Cr.P.C.---Failure to follow such procedure made the trial illegal---Circumstances established that Trial Court had not appreciated the legal position and mandatory requirements of law while proceeding and convicting the accused on the allegation of perjury---Impugned judgment, in circumstances, was not sustainable---Appeal was allowed accordingly.
Muhammadullah v. State 2014 YLR 964 and Muhammad Yaqoob Gopang v. P.O. Hyderabad PLD 2013 Sindh 551 rel.
Mian Taj Muhammad Keerio for Appellant.
Shahid Ahmed Shaikh, D.P.G. for the State.
Date of hearing: 5th January, 2018.
JUDGMENT
SALAHUDDIN PANHWAR, J.--- This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 17.04.2012, passed by learned 1st. Additional Sessions Judge, Badin, in Sessions Case No.255 of 2011, arising out of Crime No.30 of 2011, registered at Police Station S.F. Rahu, under sections 365-B, 494, 34, P.P.C., whereby appellant Muhammad Raman, who was a prosecution witness in the said crime, having been found guilty for fabricating and giving false evidence has been convicted under section 193, P.P.C. and sentenced to suffer RI for 03 years and to pay the fine of Rs.1000/-. In case of default in payment of fine he was ordered to suffer simple imprisonment for 01 month more.
2. Brief facts of the case are that present appellant Muhammad Ramzan was shown as one of the prosecution witnesses in aforementioned crime and as per prosecution case, the gist of his evidence was that he recited Nikah of the complainant of Crime No.30/2011 namely Ali Ghulam with Mst. Amna, the victim of the said case. At trial, the appellant/ P.W. Muhammad Ramzan was examined and while recording examination-in-chief he was directed to produce the original record regarding his competency to recite the Nikah and the authority of the concerned Union Council, but he has failed to do so; on the contrary, the appellant has produced a certificate dated 22.12.2008 issued by the Nazim U.C. Khorwah that he was a Nikahkhawan.
3. After conclusion of trial, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant as mentioned above.
4. Learned counsel for appellant, at the outset, has contended that the appellant, being Nikahkhawan has been convicted by the learned trial Court under section 193, P.P.C., on the plea that he failed to produce the record of Nikah of the complainant of Crime No.30/2011, cited by him as well he has failed to produce the certificate to show that he was a registered Nikahkhawan. It is further contended that scope of section 193, P.P.C. is to resile from earlier evidence in order to give favour to the accused person, but record of present case is not reflecting that statement under section 164, Cr.P.C. of the appellant was recorded during the investigation and only simple statement under section 161, Cr.P.C. recorded by the police cannot be termed as evidence, hence this is not a case that appellant resiled from earlier evidence and merely non-production of record / registration documents as a Nikahkhawan matter creates separate offence and the appellant cannot be tried under section 193, P.P.C.
5. Learned DPG is not in a position to rebut this legal aspect.
6. Heard the respective parties and perused the available record.
7. Without much ado, prima facie there appears a departure from mandatory requirement of the law in the event of an act, appearing to the trial Court, to be one of perjury, the Court would be legally required to follow the procedure, provided by Section 195(b) Cr.P.C. which directs as:
"(b) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the same Code, namely sections 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, ..and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except, on the complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate; or
From above, it is quite clear and obvious that the trial Court or the Court to which trial Court is subordinate can competently file the complaint in writing but the trial Court itself cannot try such offence which, per view of the trial Court itself has been committed. The above requirement of law seems to be a known maxim i.e. one cannot be a judge of his own cause. In the instant matter, the trial Court never filed any written complaint rather took cognizance only after issuance of the show-cause notice and then convicted the appellant. The position, being so, will be clear from a direct referral to relevant portion of impugned judgment which reads as:-
"In reply to show cause notice issued to him by this court, the accused/PW filed reply on 12.04.2012. The reply so submitted by him was not found satisfactory hence the charge was framed against him today i.e. 17.04.2012 to which he has pleaded not guilty."
The trial court may competently issue a notice under section 193, P.P.C. but if it comes to a conclusion of commission of such liko offences then it (trial Court) shall be required to follow the procedure, as provided by Section 195, Cr.P.C. Needless to add that failure to follow such directed procedure would always be sufficient for holding such trial even as illegal. Reference may be made to the case of Muhammadullah v. State 2014 YLR 964 wherein it is held as:--
6. Without dilating upon the merits of the case which may not prejudice the case of the prosecution or the plea of defence, suffice it to say that the impugned judgment of the trial court is not sustainable in the eye of law as no complaint as required under section 195(b) Cr.P.C. in writing was filed by the learned trial court and as such the conviction of the appellant cannot be maintained on this ground alone. I do not find any complaint in writing as provided by section 195(b) Cr.P.C. of the learned trial Court on record. It was the competency of the learned trial Court to file a complaint and by not doing so , no cognizance of then offence under section 193, Cr.P.C. could have been taken by the learned trial Court. Thus the trial court obviously committed an illegality/irregularity to try the appellant by deviating from the relevant provisions of law on the subject. In a case Amanullah and 4 others v. The State reported as (1984 PCr.LJ 2798) it has been observed as under;-
"I do not find compliant in writing as provided by section 195(b), Cr.P.C. of the learned trial Court on record. In the absence of such complaint, no cognizance of the offence could have been taken by the learned trial Court, as submitted by the learned Advocate for the State."
Without prejudice to above legal position, prima facie the learned trial Court judge has found the offence of perjury to have been committed on count of failure of the appellant in producing Certificate of his competence as NIKAH KHUWAN. The status of appellant to be NIKAH-KHUWAN or otherwise was not involved in investigation of the case crime hence no statement of the appellant to this fact was recorded therefore, failure of the appellant to prove his such status even was not sufficient to hold him guilty of an offence of perjury. Even otherwise, it is also a matter of record that statement of appellant was earlier nor recorded on Oath and even during his examination-in-chief he had corroborated his earlier statement as would be evident from a referral to his examination-in-chief, referred in impugned judgment which reads as:-
"I am registered Nikah-Khawan. I had received the Nikah of complainant Ali Ghulam with Mst. Amna on 15.01.2010. The Haq Mohar was fixed Nose-Rind (gold). I see the Nikahnama at Ex.8-C, which is same, correct and bears my signature so also bear signatures of witnesses and the Vakil of bride. Complainant Ali Ghulam present in the Court is same whose Nikah I had recited. (Note. The witness is directed to produce the original record regarding his competency as to recite the Nikah and the authority of the concerned Union Council)"
In his further examination in chief he has deposed as under:-
"I produce the certificate dated 22.12.2008 issued by Nazim UC Khorwah regarding my Nikah- khawan as Ex.10-A which is same and correct (Note: The original seen and returned photostate copy retained on record. Note. This witness was directed to produce the record in respect of his Nikahkhawan but only produced one stated to be certificate of UC Khorwah by Nazim of UC showing the date 22.12.2008"
Unless it is prima facie established that accused of perjury regarding a fact had made statement on Oath but then denies the fact on oath on a subsequent occasion, he legally cannot be prosecuted for offence of perjury. Reference may be made to the case of Muhammad Yaqoob Gopang v. P.O Hyderabad (PLD 2013 Sindh 551).
8. However, since I am well aware of the fact that the provision of Section 193 of the Code is of two folds. First one is relating to intentionally giving false statement while other one is relating to fabricating false evidence for the purpose of its being used in any stage of the judicial proceedings. Since, prima facie the appellant had stuck with statement as well with status of Nikahnama hence failure of appellant in producing certificate of his competency was of no consequence to initiate proceedings under section 193, P.P.C. The admission of the appellant regarding certificate to be managed would also not of any help for initiating proceedings under section 193, P.P.C. as this document prima facie was never prepared for using in a judicial proceedings i.e. facts involved in the investigation of the case Crime No.30 of 2011, registered at Police Station S. F. Rahu, under sections 365-B, 494, 34, P.P.C. but seems to have been prepared when status of appellant challenged by the Court itself. One guilty of fabricating document and using the same as genuine may well be prosecuted but not within meaning of perjury unless the ingredients to make out such offence prima facie exist because an act of forging a document is a different and independent offence from that defined as perjury.
9. The above discussion is sufficient to conclude that the learned trial Court judge has not appreciated the legal positions and mandatory requirement of law while proceedings and convicting the appellant on the allegation of perjury hence the impugned judgment legally cannot sustain. Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside. The appellant is present on bail. His bail bond is cancelled and surety stands discharged.
JK/M-195/Sindh Appeal allowed.
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2019 Y L R Note 85
[Lahore (Multan Bench)]
Before Sadaqat Ali Khan, J
ISHAQ and others---Appellants
Versus
The STATE---Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 661-J of 2011, heard on 5th April, 2019.
Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---
----Ss. 302(c), 337-A(i) & 337-A(ii)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 345---Qatl-i-amd, shajjah-i-khafifah, shajjah-i- mudihah---Compounding of offence---Scope---Accused were convicted by the Trial Court for committing murder and causing injuries and during pendency of appeal, filed application to effectuate compromise arrived at with the legal heirs of the deceased---Statements of major legal heirs of deceased were recorded by appellate Court---All the major legal heirs of deceased had deposed that they had entered into a compromise with the accused persons in order to live in harmony and peace in future and had forgiven them in the name of Allah with their freewill, consent and without any influence or duress while waiving their right of Qisas and Diyat and they had no objection if the they were acquitted---Prosecutor General had also confirmed the compromise being genuine---Complainant, present in the court, had confirmed the factum of compromise between the parties---Appeal was allowed, convictions and sentences of the appellants were set aside.
Prince Rehan Iftikhar Sheikh for Appellants.
Complainant in person.
Muhammad Ali Shahab, D.P.G. for the State.
Date of hearing: 5th April, 2019.
JUDGMENT
SADAQAT ALI KHAN, J.--- Ishaq and Mst. Hajra Bibi appellants were tried by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Sahiwal who vide judgment dated 21.03.2011 convicted and sentenced them as under:--
Muhammad Ishaq (Ishaq) appellant
Under section 302(c), P.P.C.
He was sentenced to 25-years R.I. with compensation of Rs. 3,00,000/- to be paid by him to the legal heirs of Muhammad Yousaf deceased under section 544-A, Cr.P.C. and in default whereof to further undergo six months S.I.
Under section 337-A(i), P.P.C.
He was further sentenced to two years R.I. for causing injury to Muhammad Ali along with Daman Rs. 5000/-.
Mst. Hajran Bibi Appellant
Under section 337-A(II), P.P.C.
She was sentenced to 5-years R.I. along with Arsh, which was ordered to be 5 % of Diyat.
Sentences of appellant Ishaq was ordered to be run concurrently with benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C., to both the appellants.
Whereas co-accused Walia was also convicted but after serving out his entire sentence had beep released as stated by learned DPG in case FIR No. 115 dated 20.02.2010 under Sections 302/34, P.P.C. later on added offences under sections 337-A(i), 337-A(ii), 337-F(i), P.P.C., Police Station Fareed Town, District Sahiwal.
2. During the pendency of the above said appeal, appellants through their counsel have moved Crl. Misc. No. 1431 of 2018 under section 345, Cr.P.C. to effectuate the compromise arrived at between the legal heirs of the deceased and the convicts/appellants which was referred to learned Sessions Judge, Sahiwal vide order dated 06.12,2018 for submission of his report to ascertain the genuineness and voluntary nature of the above said, compromise with further direction that the interest of minors, if any, shall also be safeguarded.
3. In pursuance of the above said order of this Court, the learned Sessions Judge, Sahiwal has submitted his report dated 14.01.2019, which is as under:
"In compliance of order passed by Hon'ble Lahore High Court, Multan Bench Multan dated 06.12.2018 and conveyed through letter No. 37662/Crl. dated 12.12.2018, on the subject cited above, it is submitted that having received above hinted letter reports regarding legal heirs of deceased Muhammad Yousaf was requisitioned from SHO Police Station Farid Town and Revenue Officer concerned. As per reports submitted by the SHO Mark-A and Revenue Officer concerned Mark-B, deceased was survived by following legal heirs:--
1. Noor Ahmad (brother)
2. Muhammad Yasin (brother)
3. Mst. Gulsban Bibi (widow)
As per reports two real sisters of the deceased namely Mst. Naziran Bibi, Mst. Hanifa Bibi and one brother Manzoor Ahmad have already died and the deceased was issueless. Legal heirs of the deceased, namely Noor Ahmad, Muhammad Yasin and Mst. Gulshan Bibi were summoned and their statements have been recorded. All three legal heirs have stated in their statements in categorical terms that they have forgiven all convicts in the name of Allah Almighty and compounded the offence besides waiving their right of Qisas and Diyat, if any, with their own free will, without any compulsion or coercion. All of them, have also stated before this Court that convict persons are closely related to them and in order to live in peace and harmony in future, they have entered into compromise with the convicts and have no objection if Muhammad Ishaq and Mst. Hajran Bibi convicts are acquitted. They further stated that the deceased died issueless and there is no other legal heir of the deceased except the (sic).
2. In view of statements of legal heirs of the deceased namely, Noor Ahmad, Muhammad Yasin and Mst. Gulshan Bibi, I am satisfied that compromise arrived at between the parties is complete and genuine.
3. Report along with list of legal heirs submitted by SHO and Revenue Officer concerned Mark-A, Mark-B respectively, statements of the legal heirs, affidavit of Mst. Gulshan Bibi Mark-C and conducted proceedings are submitted for kind perusal, please."
4. Statements of all the above noted major legal heirs of the deceased Muhammad Yousaf has been recorded by the learned Sessions Judge, Sahiwal. All the major legal heirs (Noor Ahmad, Muhammad Yasin (brothers) and Mst. Gulshan Bibi (widow)) of the deceased have deposed that they had entered into a compromise with all the appellants in order to live in harmony and peacefully in future and forgiven them in the name of Allah Almighty with their freewill, consent and without any influence or duress while waiving their right of Qisas and Diyat and they have no objection if they are acquitted. They further stated that Muhammad Yousuf deceased was issueless and there is no other legal heirs except hinted above.
5. The learned DPG has also confirmed the compromise being genuine.
6. So far as injuries on the persons of Muhammad Ali injured PW-2 and Muhammad Aziz injured PW-3 are concerned, perusal of their MLRs Exh.PS and Exh.PR respectively show that they were medically examined on 19.02.2010 at 8.15 p.m. wherein FIR No. 115 of 2010 was mentioned which was not registered at that time rather was registered on 20.02.2010 which shows that the above said injuries on the persons of both the PWs are result of fabrication and were prepared to show them as injured witnesses of the occurrence. Muhammad Yasin complainant PW-1 present in the Court has confirmed the factum of compromise between the parties.
7. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is allowed, convictions and sentences of the appellants (Ishaq and Mst. Hajra Bibi) are set-aside and they are acquitted of the charges, they are present on bail, their bail bonds stand discharged.
SA/I-16/L Appeal allowed.