JANNA NA DE MALUCHO TEXTILE MILLS LTD., KOHAT vs WAQAR AHMAD
This appeal arises from a dispute between a textile mill and its commission agent, involving two concurrent suits: one filed by the appellant at Kohat for recovery of money, and another by the respondent at Lyallpur for rendition of accounts. The respondent obtained a temporary injunction from the Lyallpur Court restraining the appellant from proceeding with the Kohat suit, an order upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether a court can restrain a party from prosecuting a suit in another court of coordinate jurisdiction when the subject matters are not identical. The Supreme Court held that the injunction was improperly granted. The Court reasoned that since the suits involved different reliefs and did not share an identity of subject matter sufficient to trigger Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, both suits should proceed independently on their own merits. The Court emphasized that there was no risk of contradictory decrees, and therefore, the appellant should not have been restrained from pursuing its prior-filed suit at Kohat.
- Can a court grant a temporary injunction to restrain a party from proceeding with a suit in another court of coordinate jurisdiction when the subject matters are not identical?
- Does the absence of identity of subject-matter between two suits preclude the application of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Should two suits involving different reliefs be allowed to proceed simultaneously on their own merits?
- Section 10, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
- Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
- Order XXXIX Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
- Order XL Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
- Section 56(b), Specific Relief Act 1877
1. MUHAMMAD YAQUB ALI, J.-The appellant has filed a suit in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Kohat, for recovery of Rs. 15,000 from the respondent who under a written agreement had acted as their Commission Agent for the sale of textile goods at Lyallpur. On a subsequent date the respondent filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Lyallpur, for rendition of accounts against the appellant and recovery of such sums as may be found due to him.
2. The appellant moved the Lyallpur Court under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to stay the proceedings is the suit filed by the respondent on the ground that the suit filed by him at Kohat was prior in date. The prayer was refused as, in the opinion of Civil Judge, there was no complete identity of the subject-matters of the two suits to attract the provisions of section 10, C. P. C.
3. On his part the respondent applied for grant of a temporary injunction to restrain the appellant from proceeding with the Kohat suit on the ground that he was mortally afraid of going there and that suit filed by him at Lyallpur was comprehensive enough to include the subject-matter of the Kohat suit.
4. The application was resisted by the appellant, but the Civil Judge granted the stay order on 12-1- 1970. The order was vacated on appeal by the Additional District Judge, but on a further Revision Petition filed by the respondent a learned Judge of the High Court restored the order of the Civil Judge restraining the appellant from proceeding with the suit filed by it at Kohat.
5. The learned Judge found that the temporary injunction was issued under section 151, C. P. C. And not under Order XXXIX, rule 2, C. P. C. No appeal, therefore, lay from the order of the Civil Judge under Order XL, rule 1, to the District Judge. On merits he found that the suit filed by the respondent was com--prehensive enough to include the relief claimed by the appellant in the suit filed by it at Kohat.
6. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that section 56(b) of the Specific Relief Act was a bar to the grant of the injunction asked for by the appellant as in effect it amounted to staying proceedings in a Court not subordinate to the Civil Judge, Lyallpur, but on an exhaustive review of decided cases the learned Judge ruled out the contention as proceedings in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Kohat, were not being stayed, but only the appellant who had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Lyallpur Court was personally restrained from proceeding with the suit.
7. Leave to appeal was granted to consider the correctness of the view formed by the High Court that section 56(b) of the Specific Relief Act was not applicable to the temporary injunction issued by the Civil Judge, Lyallpur, restraining the appellant from proceeding with the suit filed by it at Kohat.
8. On examining the judgment of the High Court we find a basic contradiction in the reasoning on which the judgment delivered by it proceeds The suit filed by the appellant being prior in date it was incumbent on the Civil Judge, Lyallpur, to stay the proceedings in the suit filed by the respondent if there was identity of subject-matters in the two suits. He, however, rightly held that section 10 was not attracted and dismissed the application filed by the appellant in this behalf. But in that case the respondent too could not ask for an injunction to restrain the appellant from proceeding with the suit filed by it at Kohat. The reliefs claimed in the two suits were different and there was no risk of contradictory decrees being passed by two different Courts on the same issues.
9. Assuming that the appellant were to succeed in obtaining a decree for recovery of Rs. 15,000 from the respondent, the later nevertheless can obtain a decree for rendition of accounts and payment of such sums as are found due to him if the facts of the case so warrant. Both the suits should, therefore, have been permitted to proceed on their own merits. This aspect of the case was completely ignored by the learned Judge in the High Court.
10. It is unnecessary to give any considered opinion on the view expressed in the decided cases examined in the High Court that section 56(b) of the Specific Relief Act is not a bar to restrain a party from prosecuting a suit in another Court not subordinate to the Court issuing the injunction.
11. Most of the cases are distinguishable on facts, but it may be pointed out that the correct rule is laid down by the Lahore High Court in Chaudhri Mohammad Afzal v. Mst. Sardar Begum (PLD 1949 Lah.
12. 16). According to the decision in this case if there was a common issue arising in both the suits, then the trial of that issue in the Lyallpur suit should have been stayed and not vice versa.
13. The conclusion we have reached is that the two suits should be allowed to proceed on their own merits and that it was incorrect to restrain the appellant from proceeding with its suit filed at Kohat.
14. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and order passed by the Civil Judge, Lyallpur, restraining the appellant from proceeding with the suit filed by it at Kohat for recovery of Rs. 15,000 from the respondent is set aside.
15. There will be no order as to costs.
Cited by 12 cases
- Pakistan National Shipping Corporation & others vs M/s. Coniston Limited 2020 CLC 454, 2019 SHC 56
- Pakistan National Shipping Corporation & others vs M/s. Coniston Limited 2020 CLC 454, 2019 SHC 56
- Mrs. NASEEM E SEHAR And 2 Others vs Mrs. JABEEN IDREES And ANOTHER 2006 CLC 1664
- PFIZER LIMITED and anothers vs WILSON'S PHARMACEUTICALS 2002 CLD 1653
- PFIZER LIMITED, UNITED KINGDOM and another vs WILSON'S 2002 C.L.R. 1164
- ABDUL HAMEED vs MUHAMMAD HANIF and 12 others 2003 MLD 201
- ATTOCK OIL COMPANY vs GHAITH RASHAD PHARAON and others 1996 CLC 1657
- Messrs SHAFIO HANIF (PVT.) LTD., KARACHI vs BANK OF CREDIT AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL, (OVERSEAS) LIMITED, KARACHI 1993 PLD Karachi 107
- NAVEED ASIF vs THE STATE 1987 MLD 1714
- S. M. AKIL FIKREE vs MUHAMMAD QAMARUZ ZAMAN 1982 PLD Karachi 745
- MESSER MUHAMMAD SHARIF CHIRAGH DIN AND 2 OTHERS vs PAKISTAN 1981 CLC 343
- THE HUB POWER CO. vs WAPDA 1999 CLC 1320