ANWAR MASIH vs GHULAM MASIH And Other
This petition for leave to appeal was filed against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had modified the convictions of the respondents in a murder case. Specifically, the High Court had converted the convictions of two respondents from Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 to Section 304 Part-I, and altered the convictions of two other respondents from Section 302 to Section 307 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, resulting in reduced sentences. The petitioner sought to challenge these acquittals under Section 302 and requested an enhancement of the sentences. The Supreme Court observed that the petition was filed with a delay of 207 days. Upon reviewing the application for condonation of delay, the Court found the provided grounds unconvincing. The Court held that in cases involving appeals against acquittal, the threshold for condoning delay is significantly higher, requiring very strong grounds which were absent in this instance. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition on the sole ground that it was time-barred, without addressing the merits of the conviction modifications.
- Is a delay of 207 days in filing a petition for leave to appeal against an acquittal generally condonable without strong grounds?
- Does the standard for condoning delay differ in cases involving appeals against acquittal compared to other matters?
- Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 304 Part-I, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 307, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--Leave to appeal has been sought from judgment, dated 16-3-1985 of the Lahore High Court; whereby in a murder case the conviction under' section 302 of James Masih and Ghulam Masih respondents was converted into 304 Part-I, P. P. C. And the sentence was accordingly reduced. Similarly, the conviction and sentence of Wilson and Pervez respondents were altered from 302 P.P.C. To 307 P.P.C.
2. This petition has been filed to challenge the acquittal under section 302, P. P. C. With a further prayer for enhancement of sentence.
3. The petition is barred by 207 days. We have perused the grounds mentioned in the application for condonation of delay which have not impressed us-. This being a case against acquittal, there must be very strong grounds for condonation of delay which do not exist. We accordingly dismiss the petition as time-barred.