GHULAM MUHAMMAD vs THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN And Other
This matter arose from two petitions for leave to appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging orders of a learned Single Judge of the High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' writ petitions as well as their subsequent review petitions. The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the significant delay in filing the petitions for leave to appeal against the original judgments, as well as the delay in filing the review petitions before the High Court, could be condoned. The petitioners' counsel contended that the review applications were filed late due to an erroneous belief that the limitation period was 90 days and argued that the petitions for leave to appeal were within time regarding the dismissal of the review petitions. The Supreme Court held that the High Court was fully justified in refusing to condone the delay in the review petitions as no plausible explanation was offered. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no merit or valid grounds for condonation of the 449-day delay and dismissed both petitions for leave to appeal.
- Whether an erroneous impression of counsel regarding the limitation period constitutes a valid ground for condonation of delay?
- Whether a petition for leave to appeal against an order dismissing a time-barred review petition can revive limitation for challenging the main judgment?
ORDER
ASLAM RIAZ HUSSAIN, J.--This order will dispose of C.P. No.185 of 1978 and C . P. No. 186 of 1978.
2. The facts giving rise to these petitions are that the petitioners filed two Writ Petitions (i.e. No.377/72 and 673/66), which, were dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 12-11- 1976. They then filed two Review Petitions (Nos.9 and 8 of 1977, respectively), which were barred by 21 days. Since no plausible explanation for condonation of delay in filing the Review Petitions was put forward, the same were dismissed on 12-11-1976.
The petitioners have now filed the present Petitions for Leave to Appeal against the orders dismissing the Writ Petitions as well as those dismissing their Review Petitions.
3. The Petitions are barred by as many as 449 days, as against the orders dismissing the writ petitions. The learned counsel has not been able to furnish any good ground for condonation of the delay. He has only submitted that the Petitions for Leave to Appeal are within time as far as the orders dismissing the Review Petitions are concerned. But as already mentioned, the Review Applications were time-barred and were dismissed as such. The learned counsel explained that the application for review were filed after the expiry of limitation, because the counsel for the petitioners was under the erroneous impression that the period for filing an application for review was 90 days. As observed earlier, the learned Judge in Chamber, was not impressed by the explanation for the delay in filing the Review applications, and refused to condone the delay and distressed the application as time-barred. We find -no defect in this order and feel that the learned Judge in Chamber was justified in dismissing the Review applications as time-barred.
4. In this view of the matter, the two Petitions are dismissed having no merit.