Ijaz Khan Versus State
Muhammad Tariq Afridi, J .--- This petition filed under the third proviso to section 497(l) Cr.P.C, on behalf of the petitioner namely Ijaz Khan seeking his admission to bail on the ground of statutory delay, till final conclusion of trial. The petitioner is presently detained in connection with FIR No. 432, dated 14.06.2023, under section 302/324/34, P.P.C, Police Station Saddar, District, Bannu.
2. The allegation against the petitioner is that the complainant Wajid Khan son of Muhammad Gul, while present with the dead body of his brother Shahid Khan (deceased) at the Emergency Room of DHQ Hospital, Bannu, reported the matter that on 14-06-2023 at about 23:00 hours, he was returning home along with his brother Shahid Khan on a Qingqi rickshaw. Upon reaching near the house of Noor Nawaz, Hashni Killa, they got down from the rickshaw and continued on foot. When they reached near a vacant plot adjacent to the house of Noor Nawaz, the accused, namely ljaz and Nawaz sons of Noor Nawaz, residents of the same locality, allegedly appeared, took out their pistols, and with the intention to commit murder, opened straight firing upon them. As a result, Shahid Khan sustained firearm injuries and died at the spot, whereas the complainant luckily escaped unhurt. After the occurrence accused fled away from the spot. The alleged motive is stated to be an exchange of abusive language between the deceased and the accused, some days before the occurrence. The complainant claims to have witnessed the occurrence in the light of a torch and reported the matter to the police, whereupon the present case was registered under Sections 302/324/34, P.P.C and investigation was set into motion. After arrest, the petitioner Ijaz Khan initially moved a bail application before the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Bannu, which was dismissed on merits. Subsequently, he filed another bail application on the statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial before the same court; however, the same was also dismissed vide order dated l4-11-2025. Hence, the instant bail application.
3. I have heard arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Asstt: Attorney General at length and scanned the record with their valuable assistance.
4. Perusal of the record shows that the petitioner's earlier bail application was dismissed on merits by the learned trial court. Thereafter, the petitioner filed another bail application on the statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial, which was also dismissed vide order dated 14.11.2025. The petitioner has now approached this Court by filing the present bail application on the same statutory ground. Since the bail application of the petitioner has already been dismissed on merits by the learned trial court, and the trial has commenced, this Court refrains from touching upon the merits of the case to avoid any prejudice to either party, and shall confine itself strictly to examining the statutory ground for grant of bail, if available to the petitioner.
5. The record depicts that petitioner was arrested on 18.06.2023, however, from the date of his arrest on 18.06.2023 and commencement of trial on 11.11.2023 to date, the accused has not sought even a single adjournment. The accused has remained in continuous detention for a period of two and half years. It is further evident from the record that although the prosecution cited ten witnesses, only four witnesses have been examined so far. The alleged delay in recording of evidence was caused by circumstances such as the polio campaign, non-production of the accused from jail before the trial court, and the absence of the Presiding Officer. Such delay cannot be attributed to the accused, so as to disentitle him to the concession of bail. It is by now settled law that speedy and fair trial is the inherent right of every accused. The guiding principle for the grant of bail on the ground of inordinate delay was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Riasat Ali v. Ghulam Muhammad and the State (PLD 1968 SC 353), wherein it was held that "delay in prosecution of accused amounts to abuse of process of law and is a valid ground for bailing out accused, however, delay in prosecution of each case as a ground for bail is to be weighed and judged, in each case on its merits."
6. In the instant case, the prosecution has not placed on record anything before the Court to indicate that the petitioner is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal or a previously convicted person for an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or a person involved in the act of terrorism. Under these circumstances, it can safely be concluded that the petitioner has succeeded in making his case for the grant of bail on the basis of statutory delay, after remaining in custody for more than two years and no prospects existed of the trial being concluded within reasonable time and detention of the accused petitioner for an indefinite period would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court.
7. For what has been discussed hereinabove, this petition is allowed and petitioner is admitted to bail, subject to furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.5,00,000/(five lac) with two sureties, each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Illaqa / duty Judicial Magistrate.
MH/232/P Bail allowed.