SIBTE MUHAMMAD And Another vs MERAJ DIN And Another
This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside a revisional order of the Settlement Commissioner and restored the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner regarding the demarcation and transfer of urban evacuee property comprising Khasra Nos. 2915 and 2916 in Raj Garh, Lahore. The core legal question was whether the Settlement Commissioner's finding of fact regarding the physical extent of the transferred property and its demarcation could be validly disturbed by the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly concluded that the Settlement Commissioner's order was based on irrelevant considerations and no order in the eye of the law, thereby justifying interference in constitutional jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision as just and fair, laying down that an order of a settlement authority based on irrelevant factors and flawed inferences regarding property demarcation is amenable to correction under constitutional jurisdiction, and refused leave to appeal.
- Can the High Court interfere with a finding of fact by a Settlement Commissioner in constitutional jurisdiction when the finding is based on irrelevant considerations?
- Does the ownership of adjacent plots by the same evacuee necessarily imply that they comprise a single property for transfer purposes?
- Whether an order passed without appreciation of relevant and material factors by a Settlement Commissioner can be sustained in the eye of the law?
ORDER
SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.--The petitioners against whom a constitutional petition filed by the respondent No. 1 in respect of transfer of Khasra No. 2915 measuring 3 Marlas 195 sq. Ft. In the urban area of Raj Garh, Lahore, was allowed, seek leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, dated 2-6-1980.
2. The petitioners undisputedly got transferred a property No. SW-IV-49-S-19. A dispute subsequently arose with regard to exact limits thereof. The petitioners' contention was that it comprised two Khasras Nos. i.e., 2916 measuring 7 Marlas 83 sq.Ft. And 2915 measuring 3 Marlas 1.95 sq. Ft. The latter served as the courtyard of the house in the former Khasra number. These both belonged to the same evacuee. By a very elaborate order and after fully inquiring into the dispute, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner by an order, dated 12-7-1971 held that the two properties were separate that the transfer of the house to the petitioners was confined to 2916 Khasra number and the demarcation was done accordingly separating Khasra No. 2915 measuring 3 Marlas and 195 sq.Ft. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioners filed a revision before the Settlement Commissioner who allowed it on 16-10-1975 holding that the house extended to the other Khasra number also. In the constitutional jurisdiction, the order of the Settlement Commissioner was held to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect and that of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner was restored.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that a finding of fact had been recorded by the Settlement Commissioner while deciding the revision petition. It concerned with the demarcation of the property of which P. T. D. Was held by the petitioners. It was an order competently passed showing awareness of all the relevant facts. Such an order, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, could not be disturbed in the constitutional jurisdiction.
4. Indeed, before the competent Settlement authorities the controversy of facts was to be resolved.
The Deputy Settlement Commissioner has refused to a number of factors all consistently established from the record for holding that the two Khasras were separate that on one was located the house and the others was a building site yet to be built upon. Notwithstanding that both these plots belonged to the same owner it was held that they had their distinct existence and the one could not be held to be the pert of the other. The Settlement Commissioner after noting the contentions of the respondents drew his conclusion as follows:-- "After going through the record, the written arguments of the parties and different orders passed by the D.S.C. I have come to the conclusion that the property consisting of Khasras Nos. 2915 and 2916 is owned by the one evacuee namely Dhani Ram. The assertion of the respondent that he was in possession of the plot in dispute in pre-partition days is falsified by his own conduct of not filing a form of transfer under Settlement Scheme No. VI but a subsequent scheme. The urge of the petitioner that she informed the Department of the construction being carried out by Meraj Din shows that Meraj Din was not in possession of the plot as claimed by him. I, therefore, feel that the property in dispute is a part of the main house and is not a separate entity."
After a review of the nature of the controversy the material on the record and inference drawn, in High Court made the following observations: -- "I am of the view that the impugned order of the Settlement Commissioner dated 10-10-1975 Is no order in the eye of law. It has been made without appreciation of the relevant and material factors and in fact the considerations on the basis of which the learned Settlement Commissioner has proceeded to hold that Khasras Nos. 2915 is a part of property S-19 are irrelevant. The fact that Khasra No. 2915 and 2916 were owned by one evacuee does not mean that they comprise one property. It is possible the; one evacuee may have abandoned many properties adjacent to each other. Further, the fact that the petitioner could not establish that he was in possession since before independence, could not lead to the result that property No. 2915 was a part of Khasra No. 2916. The last consideration that the contesting respondents had informed the Department of construction being made by Meraj Din similarly could not lead to the conclusion that Khasra No. 2915 was a part of property S. 19."
5. We find that the observations of the High Court are fully borne out from the record and the conclusions are such as can consistently be drawn and the order passed by the High Court is eminently a just) and fair order. No further question of law arises in the case. Leave to appeal is, therefore, refused.