Pakistan Case Law
1972 SCMR 166

Syed ISRAIL SHAH AND Another vs Sh. AMANULLAH AND Other

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Citation1972 SCMR 166
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 36-P/1971 R. S. A. No. 142 of 1965
Date1972-03-13
Judge(s)Waheeduddin Ahmad and Salahuddin Ahmad
Authored byWaheeduddin Ahmad
ResultLeave refused
AI Summary — generated from this judgment; read the full text below and verify before relying on it.

This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court regarding the specific performance of a contract for the transfer of land. The core legal question was whether a civil court possessed the jurisdiction to entertain a suit for specific performance concerning land allotted to the petitioners in lieu of unsatisfied Produce Index Units, particularly when the petitioners argued the land was not permanently settled and remained within the compensation pool. The Supreme Court held that the civil court indeed had jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that the land had been validly transferred to the petitioners by the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, acting as a Settlement Authority under the relevant statute. Consequently, the transfer constituted a permanent settlement, thereby removing the bar on civil court jurisdiction. The key principle laid down is that where land has been permanently transferred to an allottee by a competent Settlement Authority, the civil court retains jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding the specific performance of contracts related to such land, as it is no longer excluded by the provisions of the Land Settlement Act.

Questions settled in this judgment
  • Does a civil court have jurisdiction to entertain a suit for specific performance regarding land transferred to an allottee by a Rehabilitation Authority?
  • Is a Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner considered a 'Settlement Authority' for the purpose of land allotment under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958?
  • Does the transfer of land by a Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner constitute a permanent transfer sufficient to vest jurisdiction in a civil court?
Laws & provisions referred
  • Section 6, Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958
  • Section 15(3), Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958
  • Section 25, Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act 1958
specific performancecivil court jurisdictionland settlementrehabilitation authoritycompensation poolpermanent transfer

ORDER

1. WAHEEDUDDIN AHMAD, J.-The petitioner No. 1 bad a verified claim for land to the extent of 901 Produce Index Units. He was allotted land in, various villages in lieu of his claim. His claim to the extent of 450 P. I. Units remained unsatisfied. On the 20th August 1962, his son Major Sayed Ibne Hassan, entered into an agreement as an authorised agent of Syed Israil Shah with Sh. Amanullah respondent No. 1. Under this agreement, the petitioner No. 2 received Rs. 400 and agreed to transfer any land which will be allotted to him in lieu of 450 P. I. Units at the rate of .Rs. 10 per unit. The remaining sum of Rs. 4,100 was to be paid at the time of registration of the sale deed. It is not disputed that Major Syed Ibne Hassan Shah son of petitioner No. 1 received Rs. 4,600 from Sh.

2. Amanullah.

3. On the 19th September 1962, the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat as Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner allotted land in village Bilitang of the Kohat District in lieu of his unsatisfied P.

1. Units.

4. The petitioners refused to transfer this land to the respondents. On the 24th June j963, Sh.

5. Amanullah instituted a suit against the petitioners for specific performance of the contract referred to above. Some other persons who are co-sharers in the khata were also impleaded as defendants.

6. The petitioners resisted the suit on the ground that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit that there was no permanent allotment order and the land has not been allotted to the petitioners by the Settlement authority. These contentions were rejected by the trial Court by order dated the 24th October 1964. The matter was then taken in appeal and the learned Additional District Judge, by order dated the 17th February 1965, decided the issue of jurisdiction in favour of the petitioners.

7. He held that the civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter. This order was challenged in R. S. A. No. 142 of 1965 and a learned Single Judge of the Peshawar High Court has accepted the appeal by judgment dated the 19th February 1961. The petitioners seek permission to file an appeal against the said order.

8. Mr. Peer Bakhsh Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners, has contended that since there was no permanent settlement of the land in favour of the petitioners, the civil Court had no jurisdiction in view of sections 6 and 25 of the Land Settlement Act. He has further contended that the Deputy Commissioner, Kohat had no jurisdiction to allot the land to the petitioners and the land in dispute m as still in compensation pool. The contention of the learned counsel has not impressed us. The land in dispute was transferred to the petitioners by the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner under section 15(3) of the Land Settlement Act, 1958. According to the definition of the `Settle--ment Authority' a Rehabilitation Authority is also a Settlement authority. In these circumstances, the transfer in favour of the petitioners is quite valid and no exception can be taken to it. There has been a permanent transfer of land in favour of the petitioners and as such the civil Court had jurisdiction in the matter.

9. The second contention that the Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to allot the land has also no force. The Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, was the Deputy Rehabilitation Commis--sioner and under the definition of Settlement Authority, he was quite competent to allot the land in dispute to the petitioners. In this view of the matter, the learned Single Judge was perfectly justified in accepting the appeal. There is no ground to interfere. The petition is dismissed.

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