Pakistan Case Law
2026 SCMR 1255

MUHAMMAD SHADEED Versus State

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Citation2026 SCMR 1255
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Judge(s)Jamal Khan Mandokhail, Irfan Saadat Khan and Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui

JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL, J.--- Facts in brief are that the petitioner was arrested pursuant to FIR No. 107/2019 dated 22.04.2019 registered under section 302/34, P.P.C. at Police Station Pakistan Bazar, Karachi. He was convicted under section 302(b), P.P.C. and sentenced to death as Tazir by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge (MCTC), West Karachi (" Trial Court "), for the murder of his wife Mst. Ancela, and two minor children Baby Bareera Fatima and Master Abdul Hadi. He was also directed to pay fine of Rs. 100,000/-, in default whereof to undergo RI for one year, with further direction to pay compensation of Rs.200,000/- to the legal heirs of deceased. The judgment of the Trial Court was challenged by the petitioner before the High Court of Sindh, Karachi. A reference was sent by the Trial Court to the High Court for confirmation of death sentence of the petitioner or otherwise. The reference was answered in negative by the High Court and the criminal appeal of the petitioner was disposed of by maintaining the conviction, and modifying the sentence of death to imprisonment for life, hence, the instant criminal petition for leave to appeal.

2. Arguments heard and have perused the record. The prosecution's case, in brief, was that on the night of 21.04.2019, some unknown persons murdered Mst. Anila and two minor children by cutting their throats with a sharp-edged weapon inside their house situated at Gulshan-e-Bihar, Orangi Town, Karachi. Though, the incident was unseen, the petitioner, being husband of the lady and father of the children was subsequently nominated as an accused. The entire case of the prosecution is based upon circumstantial evidence, which includes an extra-judicial confession, the motive of strained relations between petitioner and his wife and recovery of a knife allegedly on the pointation of the accused. It is a settled law that circumstantial evidence is a weak type of evidence compared to direct evidence. It requires strict, well-settled legal standards for the purpose of proving the prosecution's case. The prosecution is obliged to establish each circumstance independently and the chain of circumstances must be consistent and so interlinked with the guilt of the accused that it leaves no hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the accused. If any link in the chain is missing or doubtful, the entire prosecution's case collapses.

3. In the case at hand, the FIR was lodged against an unknown person. The complainant, while appearing before the Trial Court, admitted that he subsequently named the accused on mere suspicion due to the allegedly strained relations between the spouses. The prosecution in order to prove conduct of the petitioner towards his wife, relied upon statements of PW-1 (the complainant) and PW2. Admittedly, the complainant did not mention the name of the petitioner or his alleged behaviour towards his wife in the FIR. During cross-examination, he admitted that his deceased sister never complained to him regarding the petitioner's behaviour or conduct, nor did she ever leave her marital home to stay with her family on account of any such grievance. He disclosed the alleged behaviour of the petitioner for the first time before the Court. Similarly, PW-2 (brother of deceased Mst. Aneela) admitted during cross-examination that he had not mentioned in his statement under section 161, Cr.P.C. that his sister had any dispute/conflict with the petitioner. Both PW-1 and PW-2 in their court statements, failed to mention specific dates, instances, or details of any domestic dispute. They also did not disclose the source, wherefrom they came to know about the alleged strained relations between the husband and wife. Besides, the record reveals that a number of persons were present at the place of occurrence before the complainant arrived. It was the private persons who shifted the dead body to the hospital and also informed the police, but, none of the residents of the locality were examined as a witnesses either to establish the hue and cry of the victims or the alleged fleeing of the petitioner from the place of occurrence. The statements of PW1 and PW2 with regard to the motive are not supported by any evidence, therefore, they remained unproved.

4. Moreover, the prosecution relies heavily upon an extra-judicial confession allegedly made by the petitioner during interrogation. Article 40 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (Order of 1984) , provides that when any fact is discovered in consequence of information provided by an accused to the investigating officer, such information may be used against the accused to the extent that it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered, provided that the said fact was not previously within the knowledge of the police. According to the prosecution, the petitioner disclosed two facts before the police, i.e., he confessed his guilt and secondly, he led to the recovery of weapon of crime. It is a fact on record that the PW1 and PW2, during the investigation, had already informed the police that the petitioner committed the offence. Since this fact was already in the knowledge of the I.O., such portion of the alleged disclosure does not qualify the test of Article 40 of the Order of 1984. If at all it is believed that the petitioner admitted his guilt before the police while in custody, such confession made to the police officer is inadmissible and cannot be proved against him as provided by Article 38 of the Order of 1984. Even if, for the sake of argument, the prosecution's stance with regard to a confession of the petitioner before the police is accepted, a question arises as to what had prevented the I.O. from having the petitioner's statement recorded by a Magistrate under section 164 of the Cr.P.C? In view of the fact that the petitioner was arrested on suspicion, and the prosecution has failed to prove the motive, the extra judicial confession made by the petitioner before the police with regard to commission of the offence is not free from doubt.

5. One of the evidence, upon which the prosecution is strongly relying upon is the recovery of the crime weapon on the pointation of the petitioner during his alleged extrajudicial confession. No doubt recovery of crime weapon is of great importance to the outcome of any criminal case, provided that its connection with the accused is established beyond a shadow of doubt. According to the I.O. and the recovery witness, the weapon was recovered after 12 days of the occurrence on the pointation of the petitioner from a dustbin situated approximately two minutes away from his house. It is a fact that the dustbin is accessible to everyone and the witnesses admitted that it was cleaned between 21st April 2019 and 3rd May 2019, before the recovery of the alleged crime weapon. Under such circumstances, it is not acceptable to a prudent mind that after the cleaning of the dustbin, which is accessible to everyone as well, how the weapon remained lying therein for so many days. Besides, it is alleged by the prosecution that the weapon was stained with human blood, but no effort was made to match it with the blood of the victim, nor the fingerprint examination was conducted to connect the petitioner with the recovered weapon. The delayed recovery of the weapon from an open and accessible place, the absence of forensic corroboration for the purpose of its connection with the petitioner and the circumstances surrounding the sealing and custody of the weapon, renders this piece of evidence doubtful, which cannot be relied upon.

6. The most serious infirmity in the prosecution's case emerges from the testimony of PW-6 Muhammad Riaz, who first reached the place of occurrence and later lodged the FIR. During his cross-examination, the witness admitted that he did not seal the crime scene for securing evidence. Sealing or securing a crime scene is the first most important step in criminal investigation to secure and safeguard the integrity of the evidence and the due process right of the accused. It prevents any person, animal or weather from destroying, removing, adding, manipulating or changing the nature of the evidence available at the crime scene, until it is properly collected and documented. It is not merely a procedural step, but is one of the requirements for due process, fair, accurate, and legal investigation. It also ensures the right to fair trial of the accused. Had the I.O. sealed the place of the occurrence, he might have been able to secure the blood patterns, fingerprints of the petitioner, the crime weapon and any other evidence in support of the prosecution which could have been strong corroborative evidence in the present case, but the needful was not done, which has significantly weakened the prosecution case.

7. The golden principle of criminal jurisprudence is that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The cumulative effect of the evidence produced by the prosecution, shows that the circumstantial evidence lacks corroboration, hence, fails to inspire confidence. The benefit of doubt is a matter of right for the accused, not a matter of grace or concession. Given that the prosecution's case is replete with doubts, the fora below have failed to properly consider the facts, and did not extend the benefit of doubt to the petitioner, hence, reached at a wrong conclusion. Their judgments are therefore, not sustainable.

These are the reasons of our short order dated 22.12.2025, which is reproduced herein below:

"For the reasons to be recorded later, the petition is converted into an appeal and is allowed. The judgments dated 17.04.2023 and 02.04.2022 of the High Court and that of the Trial Court are set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charge. He be set at liberty forthwith if not required in connection with any other case.

JK/M-26/SC Petition allowed.

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