ATTOCK GEN LIMITED Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary Finance
INAAM AMEEN MINHAS, J-. Through the instant constitutional petition, the petitioner has made the following prayer: - i. Notice dated 21.03.2018 be declared without lawful authority, without jurisdiction and of no legal effect. ii. SRO No.450(1)/2013 dated 27.05.2013 may be struck down as being ultra vires the Sales Tax Act 1990 and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
2. The facts, in brief, leading to the filing of the instant writ petition are that the petitioner is a public limited company duly incorporated under the law having its registered office at Morgah, Rawalpindi is engaged in the business of generation of electrical energy. Respondent No. 2/Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue, Islamabad issued impugned notice dated 21.03.2018 for the production of documents/information under Section 38B(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 ( STA, 1990 ) alleging therein that the Sales Tax Returns filed for the period July 2014 to December 2017 were analyzed to examine the aspect of irrelevant purchases, and the petitioner was required to explain its position on or before 06.04.2018.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned notice dated 21.03.2018 issued by the respondent No.2/Deputy Commissioner, Inland Revenue has been issued purportedly under Section 38-B of STA 1990, without fulfilling the statutory conditions prescribed therein. That a plain reading of the said provision makes it evident that the authority to call for records or documents can only be exercised where such material is considered necessary or relevant to an audit, inquiry, or investigation under the STA 1990, whereas for the relevant period, no audit, inquiry, or investigation is pending against the petitioner. That the impugned notice itself does not refer to any audit, inquiry or investigation and in absence of any such proceedings, which are pre-requisite, the invocation of Section 38-B is not justified. That no audit has been initiated under Section 72B or Section 25 of STA, 1999, nor has any inquiry or investigation been commenced, thereby indicating that the foundational requirements of Section 38-B(1)(a) have not been satisfied prior to the issuance of the impugned notice. That the jurisdiction to exercise in respect of the petitioner s sales tax matters was assigned to the Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, Large Taxpayers Unit, Islamabad, through a jurisdiction order dated 14.10.2015. That the authority to exercise powers in relation to the petitioner s affairs was vested exclusively in the said officer, and any action taken by another officer would require clear legal authorization within the framework of STA, 1990. That respondent No. 2, not being the officer to whom jurisdiction was assigned, was not competent to issue the impugned notice, therefore, the impugned notice dated 21.03.2018 does not conform to the requirements of law and is liable to be declared without lawful authority and of no legal effect. Reliance has been placed on 1963 PTD 633, 2019 PTD 484, 2026 SCMR 300 and 2026 SCMR 105.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents, in opposition, submitted that respondent No. 2, acting under the authority under Section 11 of the STA 1990 issued the impugned notice dated 21.03.2018 solely to seek clarification regarding entries in the petitioner s return. That various types of insurance services, such as life, motor, and asset cannot be properly assessed through return analysis alone. That such services are obtained for risk coverage rather than for the furtherance of taxable activity, and are therefore not admissible under Section 8 of STA 1990, hence, the petitioner vide impugned notice dated 21.03.2018 was required to explain the precise nature of the insurance services claimed. That the petitioner has an adequate and efficacious remedy available under the tax law, which has not been availed. That the relevant statute provides a complete and well-structured hierarchy of forums for the redressal of grievances, enabling the petitioner to seek appropriate relief through the prescribed mechanism. That such statutory forums are competent to examine both factual and legal aspects of the matter, and therefore constitute the proper avenue for adjudication. That where a comprehensive remedy is available under the law, the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction is generally discouraged, particularly when no exceptional circumstances have been demonstrated to justify bypassing the statutory framework, therefore, the present petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed.
5. We have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and examined the contents of the petition as well as the para-wise comments submitted by the respondents. We have also reviewed the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective contentions.
6. The petitioner, through the instant proceedings, has, in essence, called into question the competence of respondent No. 2 to issue the impugned notice dated 21.03.2018, primarily on the premise that such authority could not have been exercised on the basis of a delegation made by the Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, LTU, Islamabad. Before adverting to the merits of this contention, it is appropriate to examine the statutory framework governing the appointment, jurisdiction, and powers of the Officers of Inland Revenue under the STA 1990. In this regard, Sections 30 and 31 are relevant, which are reproduced hereunder for ready reference:-
30. Appointment of Authorities.
(1) For the purposes of this Act, the Board may, appoint in relation to any area, person or class of persons, any person to be:
(a) a Chief Commissioner Inland Revenue;
(b) a Commissioner Inland Revenue;
(c) a Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals);
(d) an Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue;
(e) a Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue;
(f) an Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue;
(g) an Inland Revenue Officer;
(h) a Superintendent Inland Revenue;
(i) an Inland Revenue Audit Officer;
(ia) an Inspector Inland Revenue; and
(j) an officer of Inland Revenue with any other designation.
(2) The Chief Commissioner Inland Revenue and Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) shall be subordinate to the Board and Commissioner Inland Revenue shall be subordinate to the Chief Commissioner Inland Revenue.
(2A) The Chief Commissioners Inland Revenue shall perform their functions in respect of such persons or classes of persons or such areas as the Board may direct.
(2B) The Commissioners Inland Revenue shall perform their functions in respect of such persons or classes of persons or such areas as the Chief Commissioner, to whom they are subordinate, may direct.
(3) Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue, Deputy Commissioners Inland Revenue, District Taxation Officer Inland Revenue, Assistant Commissioner Inland Revenue, Assistant Director Inland Revenue, Superintendent Inland Revenue, Inland Revenue Audit Officer, Inland Revenue Officer, Inspector Inland Revenue, and Officer of Inland Revenue with any other designation shall be subordinate to the Commissioner Inland Revenue and shall perform their functions in respect of such persons or classes of persons or such areas as the Commissioners, to whom they are subordinate, may direct.
31. Powers: An officer of Inland Revenue appointed under Section 30 shall exercise such powers and discharge such duties as are conferred or imposed on him under this Act, and he shall also be competent to exercise all powers and discharge all duties conferred or imposed upon any officer subordinate to him.
Provided that, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the rules, the Board may, by general or special order, impose such limitations or conditions on the exercise of such powers and discharge of such duties as it deems fit.
7. A plain and textual reading of above referred Section 30 reveals that the Federal Board of Revenue ( FBR ) is vested with the exclusive authority to appoint Officers of Inland Revenue, while simultaneously retaining the power to define the scope of their jurisdiction in relation to specified areas, persons, or classes of persons. The statutory scheme further establishes a clear hierarchical structure, within which Commissioners Inland Revenue are empowered, subject to the control of the Chief Commissioner, to assign functional jurisdiction to subordinate officers. Thus, the delineation of jurisdiction, both territorial and personal, is not static but is structured through administrative allocation within the framework expressly sanctioned by the STA 1990. Complementing this scheme, Section 31 provides that every officer so appointed shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as are conferred upon him under the Act, thereby making the source of authority statutory rather than derivative. It is also pertinent to note that Section 2(18) defines an Officer of Inland Revenue as a person appointed under Section 30, thereby linking the identity of the officer directly with the statutory mechanism of appointment. At this stage, it would be appropriate to reproduce Section 11 of the Act, which governs the powers relating to assessment and recovery:-
11. Assessment of Tax and recovery of tax not levied or shortlevied or erroneously refunded
(1) Where a person who is required to file a tax return fails to file the return for a tax period by the due date or pays an amount which, for some miscalculation is less than the amount of tax actually payable, an officer of Inland Revenue shall, after a notice to show cause to such person, make an order for assessment of tax, including imposition of penalty and default surcharge in accordance with sections 33 and 34:
Provided that where a person required to file a tax return files the return after the due date and pays the amount of tax payable in accordance with the tax return along with default surcharge and penalty, the notice to show cause and the order of assessment shall abate.
(2) Where a person has not paid the tax due on supplies made by him or has made short payment or has claimed input tax credit or refund which is not admissible under this Act for reasons other than those specified in subsection (1), an officer of Inland Revenue shall, after a notice to show cause to such person, make an order for assessment of tax actually payable by that person or determine the amount of tax credit or tax refund which he has unlawfully claimed and shall impose a penalty and charge default surcharge in accordance with sections 33 and 34.
8. When Sections 2(18), 11, 30, and 31 of the Act are read collectively, a coherent statutory design emerges, whereby Officers of Inland Revenue, irrespective of their rank, are vested with defined powers to carry out functions entrusted under the Act, including the issuance of notices as a necessary incident of assessment and enforcement proceedings. In particular, Section 11 explicitly contemplates the issuance of show cause notices by an Officer of Inland Revenue as a preliminary step towards the determination of tax liability. This authority is not contingent upon a separate or subsequent delegation but flows directly from the statute itself. Consequently, once an individual falls within the definition of an Officer of Inland Revenue under Section 2(18) and is duly appointed under Section 30, the powers exercisable by such officer including the issuance of notices are sourced in STA, 1990 and form an integral part of the statutory functions assigned to that office. Viewed in the context of the present case, the petitioner s objection rests on the premise that respondent No. 2/DCIR could not have issued the impugned notice dated 21.03.2018 in the absence of a specific delegation of powers by the Commissioner Inland Revenue. However, this contention does not align with the statutory scheme discussed above. Respondent No. 2, being a duly appointed Officer of Inland Revenue under Section 30 of the Act, derives his authority not from any subsequent or independent delegation, but directly from the provisions of the Act itself. The powers exercisable by such an officer including the issuance of notices in matters relating to assessment and verification are statutorily conferred and form part of the functions attached to the office.
9. In the circumstances of the case, the impugned notice issued to the petitioner for seeking clarification regarding certain entries in the return falls within the scope of functions that an Officer of Inland Revenue is competent to perform under the law. The mere fact that jurisdiction in respect of the petitioner may have been administratively assigned to a particular Commissioner does not negate or extinguish the statutory authority vested in Uncertified 7 WP No.1756 of 2018 subordinate officers working within the same organizational framework, particularly where such authority is exercised in accordance with the Act. Reliance is placed on a case titled The Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-III, RTO-II, Lahore v. M/s Hamza Nasir Wire and others (2020 SCMR 1822), wherein the Hon ble Supreme Court has conclusively settled the issue of delegation of powers.
10. We now turn to the contention advanced by the petitioner, wherein the impugned letter has been characterized as a notice. The respondents, however, have disputed this characterization and submitted that the petitioner has misconceived both the nature and legal effect of the communication dated 21.03.2018. As per respondents, the said letter does not partake the character of a notice in the sense of initiating any adverse or coercive proceedings under the law; rather, it is in the nature of explanation seeking clarification regarding certain entries reflected in the petitioner s return. In this regard, the language employed in the impugned communication assumes significance. The direction therein You are, therefore, required to explain your position (along with the copies of purchase invoices listed above) on or before 06.04.2018 plainly indicates that the petitioner was merely afforded an opportunity to furnish an explanation, without any determination of liability or initiation of penal consequences. The tenor of the communication, therefore, is facilitative rather than adjudicatory.
11. To properly appreciate the distinction, it becomes necessary to examine the legal connotation of the terms notice and explanation. The expression notice, as defined in Black s Law Dictionary (2nd Edition, Henry Campbell Black, West Publishing Co., 1910, pp. 840 841), denotes information or written warning, in more or less formal shape, intended to apprise a person of some proceeding in which his interests are involved. The concept has also been elaborated in Judicial Dictionary (Justice L.P. Singh and P.K. Majumdar, 2nd Edition, p. 950), wherein it is emphasized that notice constitutes the first limb of the principle of audi alteram partem and must be precise, unambiguous, and determinative in apprising a party of the case he has to meet. The relevant portion of the Judicial Dictionary [2nd Edition, P 950], is reproduced as under: -
Notice (vb.): To give legal notice to or of the plaintiffs lawyer noticed depositions of all the experts that the defendant listed.
To realize or give attention to the lawyer noticed that the witness was leaving. (See Black s Law Dictionary, 7th Ed. at 1088).
The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognised by all civilised States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should apprise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity the order passed against the person in absentia becomes wholly vitiated. Thus it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fairplay. Another principle of natural justice is popularly known as rule against bias. A third one is that the party when requested should be given a copy of the order passed against him, containing the reasons for the adverse order. (Burhanuddin Hussain v. State of U.P., AIR 1970 AP 137 at 139).
A person is said to have notice of a fact, when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it.
Explanation I: Where any transaction relating to immovable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration or, where the property is not all situated in one sub-district or where the registered instrument has been registered under subsection (2) of Section 30 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, from the earliest date on which any memorandum of such registered instrument has been filed by any Sub-Registrar within whose subdistrict any part of the property which is being acquired or of the property wherein a share or interest is being acquired is situated:
Provided that
(1) the instrument has been registered and its registration completed in the manner prescribed by the Indian Registration Act, 1908, and the rules made thereunder;
(2) the instrument or memorandum has been duly entered or filed, as the case may be, in books kept under Section 51 of that Act; and
(3) the particulars regarding the transaction to which the instrument relates have been correctly entered in the indexes kept under Section 55 of that Act.
Explanation II: Any person acquiring any immovable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof.
Explanation III: A person shall be deemed to have had notice of any fact if his agent acquires notice thereof whilst acting on his behalf in the course of business to which that fact is material:
Provided that, if the agent fraudulently conceals the fact, the principal shall not be charged with notice thereof as against any person who was a party to or otherwise cognizant of the fraud.
(See Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 3).
12. In contrast, the term explain or explanation, as reflected in Oxford Paperback Dictionary and Thesaurus (3rd Edition, 2009, p. 303), conveys the act of making something clear, intelligible, or providing reasons for a stated position. For ease of reference, the text extracted from the relevant page is reproduced as under: -
Explain (verb): a technician explained the procedure: describe, give an explanation of, make clear/plain/intelligible, spell out, put into words, express in words; elucidate, expound, explicate, delineate; clarify, unfold, throw light on, clear up, simplify; gloss, interpret, decipher, decode, translate; demonstrate, show, teach, illustrate; unravel, untangle, resolve, solve; informal get across, get over. there was nothing in his file to explain his new-found wealth: account for, give an explanation for, give a reason for; justify, give a justification for, give an excuse/alibi/apologia for, make excuses for, explain away, rationalize, give a rationale for; defend, vindicate, legitimize, mitigate; rare extenuate.
Explanation (noun): an explanation of the ideas contained in the essay: clarification, simplification; description, report, version, statement; elucidation, exposition, expounding, explication, delineation; gloss, interpretation, deciphering, decoding, translation, commentary, exegesis; demonstration, illustration; resolution, solution; informal the why and wherefore.
I suppose I owe you an explanation about Louise: account, reason; justification, excuse, alibi, apologia, rationalization, rationale; defence, vindication, mitigation; rare extenuation.
13. Similarly, Judicial Dictionary (Justice L.P. Singh and P.K. Majumdar, 2nd Edition, p. 680) describes an explanation as a clarificatory device intended to remove ambiguity or elucidate meaning, rather than to create substantive rights or obligations, in the following manner:-
Explanation: It is well-settled that explanation to a section is not a substantive provision by itself. It is entitled to explain the meaning of the words contained in the section or clarify certain ambiguities or clear them up. It becomes a part and parcel of the enactment.
[Universal IMP (USSR) Electrical Ltd. v. Shiv Bihari, AIR 1997 MP 115 at 123].
14. The same understanding is echoed in the Kitabistan New Millennium Practical Dictionary , where explain is defined as making one s meaning clear or giving reasons for one s conduct, and explanation as that which clarifies or renders something understandable, which is reproduced as under: - explain (eks-playn) v.t. and i., tell the detailed meaning of, give reasons for, explain oneself:
(a) make one s meaning clear
(b) give reasons for one s conduct explain (something) away: show why one should not be blamed (for it) explanation (eks-pla-nay-sh n): commentary; that which makes clear explanatory (eks-plan-a-tē-ri) adj: serving to explain; explanatory notes
15. Viewed in light of these well-settled distinctions, the impugned communication cannot be elevated to the status of a notice in the strict legal sense. It neither apprises the petitioner of any definitive proceedings nor sets in motion any process leading to adverse consequences. Instead, it merely seeks clarification to enable the respondents to better understand the factual matrix before taking any further steps, if required. Consequently, the petitioner s characterization of the impugned letter as a notice is not borne out by its language, purpose, or legal effect, which, in substance, remains that of a request for explanation rather than a formal notice preceding adjudication.
16. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, is extraordinary, equitable, and discretionary in nature, and is primarily intended to provide relief to a person, who is aggrieved by an act, order, or omission of a public authority that adversely affects his legal rights. It is a settled principle of constitutional jurisprudence that the invocation of such jurisdiction is contingent upon the existence of a grievance that is real, substantive, and grounded in an adverse determination or action having civil consequences. In other words, the sine qua non for maintaining a constitutional petition is the presence of an aggrieved person, i.e., one whose legally protected rights or interests have been prejudicially affected by an order or action of a competent authority.
17. It is equally well established that not every administrative communication or procedural step gives rise to a cause of action warranting interference under Article 199 of the Constitution. The superior courts have consistently held that constitutional jurisdiction is not meant to be invoked at a preliminary or exploratory stage of proceedings, particularly where no adverse order has been passed. An adverse order, in legal contemplation, is one which determines rights or liabilities, or otherwise visits a person with civil consequences such as financial burden, penalty, or legal disability. Absent such determination, a person cannot be said to be aggrieved in the constitutional sense so as to justify the exercise of writ jurisdiction.
18. The rationale underlying this principle is rooted in judicial restraint and the orderly administration of justice. Constitutional courts do not ordinarily interfere in matters that are still in a fluid or investigative stage, as premature intervention may disrupt statutory processes and preclude the competent authorities from performing their lawful functions. Thus, where a communication merely seeks information, clarification, or explanation, without adjudicating upon rights or imposing any liability, it does not attain the character of an adverse order and, consequently, does not furnish a valid basis for invoking constitutional jurisdiction. Applying this principle, it follows that only when a competent authority passes an order that finally or even provisionally determines rights to the detriment of a party, can such party be regarded as aggrieved and entitled to seek relief under Article 199 of the Constitution. In the absence of such adverse determination, the constitutional petition is premature and not maintainable.
19. In the present case, no adverse order has been passed against the petitioner, nor has any determination been made affecting its rights or liabilities. The impugned communication, being merely a request for explanation, does not entail any civil consequences or impose any legal burden upon the petitioner. In the absence of such adverse action, the petitioner cannot be regarded as an aggrieved person within the contemplation of Article 199 of the Constitution. Furthermore, no infringement of any fundamental or constitutional right has been demonstrated, nor has any legal injury been caused to the petitioner at this stage. It is a settled principle that constitutional jurisdiction is not invoked in the abstract or in anticipation of a possible adverse outcome, but rather in response to an actual and existing grievance arising from a definitive act or order of a public authority. Consequently, the present petition, being premature and not founded upon any adverse determination, is not maintainable.
20. It is also pertinent to observe that, had the petitioner opted to submit a reply to respondent No. 2 instead of invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court at the outset, there existed a reasonable possibility that the matter might have been resolved at the departmental level. The authority, upon being satisfied with the explanation furnished by the petitioner, could have concluded the proceedings without taking any further action. However, the petitioner, rather than availing this available opportunity, chose to approach this Court at a preliminary stage, prior to the culmination of the administrative process. Such recourse to constitutional jurisdiction, without first exhausting the opportunity to respond to the authority or allowing the statutory process to take its course, reflects a premature invocation of this Court s jurisdiction. It is a settled principle that where a matter is still at an initial or exploratory stage, and no adverse determination has yet been made, the parties are expected to participate in the proceedings before the competent authority so that the issue may be appropriately examined and, if possible, resolved within the framework of the law.
21. The petitioner, in the present matter, has an adequate, efficacious, and alternate remedy available under the tax law, which has not been availed. The statutory scheme of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 provides a complete, structured, and self-contained mechanism for the redressal of grievances arising out of tax proceedings. This mechanism is neither illusory nor burdensome; rather, it is specifically designed to address disputes at various stages through forums possessing the requisite expertise. The process ordinarily commences with the submission of a reply before the adjudicating authority, enabling the concerned officer to examine the explanation and, if satisfied, resolve the matter at that very stage. In the event of an adverse determination, the statute further provides a right of appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), followed by a second appeal before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (ATIR), and ultimately, a reference to High Court on questions of law. Thus, the legislative intent is manifest in providing a comprehensive and graduated hierarchy of remedies, affording ample opportunity to an aggrieved person to seek redress within the statutory framework.
22. In the presence of such an elaborate and efficacious remedial structure, the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction at the threshold, without first exhausting the remedies provided by law, is not in consonance with the settled principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. It is a well-established rule of judicial prudence and restraint that constitutional jurisdiction is not to be exercised as a substitute for statutory remedies, particularly in matters involving fiscal statutes where specialized forums are available to examine both factual and legal controversies. The premature invocation of this Court s jurisdiction, at a stage where no adverse order has been passed and the petitioner has yet to avail the remedy of submitting a reply or pursuing the statutory appellate process, undermines the legislative scheme and disrupts the orderly progression of proceedings contemplated under the law.
23. As far as the vires of the Impugned SRO is concerned, it is well established that simply characterizing a grievance as a constitutional question does not confer an automatic right to bypass the statutory mechanisms provided by law. Furthermore, there is a strong presumption of validity attached to delegated legislation. Reliance is placed on Ummat Ullah v. Province of Sindh , (PLD 2010 Kar. 236) . In Suo Motu Case No.11 of 2011 , (PLD 2014 Supreme Court 389) the august Supreme Court that a strong presumption of constitutionality, legislative competence, legality, reasonableness and intra vires is attached with full force to subordinate legislation and to strike down such delegated legislation, the challenger is required to show that the same impinges upon fundamental rights, conflicts with any Constitutional provision, there is a lack of legislative competence of the delegatee making it or it is beyond the scope of parent statute. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not put forward any valid ground for laying challenge to the vires of the same. In order to strike down the amendment, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to show that any of the disqualification exist namely (a) it impinges upon fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution (b) it is in conflict with any Constitutional provision (c) it is beyond the legislative competence of the delegatee making it and or (d) it is violative or beyond the scope of the parent or enabling statute, and in the absence of these, the same cannot be declared ultra vires. Moreover, even when the validity of a statutory provision is challenged, the availability of an alternate remedy remains a critical and determinative factor. Courts have consistently held that a litigant cannot evade the statutory framework merely by framing the dispute in constitutional terms. Where the issue pertains to assessment, calculation of liability, imposition of penalty, or the application of statutory provisions to specific facts, such matters must initially be addressed within the prescribed statutory forums. In Tariq Transport Company Lahore v. The Sargodha Bhera Bus Service, Sargodha (PLD 1958 SC 437) , the Honorable Supreme Court observed:-
Where a statute creates a right and also provides a machinery for the enforcement of that right, the party complaining of a breach of the statute must first avail himself of the remedy provided by the statute for such breach before he applies for a writ or an order in the nature of a writ.
The Court further emphasized that:-
It is wrong on principle to entertain petitions for writs, except in very exceptional circumstances, when the law provides a remedy by appeal to another Tribunal fully competent to award the requisite relief. Any indulgence to the contrary is calculated to create distrust in statutory tribunals of competent jurisdiction and to cast an undeserved reflection on their honesty and competency and thus to defeat the legislative intent.
24. The principle derived from the above referred cases is that where the legislature has provided an adequate, effective, and accessible statutory remedy, the High Court ordinarily refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under Article 199. A litigant is expected to exhaust these remedies before invoking constitutional relief. The extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 is intended not as a shortcut to circumvent statutory forums, but to provide recourse where there is clear and manifest illegality or abuse of authority, and no equally effective alternative remedy exists. In Malik Basit v. Mst. Razia Sultana [W.P. No. 1080 of 2025] , this Court held:-
According to the rule of jurisdictive prudence, the courts usually show restraint with the directions to the parties first to take the recourse of an alternate and or equally effective mechanism and framework of remedy provided rather than to take departure to surpass or circumvent such remedy. Reliance can be placed in the case of the Government of Punjab through the Secretary, Schools Education Department, Lahore and others v. Abdur Rehman and others (2022 SCMR 25). The lawmakers' goal behind adopting these remedies is to constrain issues falling within the jurisdiction of an appellate court to be solely adjudicated before that forum. Any endeavour to bypass or evade these designated forums is deemed impermissible, as mandated by Article 199(1) of the Constitution. Where an adequate forum was available to the petitioner in the shape of an appeal that was not exhausted, the principle of exhaustion of remedies imposes a restriction on a litigant, prohibiting them from seeking a remedy in the constitutional jurisdiction.
6. The exceptional jurisdiction conferred by Article 199 of the Constitution is fundamentally designed to provide a specific remedy when the illegality and impropriety of an action by an executive or other governmental authority can be demonstrated without protracted inquiry. The term "adequate remedy" denotes a remedy that is effective, attainable, accessible, advantageous, and expeditious. The petitioner has an effective remedy for filing an appeal, but the petitioner missed the bus without any reasonable and lawful excuse. The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies dictates that a litigant must not pursue a remedy in a different court or jurisdiction until the remedy prescribed by law has been fully exhausted. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court should not serve as the exclusive recourse or remedy for rectifying the wrongs, distress, and sufferings endured by a party, especially when an equally efficacious, alternative, and adequate remedy is available under the law. This principle is grounded in the notion that the litigant should not be inclined to bypass or disregard the provisions enshrined in the pertinent statute, which delineate specific procedures for challenging the impugned action. Proceedings under Article 199 of the Constitution are oriented towards enforcing a right rather than establishing a legal right. Therefore, the right asserted by the petitioner must not only be clear and complete but also straightforward and there must be an actual infringement of that right.
25. In view of the above discussion, it is evident that the petitioner, at this stage, has not suffered any legal injury, nor has any adverse order been passed affecting its rights. The impugned communication, being a request for explanation, cannot be treated as a violation of any constitutional or statutory right. The statutory framework under the STA 1990 provides an adequate, efficacious, and accessible mechanism to address grievances, which the petitioner has chosen not to utilize. Having bypassed the prescribed forums and prematurely invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, the petition is manifestly not maintainable.
26. In the context of the present case, the petitioner cannot be regarded as an aggrieved person within the contemplation of Article 199 of the Constitution. As discussed hereinabove, no adverse order has been passed against the petitioner, nor has any determination been made which affects its rights or imposes any civil consequences. In the absence of such prejudice, the foundational requirement for invoking constitutional jurisdiction; namely, the existence of a person aggrieved, is not satisfied. Consequently, no locus standi vests in the petitioner to challenge the vires of the legislation, including SRO No. 450(I)/2013. It is a settled principle that a constitutional challenge to a statutory instrument must be founded upon a direct and tangible grievance, demonstrating that the impugned provision has been applied, or is imminently likely to be applied, in a manner that adversely affects the petitioner s rights. In the present case, no such circumstance has been established.
27. For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the instant petition.
MH/49/Isl Petition dismissed.