Sh. DAW00D AHMAD vs DISTRICT JUDGE, LAHORE And Other
This petition for leave to appeal arises from the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the Lahore High Court, which upheld the petitioner-tenant's ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller on the basis of a special oath offered by the tenant himself. The core legal question was whether a tenant, having invited an ejectment decision upon a special oath, can subsequently challenge the resulting order or argue that the case must still be decided through independent judicial determination. The Supreme Court held that a party who initiates and invites a decision based on a special oath is barred from questioning his own offer and its compliance, and such conduct properly disentitles him to discretionary relief. The Court affirmed that participating in and inviting such a procedure estops a party from challenging the resulting judicial order, and the High Court correctly refused to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction.
- Can a tenant challenge an ejectment order passed on the basis of a special oath offered by the tenant himself?
- Whether an ejectment proceeding resolved through a special oath requires further independent judicial determination of the merits?
- Does a party who invites a decision on a special oath become barred from questioning its compliance?
ORDER
1. SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.--The petitioner, a tenant whose ejectment in question was decided on the oath offered by him seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 12- 8-1984 whereby a constitutional petition filed by him, was dismissed after an elaborate discussion on the ground that it did not call for interference in discretionary jurisdiction.
2. The petitioner's ejectment was sought by the landlord on various grounds not necessary to reproduce or examine. During the course of the proceedings, the petitioner offered that if Dr. Muhammad Zulfiqar took a particular oath on Quran, an order of ejectment may be passed against him. This offer was accepted. The oath was taken and the ejectment order was passed by the Rent Controller. On appeal the District Judge dismissed it limine as it was in accord with what the petitioner wanted. He thereupon invoked the constitutional jurisdiction and the High Court did not consider it a fit case for grant of relief in discretionary jurisdiction.
3. Mr. A . K . Dogar, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended before us, and it appears by way of an afterthought, that the oath taken was not in complete accord with the offer made for there was an omission in the statement of Dr. Zulfiqar about the receipt of advance by him or by his brother.
4. Upon this we adjourned the proceedings, called for the presence of the parties and recorded on the Holy Quran the statement of Dr. Zulfiqar on that particular aspect. The position has not improved for the petitioner.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner was heard thereafter and he contended that the offer made by the petitioner stood exhausted and the imperfection could not be ordered by supplementing the oath at this stage. He further contended that in spite of the oath the case had to be decided in accordance with the law and the result could not automatically follow by taking of the oath. There had to be intervention and determination of the matter judicially or quasi-judicially which was not done in the case. Another argument taken up by him was that the first appeal under the Rent Restriction Ordinance could not be dismissed in limine. , We want to make it clear that we resorted to examination of Dr. Zulfiqar not with a view to removing an imperfection but in order to satisfy ourselves whether it was a fit case where the discretionary relief of granting leave to appeal should be allowed otherwise we consider the objection raised to be an afterthought.
6. We find that in proceedings before the Rent Controller a resort to such an inquiry as was conducted and the proceedings taken at the initiation of the petitioner himself barred him from further questioning his own offer and its compliance which took place duly and properly in the presence of his counsel. This indeed deprives him of any relief in discretionary jurisdiction and the High Court had rightly denied it to him. We do not consider that such an exercise of discretion requires interference by this Court. There is no merit and the petition is dismissed.