SIRAJ DIN vs SUBA (THROUGH HIS LEGAL HEIRS)

1. MUHAMMAD HALEEM, ACTG. C. J.-Leave was granted to consider whether the setting up of free dispensary is a ground recognised for eviction A under section 13(3) (a)(i) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959.

2. ' One Suba now represented by his L. Rs, was a tenant of a premises comprising three rooms, a store room and a courtyard, situate in Mohallah Guru Nanakpura, Gujranwala city. The appellant sought his eviction on two grounds : Firstly, that be had defaulted in the payment of rent ; and, secondly, that the premises was needed by the appellant for setting up a free dispensary for poor people, and for that purpose he had deposited Rs, 75,000 in the United Bank Limited, Bank Square, Gujranwala, in the current account, to the credit of Messrs Fazal Free Dispensary. Its account No, was 4721.

3. ' The Rent Controller held against the appellant on the first ground but as to the second ground it reached the conclusion that the purpose was bona fide as the appellant wanted to open a free dispensary for earning spiritual benefits for his father and himself. In first appeal this conclusion was upheld and the appeal was dismissed. However, in second appeal a learned single Judge in the High Court reversed the conclusion of the Courts below and held : "Opening of Free Dispensary is really a charitable object which involves the use of the premises for the benefit of the public and not for the visible benefit of the landlord though the ultimate object of the charity may be his spiritual aggrandisement. However, laudable the object with which the respondent has submitted the application for ejectment, it does not fall within the scope of section 13 of the Ordinance ; ' and allowed the appeal.

4. ' It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the words "his needs" in clause (b) of section 13(3)(a)(i) cannot be restricted to physical needs, in contradistinction to social, economic, intellectual, emotional and spiritual needs, and, therefore, the High Court was not right in holding as it did. Here I may add that this submission is lifted from Adamali Hasanali v. Mst. Rubab Bai (I) ; and what apparently is discernable is that whatever was said was in respect of the need of the landlord as to his own occupation. This is obvious from the words, which follow, namely : ' Which may be projected in the form of a need for a sitting room, for an office, for a wife, for children, for a room reserved for prayers or for a room reserved for maintaining a library. The needs would differ from landlord to landlord and some of those which may be genuine in one case may not be so in another case ; nor is it open to the landlord to declare his needs as his own subjective decisions, firstly, because his needs reflect the ideas of the society and secondly because his rights or {{FOOT NOTE}}

(1) PLD 1965 (W. P.) Kar. 408 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' controlled by the society. The character of the social order to which he belongs places the general limits on his needs and his own characteristics place specia! Limits on them. Mr. Dalai has rightly pointed out in the above-mentioned commentary that :- "In order to determine what is family or dependent or person essential or necessary for occupation in each case, it is proper and desirable for the Court to bear in mind the context of social order, habits and ideas of living and the socio-religious customs of the community to which the landlord belongs."

5. ' In this case the landlady had applied for eviction from a residential building and the reason given was that the premises was needed by the landlandy for herself and her husband who was ill.

6. During the pendency of this application the Karachi Rent Restriction Act was replaced by the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, and the same relief was pursued under section 13(3) (a)(i).

7. ' The question for decision was as to whether the need was recognised under the law which relates to the illness of the husband. It was in this context that the above observations were made, but conjunctively with the occupation of the landlord. But what the learned counsel now urges cannot be disassociated with "his own occupation", i,e, physical possession. The law permits a landlord to seek the ejectment of a tenant if he wants for his own occupation or for that of his children, provided that he is not occupying another residential building suitable for his needs or that he has not vacated such a building. The words "suitable for his need" clearly connote an idea "a want of something which one cannot do without." And this has been construed in the Karachi case.

8. However, what is said in that case cannot be extended to a case where the landlord seeks an ejectment on the ground that he wants to run a free dispensary for the poor. The need would not be co-related to his occupation which is a must as according to the language of the provision.

9. ' Accordingly, the judgment of the High Court is unexceptionable as it will not be his own occupation, but that of those who would run the dispensary. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed, but with no order as to costs.