MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs KHUSHI MUHAMMAD And Other
This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order of the Lahore High Court passed in a writ petition. The petitioner contended that the High Court's order, which included the phrase "after allowing the landlord to amend his pleadings," effectively precluded the trial court from exercising its judicial discretion to examine the merits of the proposed amendment. The petitioner argued that the consent given by the parties was limited to merely seeking an amendment, not a mandatory direction to allow it. The Supreme Court examined the impugned order and held that the language used by the High Court did not constitute a fait accompli. The Court clarified that the phrase in question was subject to the terms of the consent recorded earlier in the order, meaning the trial court retained the discretion to evaluate the amendment application on its merits. Consequently, the Supreme Court found no merit in the petition, holding that the High Court's order did not improperly fetter the trial court's discretion, and dismissed the petition accordingly.
- Does a court order allowing a party to seek an amendment to pleadings automatically mandate that the amendment must be granted?
- Can a trial court exercise its discretion to examine the merits of an amendment application despite a prior order allowing the party to seek such an amendment?
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD HALEEM, C.J.-- In this petition, the petitioner assails the operative part of the order, dated 1-10-1984 of the Lahore High Court passed in Writ Petition No. 132 of 1984, whereby while doing so the words "after allowing the landlord to amend his pleadings" were used, which, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, left no discretion with the trial Court to examine the question of amendment on merits although the consent was only given for seeking amendment in the pleadings.
2. These words, in our view, do not have the effect of a fat accompli but are subject to the terms of the consent recorded earlier in the order.
3. This will suffice to dispose of this petition, which is dismissed.