MAQBOOL AHMAD vs THE MEMBER (COLONIES), BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition relating to a Land Grant Scheme under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912. The petitioner held a temporary lease of land which was allegedly subject to extension and future grant of proprietary rights through subsequent notifications. Meanwhile, the disputed land was allotted to the respondent-respondents as alternate land under the Grow More Food Scheme. The petitioner challenged this allotment unsuccessfully before the revenue authorities and subsequently the High Court. The core question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to interference in discretionary constitutional jurisdiction despite having instituted parallel civil litigation which was abandoned. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not approach the courts with clean hands due to the abandonment of multiple prior civil suits concerning the same subject matter. The Court laid down the principle that the jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal is highly discretionary and will be withheld where a party engages in parallel, abandoned litigation and fails to act with utmost good faith.
- Whether leave to appeal should be granted against the dismissal of a constitutional petition when the petitioner has pursued and abandoned parallel civil suits regarding the same subject-matter?
- Does a temporary lessee acquire a vested right to extension of lease and proprietary rights based on subsequent notifications to preclude alternate allotment under the Grow More Food Scheme?
- Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act 1912
ORDER
MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--Leave to appeal has been sought from judgment dated 9-6-1981 of the Lahore High Court; whereby a Constitutional petition arising out of Land Grant Scheme under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act (No. V of 1912) filed by the petitioner, was dismissed.
2. The facts given by the learned counsel are that the petitioner held temporary lease of land for 5 years from 1974 to 1979. In March, 1978, necessary orders and notifications were issued that the temporary leases would be extended by another 5 years. And subsequently by another notification promise was held out to the temporary lessees like the petitioner that they might be granted proprietary rights. In the meanwhile, however the land in dispute allotted under the then temporary lease of the petitioner was allotted to the contestant-respondents on 7-12-1978 as an alternate land under Grow More Food Scheme framed under the same law which is relied upon by the petitioner. The respondents were, however, directed to take the possession on the expiry of the initial lease period in favour of the petitioner. This was challenged from the petitioner side before the Commissioner, but the appeal was dismissed and the revision before the Member, Board of Revenue, met the same fate.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that by subsequent notifications after the initial temporary lease granted to the petitioner, he became entitled firstly to the extension of lease beyond 1979 for 5 years and then to the grant of proprietary rights under certain conditions.
Therefore, the land in dispute was within the vested rights of the petitioner, it could not have been granted to the respondent side.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents in reply has contended that the petitioner did not take the High Court nor this Court in confidence with regard to another line of litigation lodged by him.
According to him the petitioner instituted a suit with regard to the same subject-matter. He had also made an application for stay order which was refused. His appeal against this refusal was also dismissed. The petitioner then abandoned the said suit. It was during this period that the respondent-side was given the land in dispute. Not satisfied with the first attempt in the civil Court the petitioner filed a second suit. This time the actual transfer of the land to the respondents was challenged. But after sometime the counsel made the statement giving up the pursuit of the suit by asserting that the petitioner had not given him any instructions. It was thereafter that the petitioner started pursuing the third channel of litigation by moving the Colony Authorities and then ultimately filing the writ petition.
The aforesaid fact shows that the petitioner did not approach the Courts with clean hands. The jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal is highly discretionary. We feel that in the afore stated circumstances it is not a fit case for grant of leave to appeal. The petition accordingly is dismissed.