Messrs PAKISTAN STATE OILS COMPANY Ltd. vs KHALIL AHMAD ANWAR, RENT
The petitioner, a tenant of commercial premises, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed its constitutional petition challenging the Rent Controller's disposal of preliminary objections. The original landlord, Syeda Qamar Sultana, had initiated eviction proceedings against the petitioner on grounds of default, personal requirement, and reconstruction. Following her death, the respondents were impleaded. The petitioner contested the landlord's title and the validity of the proceedings, arguing that the Rent Controller lacked jurisdiction. The High Court dismissed the constitutional petition, noting that the ejectment application was pending, evidence remained to be recorded, and no jurisdictional defect existed. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, holding that where a landlord-tenant relationship is admitted, the Rent Controller possesses exclusive jurisdiction to determine all relevant facts and legal issues. The Court emphasized that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass statutory proceedings or challenge interlocutory orders, especially when the Rent Controller is legally empowered to adjudicate the controversy on its merits. Leave to appeal was consequently refused.
- Can a tenant invoke constitutional jurisdiction to challenge a Rent Controller's preliminary order while the main ejectment application is still pending?
- Does the Rent Controller have the jurisdiction to determine the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and related legal issues?
- Can constitutional jurisdiction be used to bypass statutory proceedings before a Rent Controller?
ORDER
1. SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.--The petitioner, a tenant of commercial premises seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, dated - 28-1-1984 whereby a constitutional petition filed by it challenging the disposal of preliminary objections by the Rent Controller, was dismissed.
2. The petitioner had obtained the property in dispute on rent from Syeda Qamar Sultana who sought its eviction on grounds of default in the payment of rent; personal requirement of her children and for its re-construction. A number of objections were taken to the competence, Syeda Qamar Sultana died during the pendency of the rent proceeding and the respondents were impleaded as parties and an amended application was filed.
3. The petitioner took up the plea that Syeda Qamar Sultana had ceased to be the owner of the property even before she filed the ejectment application and that no notice of the transfer by her in favour of the respondents was sent to the petitioner. The Rent Controller disposed of the preliminary objections on the finding that the relationship of the landlord and tenant existed between Syeda Qamar Sultana and the petitioner and she was entitled as co-owner to seek the relief from the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller wanted to proceed on merits but the petitioner invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court with a view to avoid the proceedings before the Rent Controller. The learned Judge in the High Court dismissed the constitutional petition on the ground that the ejectment application is pending that evidence is yet to be recorded and that there was no jurisdictional defect.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that his objections before the Rent Controller were in the nature of a plea of absence of jurisdictional fact and on that account, he could invoke the constitutional jurisdiction. The Rent Controller could not under the law grant the relief which the respondents, or before them Syeda Qamar Sultana was seeking.
5. The petitioner itself that the plot in dispute was obtained on rent lease from Syeda Qamar Sultana does not deny it. The dispute, therefore, is clearly between the landlord and the tenant. The scope of the dispute is such that it is covered by a contract between the parties with the statute controlling it. When such a relationship exists and the dispute arises as between landlord and tenants the Controller alone has the jurisdiction. It is for him to determine the facts and the law applicable and then to regulate the relief. The proceedings cannot on the admitted facts be thrown out for want of jurisdiction.
6. It appears to us that the entire thrust of the argument of the petitioner is that for reasons given by the relief could not be claimed by the respondents, cannot be granted by the Controller or should not be granted by the Controller. This contention does not oust the jurisdiction of the Controller. It on the other hand invests him with the jurisdiction to decide ell those questions, which are relevant for deciding the controversy between the parties. Where the manifest intention of the law is that such interlocutory or intermediary orders should not be decided by way of an appeal, taking resort to a constitutional jurisdiction couldn---t divert the law. We find that the High Court has very rightly abstained from interfering with the proceedings. Leave to appeal is, therefore, refused.