BASHIR AHMAD And Others vs MUHAMMAD ASLAM And Another
This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed writ petitions filed by the petitioners regarding pre-emption suits. The core legal question was whether the District Judge, exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, acted arbitrarily or beyond his discretion by setting aside the trial court's order, which had refused to extend the time for the deposit of Zar-e-Panjum under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, finding that the District Judge's exercise of discretion was neither fanciful nor arbitrary. The Court held that the trial court had acted arbitrarily by failing to properly apply its mind to the specific facts and circumstances of the case when refusing the extension of time. The key principle laid down is that while revisional jurisdiction is discretionary, an appellate or revisional court is justified in correcting a trial court's order if that order was passed in a perfunctory manner without judicial application of mind to the individual circumstances of the case.
- Can a revisional court set aside a trial court's discretionary order regarding the extension of time for depositing pre-emption money?
- Does a trial court act arbitrarily if it refuses an extension of time for depositing Zar-e-Panjum without applying its mind to the specific facts of the case?
- Is the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by a District Judge subject to interference if the discretion was exercised reasonably?
- Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
- Section 22(4), Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913
ORDER
MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--These two petitions for leave to appeal are directed against judgment, dated 25-4-1981 of the Lahore High Court; whereby two writ petitions filed by the petitioners arising out of two suits for pre-emption filed by the respondents, were dismissed.
2. In the suits for pre-emption, the plaintiffs having been refused (by the trial Court) extension of time for deposit of the Zar-e-Panjum, were permitted by the District Court in its revisional jurisdiction to make the deposit. Petitioners were unsuccessful in the High Court.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the District Judge was exercising revisional jurisdiction under section 115, C. P. C. Therefore, he could not have in his discretionary jurisdiction, set aside an order passed by the trial Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under section 22(4) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. He also contended that the exercise of discretion by the District Judge was fanciful and arbitrary, therefore, relying on Niaz Ali v. Ibrahim. PLD 1976 Lah. 1057, as also Hadayat Ullah v. Murad Ali Khan PLD 1972 SC 69, he contended, the order of the District Court impugned before the High Court, was liable to be set aside.
4. Both the cases relied upon by the learned counsel were cited before the High Court. It also took note of another case decided by this Court namely Ejaz Nabi v. Ghulam Hussain 1970 SCMR 169.
After taking note of the relevant case-law on the point a learned Single Judge in the High Court repelled the contentions raised from the petitioner side.
5. The learned District Judge after taking due note of the facts and circumstances of the case came to the following conclusion: "In the given circumstances, therefore, the learned Senior Civil Judge did not apply his mind to the facts and the circumstance of the case and he acted arbitrarily and against the principle of justice.
I have already observed in one of my previous judgments in an appeal that the learned Senior Civil Judge had not passed proper order and had not appreciated the correct position of the case. The same is the position in the present case also. He should have allowed the application of the petitioner for extension of time for depositing one-fifth of pre-emption money but he acted arbitrarily by writing a perfunractory judgment. He is advised to consider the facts and circumstances of every individual case with a patient mind as it is the duty of the judicial officer to apply his mind judicially keeping in view the circumstances and facts of each individual case "
The exercise of the discretion by the learned District Judge was, unexceptionable. It was neither fanciful nor arbitrary, on the one hand this could rightly be said about the order of the trial Court.
These petitions merit dismissal. Leave to appeal is accordingly refused.