DIWAN And Others vs MUHAMMAD YUNIS
This is a petition for leave to appeal arising from a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petitions concerning a land settlement dispute. The core legal question involved the competing entitlement of sitting allottees—specifically, big landlords versus small claim holders—to a small parcel of available land in a village. The Supreme Court held that where all competing parties are sitting allottees in the village, and the disputed land is of a small size only capable of satisfying small claims, the refusal of the High Court to interfere in its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction against a non-arbitrary order passed with jurisdiction does not warrant interference by the apex court. The key principle laid down is that discretionary constitutional jurisdiction will not be exercised to interfere with an order passed by a competent authority having jurisdiction, especially where the impugned decision is neither arbitrary nor in contravention of mandatory legal provisions.
- Whether erroneous decisions passed by an authority having jurisdiction are liable to challenge in writ jurisdiction?
- Does a sitting allottee with a large number of unsatisfied units have a preferential right over small claim holders for a small piece of disputed land?
- Is the Supreme Court bound to interfere with the refusal of a High Court to grant relief in its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction under the circumstances?
ORDER
MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--In these to petitions Nos. 963/1980 and No. 964/1980, leave to appeal has been sought from judgment dated 28-4-1980 of the Lahore High Court; whereby to Constitutional petitions arising out of a land settlement case filed by the petitioners were dismissed.
2. The petitioners as also the to sets of respondents in these petitions, were admittedly at the relevant the sitting allottees of the village where they sought the satisfaction of their remaining P.I.
Units. The petitioners held large number of units which were yet to be satisfied, though a large number of their units had already been satisfied. The to sets of respondents were holders of small number of units. The piece of land which is in dispute is a small one and could satisfy only small claim holders. This land would not have satisfied the units of the petitioners even if it would have been allotted to them. All the parties are transferees via-a-via their claims, from other estates. The petitioner from the same district while the respondents from adjoining district. However, the fact remains that after the transfer of the units of all the parties they had obtained allotments in the village in question and thus had become sitting allottees in this behalf thus their entitlement to get the remaining units satisfied on the disputed land, was at par. On a remand by the High Court the concerned officer made the allotment in favour of the respondents on the consideration that they in his view had better entitlement, although as observed above both the parties were sitting allottees. The High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction however after noticing the respective claims of the parties dismissed the petitions with following observations:----- It is "established that the petitioners as well as the respondents were sitting allottees of the Chak. It is also proved that the respondents were only holders of small claims. The piece of land which is subject of dispute is also of a small size, adjustable against the claims of the respondents. The petitioners, on the other hand, were big landlords and even holding more than a thousand 2.I. Units unsatisfied. The petitioners did not plead lack of jurisdiction in respondent No. 8 to adjudicate in the matter. The jurisdiction vested in him has neither been exercised arbitrarily, nor in contravention of the mandatory provisions of law. Even erroneous decisions are not liable to challenge in writ jurisdiction provided that they were passed by an authority having jurisdiction in the matter. The impugned order is unexceptionable and not liable to interference in the extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court."
Learned counsel has contended that the number of units belonging to the petitioners have not been correctly counted by the High Court. This argument will not make any difference because the number of units given by the learned counsel himself though different from what the High Court noted, cannot be described as small. He then contended that according to paras. 9 and 9-A of the Settlement Scheme the petitioners would be entitled to preference over the respondents. But in ultimate analysis it was discovered that after the allotment in the village in favour of the parties concerned they all become sitting allottees and each was entitled to allotment on the basis of his being a sitting allottee. Learned counsel then contended that even if the respondent's entitlement was to be treated at par with the petitioner's rights, the respondents should have been allotted smaller area from the available land and the remaining should have been allotted to the petitioners. It is in this very content that a learned Judge in the High Court declined to exercise discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioners on the main ground that the order impugned in the High Court was passed with jurisdiction on the one hand and on the other it could not be treated as arbitrary.
3. After hearing the learned counsel at some length we do not consider it a fit case for interference by this Court in the refusal by the High Court to grant relief to the petitioners in exercise of its discretionary constitutional jurisdiction. These to petitions accordingly are dismissed.