MEHRAJ BEGUM AND OTHERS vs Mst. NUZHAT MAJEED
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside the appellate court's judgment and restored the Rent Controller's eviction order. The core legal question concerned the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and whether the tenancy vested in an individual partner or a firm. The Supreme Court held that the arguments raised by the petitioners related purely to the appreciation of evidence and that the High Court's judgment did not violate established principles regarding interference with a judgment of variance in second appeal. The petition was accordingly dismissed, with a two-month extension granted for voluntary surrender of possession upon an undertaking to pay due rent. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent factual findings regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant unless the lower court's appreciation of evidence suffers from a legal infirmity.
- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant?
- Does a denial of tenancy by the tenant result in forfeiture of the tenancy?
- Can a tenancy be created through oral agreement or the conduct of the parties?
ORDER
1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.-Leave to appeal has been sought from judgment dated 25-1-1982 of the Lahore High Court, whereby in a rent case the judgment of variance by the first appellate Court, was set aside and the order of eviction passed by a learned Rent Controller, was restored.
2. ' The only issue on the pleadings of the parties which was made the subject of controversy before the learned Rent Controller, was whether there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It was answered in the affirmative and because of the denial (unjustified) of tenancy resulting into forfeiture thereof as also on account of default in payment of rent (petitioners pleaded adjustment against alleged expenditure) the order of eviction was passed. The learned first appellate Court re-examined the issue with regard to relationship of landlord and tenant and found the answer in favour of the petitioner's side. On second appeal from the respondent's side the High Court further examined the same issue and agreeing with the judgment of the learned Rent Controller, restored it. Therefore, this petition for leave to appeal.
3. ' Learned counsel has contended that there was no relationship between the predecessor-in- interest of the petitioners and the respondent. He has criticised the approach of the learned Single Judge on the question of examination of evidence in this behalf. Similarly, he has contended that if there was creation of any tenancy, in law by the conduct of the parties or through oral agreement (there is no written agreement), it was in favour of the firm "Mian Muhammad Shafi (Mozang)
4. Contractors" and not in favour of Mian Muhammad Shafi, one of its partners and that being so the entire proceedings before the Rent Controller, on the assumption that Mian Muhammad Shafi the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, was the tenant, were misconceived. Learned counsel has also raised general questions with regard to appreciation of evidence.
5. After hearing the learned counsel, we are of the view that the arguments stressed in support of this petition, in reality, relate to the appreciation of evidence by the learned Courts below. The reasoning and conclusions in that High Court Judgment do not in any way violate the rule laid down in Madan Gopal and 4 others v. Maran Bapari and 4 others (11, wherein the principles regarding interference with a judgment of variance in second appeal by the High Court, were laid down. As the impugned judgment does not suffer from any infirmity legal or otherwise, we find no justification for interference. This petition accordingly is dismissed.
6. ' On an undertaking by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the possession of the premises would be delivered voluntarily to the respondent, we grant two months' time to the petitioners in this behalf subject to their paying the due rent for this period also.
(1) PLD 1969 SC 617