MUHAMMAD RASHID vs MUHAMMAD IRFAN And Another
This matter arises from a petition filed by the complainant challenging an order of the High Court suspending the death sentence of the respondent and releasing him on bail under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The core legal question concerns the propriety of suspending a sentence and granting bail to a convict held vicariously liable for murder under section 302 read with section 34 and section 114 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, where firearm injuries were attributed to a co-convict. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that no case was made out for interference with the discretionary order passed by the High Court and accordingly dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the discretionary exercise of power by the High Court in granting bail and suspending a sentence under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 unless strong grounds are shown.
- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with the High Court's discretionary order suspending a sentence and granting bail under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Is a convict held vicariously liable under section 302 read with section 34 and section 114 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 entitled to suspension of sentence and bail when firearm injuries are attributed to a co-accused?
- Section 426, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
- Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 114, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
ORDER
M.S.H QURAISHI, J.---The petitioner who is complaint in the case, is aggrieved by the impugned order of the High Court, whereby, on an application made under section 426, Cr.P.C., the sentence of death passed by the trial Court under section 302 read with section 34, P.P.C., against Muhammad Irfan, one of the to convicts in the case, was suspended and he was admitted to bail.
2. The firearm injuries resulting in the death of the deceased had been attributed to the co-convict and not to Muhammad Irfan. The reason for holding him vicariously liable for the murder as given by the trial Court was: "It is in evidence of Muhammad Rashid and Muhammad Aslam P.Ws that he came to the spot in Suzuki alongwith his co-accused. This shows that he had an intention common with his co- accused. On getting down from it there he immediately came to the deceased and gave him slaps and also raised Lalkara addressing him that they would teach him a lesson for having had given beating to his co-accused."
From this, the learned trial Court concluded: "By so doing he instigated his co-accused who fired at the deceased. He is, therefore, equally liable for the at done by him in view of section 114, P.P.C."
It is in this background that the impugned order was passed.
3. After hearing counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that no case is made out for interference with the impugned order passed inn the exercise of discretionary power. The petition is dismissed.
Cited by 1 case
- SUGHRAN Versus THE STATE 1992 MLD 2373