HABIBULLAH KHAN vs THE ELECTION TRIBUNAL And Other
This matter arises from a petition filed against the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court, which had upheld an Election Tribunal's order annuling the petitioner's election success. The petitioner, an employee of a government-owned statutory corporation, contested and won an election for a worker's special interest seat in the Municipal Committee, Dera Ghazi Khan. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was disqualified from contesting the election under the relevant local government laws. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was indeed disqualified under section 21(f) and section 21(e) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, as he fell within the excluded category of workers employed by a statutory corporation controlled by the government, regardless of the broader definition of worker under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, establishing the principle that statutory disqualifications for government and corporate employees under local government laws supersede general definitions of workers.
- Whether an employee of a government-controlled statutory corporation is disqualified from contesting local government elections for a worker's seat?
- Does the definition of worker under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 override specific disqualifications provided in the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979?
- Is an employee transferred outside the constituency ineligible to contest a special interest worker seat for that constituency?
- Section 21(f), Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979
- Section 10(4), President's (Post Proclamation) Order V of 1977
- Section 3, clause (49), Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979
- Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969
- Section 21(e), Punjab Local Government Ordinance 1979
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD HALEEM, C.J.--The petitioner who is admittedly an employee of the Government Transport Service, Punjab, a statutory Corporation, owned, financed and controlled by the Government of the Punjab, contested election for the special interest seat of worker of the Municipal Committee, Dera Ghazi Khan, and was duly elected.
2. Ashiq Muhammad one of the candidates, who did not contest the election, filed a petition before the Election Tribunal on 2nd of November, 1983, to annul the success of the petitioner alleging therein that he was ineligible to contest the elections as he had ceased to be a worker at Dera Ghazi Khan on account of his transfer to Rawalpindi. The Election Tribunal by its order, dated 11-3- 1983 accepted the plea and held that he was disabled to contest the elections for that seat.
3. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court, which too was dismissed on the ground that he was disqualified by reason of section 21(f) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, as he was admittedly a worker of a statutory Corporation controlled by the Government. This provision in effect incorporates section 10(4) of the President's (Post Proclamation) Order V of 1977 and pointedly refers to this disability.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner invited our attention to section 3, clause (49) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance where "worker" has been defined to mean a "worker" as defined in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, to contend that by that definition he would not be hit by the disqualifications. It is true that the definition of the word "worker" in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, is broadly stated to include all types of employment but the disqualification in section 21(f) excludes the category of those workers who are hit by it to seek election. Such a disqualification applies to every one, and no categorisation can be spelt out from section 21(f) by reason of the use of the word "person" therein. There is another disqualification which has not been noticed by the High Court and, that is, section 21(e) of the Ordinance which equally disables the petitioner to seek; election.
5. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition, which is dismissed.