Pakistan Case Law
1986 SCMR 79

SARWAR ZIA vs BAGH DIN

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Citation1986 SCMR 79
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.Civil Petition No. 311 of 1984 Civil Revision No. 548 of 1982
Date1985-05-05
Judge(s)Aslam Riaz Hussain, Nasim Hasan Shah and Shafiur Rahman
Authored byShafiur Rahman
ResultLeave refused
AI Summary — generated from this judgment; read the full text below and verify before relying on it.

This petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for possession of a portion of property comprising a room and verandah, which was decreed against the petitioner (defendant) by the trial Court and affirmed by the appellate Court and High Court in revision. The core legal questions pertained to whether an admission made by the petitioner's predecessor-in-interest in prior litigation bound the petitioner as a privy, and whether the closure of the petitioner's evidence under Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was lawful. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding ownership were based on a clear admission made by the predecessor-in-interest in a previous written statement and compromise, which fully bound the petitioner as successor-in-interest. The Court further affirmed that the closure of evidence was justified given the repeated failures of the petitioner to process witness fees or produce evidence despite multiple adjournments. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.

Questions settled in this judgment
  • Whether an admission regarding property ownership made by a predecessor-in-interest in earlier litigation is binding on their successor-in-interest?
  • Whether a court is justified in closing a party's evidence under Order XVII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 when the party repeatedly fails to pay process fees or produce witnesses despite multiple adjournments?
Laws & provisions referred
  • Order XVII Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
  • Order XVIII Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
leave to appealclosure of evidenceadmission by predecessorprivy in estateOrder XVII Rule 3concurrent findingssuit for possession

ORDER

1. SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.--The petitioner who has been unsuccessful as defendant in all the three Courts below in resisting the claim of the plaintiff-respondent to the possession of a portion of the property, seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, dated 28-1-1984 whereby her revision petition was dismissed.

2. The plaintiff /respondent was transferred property SE-IX-39-S-5 Dharampura, Lahore, and holds P.T.D. For the same. Sultan Beg the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner purchased in auction the adjacent property SE-IX-39-S-6. The plaintiff claimed a room and Verandah in possession of the petitioner as part of the -property transferred to him. The suit was contested. The petitioner's evidence was closed under Order XVII, rule 3, C.P.C. Her application under Order XVIII, rule 2 was also dismissed. The suit was decreed against her. Her appeal and revision both failed.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the finding of fact that the disputed portion was a part of the property transferred to plaintiff /respondent was patently incorrect and untenable. He also challenged the closure of her evidence.

4. The finding of fact was recorded by the trial Court and maintained in appeal and revision on an admission of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner in litigation with the respondent. The trial Court expressed it in the following words:- "The defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had purchased the property transferred to Sultan Beg from himself.

5. Obviously the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were to be the owners only of the property that had been transferred to Sultan Beg. And as they happened to become successors-in-interest of Sultan Beg, the admission made by Sultan Beg regarding the plaintiff's claim would be completely binding on the defendants Nos. 1 and 2. Some time back the present plaintiff had brought a declaratory suit against the said Sultan Beg and in his written statement filed in that case, Sultan Beg had admitted the present plaintiff to be the exclusive owner of two rooms and one Verandah comprising House No. SE-IX-39-S-5. The foregoing Sultan Beg further admitted therein that the said rooms and Verandah did not at all form a part of House No. SE-IX-39-S-6. That being the case, the present defendants Nos. 1 and 2 who are the privy of Sultan Beg, cannot avoid that admission successfully.

6. And thus they must accept the preposition that the disputed property is exclusively owned by the present plaintiff. The issue No. 4 is, therefore, answered in the affirmative."

7. The compromise between the parties, dated 11-2-1965 (Annexure 'B/1'), the admission of Sultan Beg bear out this finding of fact.

8. As regards the closure of evidence the first appellate Court found as follows:- "The adjournment made on 5-6-1974 by the learned trial Court clearly shows that the learned trial Court had made it responsibility of the appellants to secure the service of the witnesses for 26-6- 1974 but for this date the appellants neither deposited the process fee nor took any other effort to secure the service of their witnesses and so the learned trial Court was left with no except to proceed under Order XVII, rule 3, C.P.C. On 26-6-1974. The record further shows that on this date too the learned trial Court gave yet another adjournment for getting the statement of the special attorney of the appellant recorded but the appellants again succeeded in getting at least four adjournments for the statement of the special attorney of the appellants but on 9-9-1974 the learned trial Court was obliged to close his statement also under Order XVII, rule 3, C.P.C. From the proceedings taken up by the learned trial Court on the record it cannot be said that the order of the learned trial Court under Order XVII, rule 3, C.P.C. Was harsh or unwarranted in law."

9. The High Court endorsed these remarks.

10. Learned counsel has not been able to show from any record filed that these remarks are against fact or undeserved.

11. We find that it is not a fit case for grant of leave to appeal which is hereby refused.

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