ABDUL HAKIM WARSI vs CHIEF EXECUTIVE INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS CORPN.
This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Baluchistan High Court, which dismissed a constitutional petition challenging the orders of the Labour Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The petitioner, a former accounts officer who had resigned from his employment, sought financial benefits and filed an application under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969. The lower forums and the High Court dismissed the claim primarily on the ground that the petitioner was employed in a managerial or supervisory capacity as an Accounts Officer within the meaning of the Newspapers Employees Conditions of Service Act 1973, and was therefore not a workman entitled to maintain the application. The Supreme Court considered whether the High Court's factual finding was sustainable. The Court held that since the petitioner failed to controvert or dislodge the factual finding that he worked in a managerial or supervisory capacity, the High Court was justified in dismissing the constitutional petition. The petition was accordingly dismissed in limine.
- Whether an employee working in a managerial or supervisory capacity as an Accounts Officer in a newspaper establishment falls within the definition of a workman?
- Can a former employee who has resigned maintain an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969?
- Will the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent factual findings regarding the nature of an employee's duties when left un-controverted?
- Section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969
- Section 18, Newspapers Employees Conditions of Service Act 1973
ORDER
1. ABDUL KADIR SHAIKH, J.--This is petition for leave to appeal from the judgment of Baluchistan High Court dated 3-5-1986 dismissing a constitution petition filed by petitioner who sought to challenge the judgment dated 27-9-1982 passed by the Presiding Officer, First Labour Court, Quetta and the judgment of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Baluchistan whereby his claim for financial benefits against the first and the second respondent was disallowed.
2. Facts briefly stated are that while petitioner was working as an employee of the aforesaid two respondents in his capacity as accounts officer at Quetta, he tendered his resignation which was accepted with effect from 7-5-1980. Petitioner afterwards claimed sum of Rs.73,365 from the two respondents on account of arrears of salary, increments, earned leave, bonus etc. And after complying with the procedure filed an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance for redress.
3. The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court dismissed the application by the judgment dated 29-7- 1982 on the ground that a 'worker' as defined under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 who has resigned from his employment is not entitled to file an application under section 25-A of the Ordinance for the redress of any of his grievances. This Judgment was upheld by the Labour Appellate Tribunal, and the constitution petition filed by the petitioner whereby he sought to challenge the aforesaid judgments was also dismissed.
4. Mr. S.A.M. Quadri learned Advocate-on-Record for the petitioner submits that the view that has prevailed in the Courts below that a 'worker' after resigning from his employment stands disentitled to seek relief under section 25-A of the Ordinance is erroneous in law.
5. We feel that it is not necessary to deal with this question, for, the High Court has further held that "the petitioner is not covered by the term workman for the Additional reason that as Accounts Officer at the relevant time he was employed in a managerial or supervisory capacity in the newspaper establishment as provided in the aforesaid section 18 of the said Act (Newspapers Employees Conditions of Service Act 1973)". There is nothing to show that' petitioner had controverted the aforesaid factual position before the High Court, or, asserted that he, in his capacity as Accounts Officer, was not working in a managerial or supervisory capacity. He has also failed to produce anything on record before us to dislodge the factual findings of the High Court. In view of the aforesaid findings of facts alone, the High Court was quite right in dismissing the constitution petition.
6. We, therefore, find no justification for interference and dismiss this petition in limine.