JEHANZEB KHAN vs QUAID I AZAM UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed a constitutional petition challenging the dismissal of an Assistant Executive Engineer from service at Quaid-i-Azam University. The petitioner had been dismissed following an inquiry conducted by a retired High Court Judge regarding allegations of misconduct. The core legal question was whether an inquiry report could validly form the basis of disciplinary action if the Inquiry Officer was not an employee of the University, specifically interpreting Rule 6(2) of the Efficiency and Discipline Statute of 1982. The High Court held that the provision requiring the Inquiry Officer to be senior in rank was intended to ensure impartiality and prevent prejudice, rather than strictly mandating that the officer be a university employee. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, reasoning that the inquiry conducted by an impartial authority of unquestioned integrity satisfied the requirements of justice. The Court affirmed that the High Court correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to interfere, as the inquiry report provided a valid basis for departmental action despite the officer's non-employee status.
- Can an inquiry report form the basis of disciplinary action if the Inquiry Officer is not an employee of the organization?
- Does the requirement that an Inquiry Officer be senior in rank mandate that the officer must be an employee of the institution?
- Is the High Court's refusal to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction justified when the inquiry was conducted by an impartial authority?
- Rule 6(2), Efficiency and Discipline Statute of 1982
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--Leave to appeal has been sought from judgment, dated 15-12-1984 of the Lahore High Court; whereby a Constitutional petition arising out of service matter, was dismissed.
2. The petitioner, when serving as Assistant Executive Engineer in the Qusid-e-Azam University, Islamabad (respondent herein), along with two others was charged of misconduct regarding the construction of 12 'C' type houses for which the estimated cost was Rs.27,75,000. They were held guilty in an inquiry conducted by a retired Judge of the High Court. Accordingly, they were dismissed from service. They challenged the dismissal through writ petitions, which were disposed of on the withdrawal of the dismissal order by the respondent on account of some technical defect.
3. Fresh orders of dismissal were passed after service of show-cause notice.
4. The point urged before the High Court and noted in the impugned judgment was that the inquiry report could not form the basis of punishment as the Inquiry Officer was not an employee of the University. Rule 6(2) of Efficiency and Discipline Statute of 1982 was relied upon during the hearing before the High Court.
5. It was observed by the High Court that two views were possible: One, that the word "person" having been used instead of "officer" in relation to the Inquiry Officer, it was not intended that he should be an officer /employee of the University. On the other hand, as the person to be appointed as Inquiry Officer was required by the rule to be one senior to the accused officer, therefore, it led support to the opposite view that the said person should be an officer of the University. Keeping both these possibilities in view, the learned Judge in the High Court further observed as follows: "The provision that the inquiry be held by a person senior in rank is meant only to guard against prejudice and undue influence and thus meet the ends of justice. The inquiry conducted by a person of unquestioned integrity, whose judgment could not be influenced by any of the parties, cannot therefore, be disregarded merely on the technical ground that the Inquiry Officer was not an employee of the University. It is nobody's case that the petitioners were not afforded a full opportunity to defend themselves. On the other hand they had the advantage of presenting their case before an impartial authority."
6. Accordingly the learned Judge refused to exercise Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court and dismissed the writ petition.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners reiterated the argument advanced before the High Court and also further contended that the petitioner was not allowed to be represented by a lawyer before the Inquiry Officer; and, that P.W.11 Mr. M.A. Rauf who had conducted the preliminary inquiry, appeared as a prosecution witness before the Inquiry Officer, therefore, the proceedings against the petitioner were vitiated.
8. It does not appear from the impugned judgment that the last noted two arguments were pressed before the High Court. In the circumstances of the case we would not permit the same to be raised now before this Court.
9. On the other question raised by the learned counsel suffice it to say that the same having been noted by the High Court, (notwithstanding the same) it declined to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction for the main reason that the Inquiry officer being a retired Judge of the High Court against whom there was no allegation of any bias, his report against the petitioner could form a basis for the departmental action.
10. The consideration which weighed with the learned Judge in the High Court for not exercising discretionary jurisdiction cannot be considered as irrelevant not against any principle of law. We, therefore do not consider it a fit case for grant of leave to appeal. This petition accordingly, is dismissed. .