MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs NAZAR MUHAMMAD, And Other
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which upheld a decree in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether the suit for pre-emption was barred by limitation, specifically regarding the date of the completion of the sale and the subsequent taking of possession. The petitioner argued that the suit was filed beyond the statutory period of one year, contending that possession had transferred on an earlier date. The Supreme Court examined the findings of the lower courts, which had consistently held that the change of possession was not reflected in the Khasra Girdawari and that the plaintiff-respondent had only learned of the sale when the vendee demanded a share of the produce. The Court held that since the attestation of the mutation occurred after the suit was filed and the claim of possession transfer was not effectively proven, the suit was not time-barred. The principle laid down is that the limitation period for a pre-emption suit commences from the date of taking possession or the attestation of mutation, and factual findings regarding the date of possession by lower courts will not be disturbed absent effective rebuttal.
- Does the limitation period for a pre-emption suit under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 commence from the date of possession or the attestation of mutation?
- Can a suit for pre-emption be considered timely if the plaintiff institutes the action within one year of learning about the sale, despite the vendee's claims regarding an earlier date of possession?
- Are findings of fact regarding the date of possession, when consistently held by trial and appellate courts, subject to interference by the Supreme Court?
- Section 30, Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913
ORDER
1. SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.--The petitioner who is a defendant vendee in a pre-emption suit seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, dated 30-3-1980 whereby the claim of the plaintiff---respondent was decreed and his objection with regard to the suit being barred by the was rejected by the trial Court which was upheld in the first appeal by, the Additional District Judge and by the High Court in the second appeal.
2. A mutation of sale was entered in the register of mutations on 20-1-1971. The Revenue Officer recorded the statement of some of the vendors on 27-12-1972 and the mutation itself was sanctioned on 31-12-1975. A suit for pre-emption was, however, instituted on 2-1-1974. The objection of the petitioner was that the suit was neither in fact nor shown to be within the. His case based on the admission of the parties to the sale was that the change of possession of the land had taken place on 29-1-1971 or in any case by 27-12-1972. The trial Court found that this change of possession was contained only in the admission of the vendee and the vendor and not reflected in the Khasra Girdawari. The same view was taken by the first appellate Court and in the High Court. The claim was adjudged to be in the and the suit was decreed.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to the plaint wherein the sale is shown to have been completed on 27-12-1972 and the suit was not shown to be within one year of it and a specific objection had been taken that neither the plaint disclosed that the suit was within the nor was in fact it was within the. The Courts in determining the question of fact had omitted to keep this defect of the pleadings in view and should have given effect to the objection and held the suit to be not competent and within the.
4. A suit pre-empting the sale could be instituted under section 30 of the Pre-emption Act within a year of the taking over possession of the property purchased by a vendee or of the attestation of the mutation. In this case the attestation of the mutation itself took place subsequent to the institution of the suit while the change of possession had taken place as admitted by the vendee and some of the vendor on 21-9-1971. In either case, therefore, a suit was incompetent barred by the if change of possession was taken to be the date of cause of action and premature if the attestation of the mutation was taken to be the date.
5. The defect pointed out in the plaint has been explained by the attorney of the plaintiff-respondent when he appeared as a witness. The plaintiff-respondent was tenant of a portion of the land which was the subject-matter of the suit and when the vendee asked of a share in the produce of the land it was then that he learnt about the sale itself and it was at that the that he instituted the suit and it was within one year of it. All the three Courts have held that possession under the sale had not changed and this statement of the plaintiff---respondent has not received an effective rebuttal. In the circumstances, we find that there is no further legal question to be examined in this Court. Leave to appeal is, therefore, refused.
6. M.I.