STATE vs MUHAMMAD YAQUB KHAN
This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the State against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court acquitting the respondent of an offence under section 9 of the N.-W. F. P. Hazara Forest Act, 1936, and setting aside his conviction by the trial Magistrate. The core legal question concerned whether the petition, barred by limitation, warranted condonation of delay and whether interference on merits was justified against the acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the petition was barred by limitation by 15 days due to a mistake by the State, and since the respondent had acquired a valuable right to liberty, no sufficient ground existed for condonation of delay. Furthermore, upon examining the impugned judgment, the Court found it unsuitable for interference on merits. The petition was accordingly dismissed, reaffirming the principle that delay by the State in filing appeals against acquittal will not be condoned lightly, particularly when valuable rights of liberty have accrued to the accused.
- Whether a petition for leave to appeal filed by the State against an acquittal can be entertained when it is barred by limitation?
- Will a mistake on the part of the State constitute sufficient ground for the condonation of delay in filing a criminal petition?
- Is interference warranted against an acquittal where the respondent has acquired a valuable right to liberty?
- Section 9, N.-W. F. P. Hazara Forest Act 1936
ORDER
' A sum RIAZ HussAirt, J.-This petition by the State is directed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, dated 29-5-1982, acquitting Muhammad Yar Khan respondent of an offence under section 9 of the N.-W. F. P. Hazara Forest Act, 1936 setting aside his conviction by the learned trial Magistrate.
2. The learned Assistant Advocate-General has, however, conceded before us that this petition for leave to appeal against the acquittal of the respondent is barred by limitation by 15 days and that the delay was caused by mistake on the part of the State. As such there is no ground for condonation of the delay specially in a case where the respondent has' acquired a valuable right to liberty. Even otherwise after having gone through the impugned judgment we do not consider it fit case for interrefence on merits by way of granting leave. The petition is, therefore, dismissed.