ABDUL ALEEM vs WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY LAHORE _
This appeal arises from a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's service appeal as time-barred. The appellant, a former employee of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), challenged his removal from service, which occurred on 4th January 1978. After filing a departmental appeal that remained undecided, the appellant filed an appeal before the Service Tribunal on 25th June 1978, beyond the statutory limitation period. The appellant sought condonation of delay, citing ignorance of the law and alleging the removal order was void ab initio and mala fide. The Tribunal refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal primarily to consider whether the Tribunal should have referred the matter to a larger bench due to a potential difference of opinion among its members. The Supreme Court held that the impugned order was signed by both members, indicating no disagreement, and rejected the claim of discrimination. The Court affirmed that condonation of delay is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of each case, finding no merit in the appeal.
- Is the question of whether there is sufficient cause for condoning a delay in filing an appeal generally considered a question of fact?
- Can an appellate court interfere with a tribunal's order based on an alleged difference of opinion among its members when the written order is signed by all members without indication of dissent?
- Does the fact that other appeals may have been admitted to regular hearing by a tribunal automatically entitle an appellant to similar treatment without proof of similarity in facts?
- Section 4, Service Tribunals Act 1973
ZAFFAR HUSSAIN MIRZA, J.--This appeal by leave of this Court arises out of the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, dated 22nd December, 1980, whereby the appellant's appeal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, was dismissed as being barred by limitation.
2. In the aforesaid service appeal the appellant was seeking to challenge the order of his removal from service in the WAPDA which order was passed against him on 4th January, 1978. The appellant called in question the aforesaid order by means of a departmental appeal filed on 20th January, 1978. As the departmental appeal was not decided within the statutory period of 90 days, the appellant filed a direct appeal before the Service Tribunal, on 25th June, 1978, clearly beyond the period of limitation but he requested the Service Tribunal to condone the delay primarily on the ground that he "did not know the exact implication of the provisions of limitation contained in the Service Tribunals Act". In addition he also contended before the Service Tribunal that the order of removal from service being void ab initio and mala fide, the period of limitation was liable to be condoned.
3. The grounds urged by the appellant in support of his request for condonation of delay did not meet the approval of the Service Tribunal and consequently no justification was found for condoning the delay in filing the appeal beyond time. Accordingly by the impugned order, as stated above the appeal of the appellant was dismissed in limine.
4. The appellant being dissatisfied approached this Court for leave to appeal and sought to urge the grounds mentioned above to assail the order of the Tribunal refusing to condone the delay in filing appeal before the Tribunal. The learned Judges of the Bench of this Court who heard the petition were not inclined to agree with the contention that a case for condonation of delay was made out which deserves interference. However, leave was granted on the ground that one of the two learned Members of the Tribunal "wanted to admit the appeal and, therefore, instead of dismissing the appeal in limine, the case should have been referred to a larger Bench. The further ground noticed was that several other appeals involving the same questions were admitted to regular hearing.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant at some length. He has urged that under similar circumstances other appeals were admitted to regular hearing by the Service Tribunal and, therefore,appellant was discriminated against. When asked to point out such other similar cases he showed his inability to give any details of such cases. It seems to us, therefore, that there is no substance in the submission that the appellant was treated differently from others and in any case the question whether there was sufficient cause for the delay in filing appeal which may be condoned, the question generally is one of fact depending upon the circumstances of each case.
Therefore, we are not satisfied that merely because in some other cases the facts of which are not before us delay might have been condoned, the same yardstick should be made applicable in the present case. Although the other ground that one of the learned Members of the Service Tribunal was inclined to admit the appeal has not been pressed, we find that the impugned order whereby the appeal was dismissed as time-barred has been signed by both the learned Members constituting the Bench. We cannot go beyond the order particularly when there is no such indication on the record to hold that there was any difference of opinion between the learned Members constituting the Bench.
5.For the foregoing reasons we find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.