Iftikhar Hussain Versus Pervaiz Khan
1. Chaudhary Khalid Rasheed, J .---
2. Foreword:
3. The captioned special leave to appeal has been directed against the order of Senior Civil Judge, Mirpur, dated 16.05.2025, whereby respondent No.1 herein, was acquitted of charge by the trial Court while deciding an application under Section 249-A,Cr.P.C.
4. The facts giving rise to the instant CPLA are, that applicant/appellant herein, logged a complainant against the respondent No.1 at Police Station Chackswari, the police authority after registration of FIR and completing investigation submitted its report under section 173 Cr.P.C in offence under section 506 A.P.C. against the respondent No. 1. During the trial of the case, an application under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C was filed by the respondent No.1 and the trial Court after hearing arguments pro and contra, accepted the aforesaid application by acquitted the accused-respondent No.1 from the charge while exercising powers as visualized under section 249-A, Cr.P.C, vide its impugned order dated 16.05.2025; hence, the instant special leave to appeal.
5. STANCE OF THE APPLICANT/APPELLANT:
6. The learned counsel for the applicant/appellant has reiterated the facts of the case by vehemently submitted that the trial Court passed the impugned order sine legal backing, hence not sustainable but during the course of the arguments when the learned counsel for the applicant/appellant was confronted on the point that whether the alleged offence has been attracted from the contents of FIR and whether the charge under section 506 was liable to be framed keeping in view of the contents of section 503 A.P.C, he failed to for satisfy the Court on this point rather prayed issuance of the notice to the other side by allowing the special leave to appeal under section 417(2) Cr.P.C.
7. I have heard the learned counsel for appellant at some length gone through the impugned order and record of the case with due care and caution.
8. COURT OBSERVATIONS AND RELEVANT LAW:
9. The perusal of the impugned order depicts that the same has been passed by the trial Court in pursuance of the application presented under section 249-A Cr.P.C presented by the respondent No. 1 during the trial of the case. Despite of the fact that the learned counsel for the applicant/appellant failed to satisfy the Court, for the safer administration of the justice, I have gone through the impugned order in the light of available record and found that the same has been passed by the learned trial Court while rightly applying its judicial mind. For better appreciation, the Section 503 A.P.C is usefully reproduced herein;-
10. "503. Criminal intimation, whoever threatens another with an injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits cranial intimidation."
11. The bare perusal of the supra section reveals that for attracting offence under section 506 A.P.C, threat to injury or death is only one condition the other condition is compelling to commit an unlawfully act or refraining from doing a lawful act is sine qua non but no such allegation has been levelled against the accused person, thus in case of framing charge by the trial Court it would be deemed to be a groundless as mentioned in 249-A, Cr.P.C which is hereby usefully reproduced below:-
12. "249-A. Power of Magistrate to acquit accused acquit accused at any stage. Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to prevent Magistrate from acquitting an accused at any stage of the case if, after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, he consider that the charge is groundless or that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence."
13. Hence, no anomaly or legal infirmity has been committed by the Court below rather accurately exercised the powers conferred under section 249-A Cr.P.C.
14. Thus, in view of the supra circumstances, in my considered view, serving a notice to the other party by allowing special leave to appeal would be a futile exercise which is not permissible under law.
15. DISPOSAL:
16. The sum and substance of the above discussion is, the instant special leave to appeal is hereby dismissed at its inception.
17. JK/57/AJK H.C Appeal dismissed.