Pakistan Case Law
1987 SCMR 669

MUHAMMAD ISHAQUE And Others vs Mst. KHATOON And Other

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Citation1987 SCMR 669
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 235 of 1980 R.S.A. No. 51 of 1961
Date1987-02-08
Judge(s)Muhammad Afzal Zullah, Mian Burhanuddin Khan and Saad Saood Jan
Authored byMuhammad Afzal Zullah
ResultPetition dismissed
Summary

This matter originated from a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' Regular Second Appeal. The appeal arose from a decree originally passed in favour of the respondents. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that the consent decree passed against the respondents was based on a genuine compromise and, therefore, should not have been set aside on the grounds of fraud and collusion. The Supreme Court examined the arguments presented by the petitioners' counsel but found no legal infirmity or error in the concurrent findings of the appellate courts below. The Court held that the petitioners failed to establish any justification for the re-appraisal of evidence. Consequently, the Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it, thereby affirming the lower court's decision to set aside the consent decree. The judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless a clear legal infirmity or misappreciation of evidence is demonstrated by the appellant.

Questions settled in this judgment
  • Can a consent decree be set aside on the grounds of fraud and collusion?
  • Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court undertake a re-appraisal of evidence in a second appeal?
  • Is a consent decree immune from challenge if it is alleged to be based on fraud?
consent decreefraud and collusionregular second appealre-appraisal of evidenceleave to appealcompromise decree

ORDER

1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAHJ.--Leave to appeal has been sought from judgment, dated 16-12-1979 of the Lahore High Court; whereby petitioners' Regular Second Appeal arising out of a decree passed in favour of the respondents, was dismissed.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioners has tried to show that the consent decree passed against the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 was based on a genuine compromise, therefore, it could not be set aside, on ground of fraud and collusion.

3. He has not been able to show any infirmity in the two appellate judgments legal or otherwise. No justification for re-appraisal of evidence has been made out. This petition accordingly, is dismissed.

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