Mst. GHULAM FATIMA vs Haji SALEH MUHAMMAD And Other
This matter originated from three constitutional petitions challenging the disposal of property by the Member, Board of Revenue, which the High Court dismissed primarily on the ground that the appellant lacked locus standi. The appellant, the wife of a pre-Independence owner, claimed rights over the property, having managed it and collected rent from tenants for years, a fact recognized by the administration. The core legal question was whether the appellant possessed sufficient interest in the property to maintain a constitutional petition against the transfer of said property to the respondents. The Supreme Court held that the appellant, having a recognized, long-standing, and arguable interest in the property, did indeed possess the necessary locus standi to challenge the administrative decision. Consequently, the High Court's dismissal on the ground of lack of standing was set aside. The principle laid down is that a party who has a live, vital, and arguable interest in property, supported by administrative recognition and prior dealings, cannot be summarily denied the right to seek judicial review on the basis of lacking locus standi.
- Does a person who has been recognized by the administration as having the right to collect rent from a property possess sufficient locus standi to challenge the transfer of that property in a constitutional petition?
- Can a High Court dismiss a constitutional petition solely on the ground of lack of locus standi when the petitioner has demonstrated an arguable, vital interest in the subject matter?
- Is it appropriate for an appellate court to remand a case to the High Court for a decision on merits when the High Court dismissed the petition prematurely on a preliminary point of standing?
1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--These three appeals through leave of this Court are directed against the judgment of the Baluchistan High Court dated 7-9-1982 whereby three constitutional petitions arising out of the disposal of three units of property purported to be evacuee, by the Member Board of Revenue, were dismissed on the main ground that the appellant had no locus standi to file the petitions, leave to appeal was granted to examine the validity of the view taken by the High Court.
2. The facts as alleged, but subject to further verification, briefly stated for the purpose of the order of remand, we have decided to make are: That the property in dispute situate at Loralai belonged to Hindus prior to Independence. The appellant was the wife of one of them. Hasoo Ram who either migrated to India or died in that attempt soon after Independence. She allegedly embraced Islam litigation with a view to keep or acquire the control and management of the property, which was under tenants. She allegedly recovered rent from them and also sought eviction of one or more of them. She approached the Court/ Rehabilitation and Custodian Settlement Authorities and claims to have obtained such orders as have the effect that the property was to be managed by her and/or that it was not evacuee.
3. She also after a protracted litigation with Sohba Ram, brother of her husband, obtained a consent decree from Court that she was entitled to recover rent from the tenants--the respondents herein.
4. It is also stated that the entire property in dispute was once given in charity in the name of Allah to an Islamic religious institution. Respondent while asserting this aspect of the case have accused the appellant of fraud. According to them she did embrace Islam but it was only to keep hold over the property; because, subsequently she again became a Hindu. And thus as they alleged, became also a Murtad. It is also asserted on their behalf that Sohba Ram, her late husband's brother and once co-sharer in the property, had migrated to India soon after partition; but, returned to Pakistan few years, later and died in 1970 as a Pakistani citizen. They alleged that the present case is being fought by an heir of Sohba Ram as appellant's agent.
5. Be that as it may, it seems the respondents remained in physical possession of the property as rent paying tenants in attornment to the appellant, till the repeal of the evacuee/ rehabilitation and Settlement laws. They sought transfer of the property as available for disposal. The learned Member, Board of Revenue by his order dated 1-7-1979 transferred it as evacuee property in compensation pool, to the respondents, despite resistance by the appellant on twin grounds; of her own claim over it; as also, lack of jurisdiction of the Member Board of Revenue. After failure before the Member, Board of Revenue the appellant agitated the matter in constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, which attempt also failed; because, the High Court after noticing some of the salient features of the case and her claim, dismissed her petition for the main reason, as noted earlier, that she lacked locus standi.
6. We have heard the learned counsel and have also perused the relevant material on record. It cannot be said that in view of the admitted and other established facts the appellant had no live vital interest in the property. It is an admitted position by the Member, Board of Revenue as noted in the order impugned before the High Court that "The Administration allowed the ex-wife of Hasu Ram to collect the rent of property for her maintenance. She is still collecting the rent of the property." There are several circumstances to show that the appellant dealt with the property as if she has a right to do so. The Member Board of Revenue, it seems, accepted the fact that the "administration" had recognized her right to do so. He also noted respondents plea that permission granted to her was illegal. All the circumstances showed that she had claimed a vested interest in the property with support of arguable material. Therefore she could not be held to be lacking locus standi. The High Court judgment therefore, is liable to be set-aside on this short ground. While accepting the appeal we order accordingly.
7. The next question arose as to how the controversy be resolved. The High Court while noticing and commenting upon the merits remained of the view that the appellant lacked locus standi.
8. Therefore, no definite final judgment has been rendered on merits of the case. It is appropriate therefore, to remand the entire case so as to enable the High Court to give its considered judgment on all the issues involved. Some of them are: to whom the property longed before 14-8-1947; who succeeded as heir thereafter; whether the appellant was also an heir under the Hindu Law; what is the reality about her embracing Islam and its effect on her rights if any; whether the appellant managed the property with or without the permission of Custodian/ Rehabilitation and Settlement Authorities and/or her own brother-in-law Sohba Ram and what is its effect on the character of the property or her rights therein; whether it became evacuee property and when and whether it was treated or declared again as non-evacuee property; what is the effect of payment of rent by the tenants to the appellant; whether the evacuee and rehabilitation/settlement laws were applicable to this property and what was the effect of repeal thereof; whether the learned Member, Board of Revenue had jurisdiction to pass the order dated 1-7-1979, transferring the property to respondents, despite appellant's objection as also her desire to retain the same whether appellants case before the Member, Board of Revenue, could be treated as expression of option to retain the property if it is held that she was in possession through the rent paying tenant; whether property could be transferred to the respondents in preference to the appellant under the existing law and other related questions.
9. In the light of all that is discussed above on acceptance of this appeal the impugned judgment is set aside and the case is remanded to the High Court for fresh decision. The parties including the department shall submit written statements of facts and law together with all available copies of records within to months of receipt of notices from the High Court. There shall be no order as to costs,