TRADE CONTACT LIMITED, LAHORE And Others vs ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the appellant's Regular Second Appeal in a bank loan recovery case. The respondent Bank had instituted a recovery suit before the Special Court Banking, Lahore, which was decreed after the defendant's counsel made a statement withdrawing the contest and agreeing that the bank's claim be satisfied through the sale of pledged stocks. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the statement made by the defendant's counsel before the trial court amounted to an admission of the bank's claim and the withdrawal of the defense. The Supreme Court held that the language of the statement clearly conveyed the intention that the bank's claim be satisfied from the sale proceeds of the pledged goods, thereby precluding any further contest. The petition was accordingly dismissed, affirming the interpretation of the courts below regarding counsel's binding statement.
- Does a statement by a defendant's counsel agreeing to the satisfaction of a bank's claim through the sale of pledged goods amount to an admission of the claim and withdrawal of the defense?
- Can an appellate court interfere with the concurrent interpretation of a counsel's statement made before the trial court?
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--Leave to appeal has been sought from judgment, dated 21-1-1986 of the Lahore High Court; whereby the appellant's Regular Second Appeal arising out of a Bank loan case, was dismissed.
2. The respondent Bank instituted against the petitioner a suit for the recovery of Rs.7,85,063.93 before Special Court Basking, Lahore. It was decreed mainly on the basis that 'the counsel for the defendants in more than one statements have admitted the claim of the bank as correct and suggested that it be recovered by the sale of the pledged stocks in the custody of the bank. In this way the application, pledged contest the suit was not pressed, rather it was withdrawn'. It main to mentioned here that earlier to the aforementioned statements the petitioner-defendant had made an application for permission to contest the suit.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated the plea as was urged before the High Court, namely, that no such state same admitting the claim of the bank was made before the learned Statement Court, Banking. In order to appreciate the point it is necessai0ecial reproduce the statement of the petitioner's counsel made on 10-11-1984 which was relied upon by the High Court.
4. It reads as follows:-- The correctness of the language used in the afore quoted stat is not challenged by the learned counsel. He, however, has vehemenently contested the inference of an admission of plaintiffs claim, drawn by the learned two Courts below. The learned counsel himself was the defendant's counsel before the Special Court Banking and he says the he never intended by the afore quoted statement to convey than that defendant was admitting the claim of the bank and that it the intention to press the application for contesting the suit.
5. We do not agree with him. The words 'Jis Ko Farokhat Ke Raqam Bank Kay Mutalba Ki Minha Ker Li Jaey' in the statement 'r Kay learned counsel before the Special Court Banking are clear enough the covey the intention that the claim of the bank may be satisfied by the sale of the pledged goods. If there was any intention to contest the suit there was no occasion for the defendant to agree to the Bank---s appropriating against its claim the sale proceeds of the pledged goods. We, therefore, are unable to agree with the plea of the learned counsel. On the question of interpretation of the statement made by him before the learned trial Court.
6. That being so, there is no force in this petition and the same is dismissed.