GHULAM AHMED vs BASHIR AHMED AND Other
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the complainant challenging the refusal of the High Court to grant an interim order for the cancellation of bail previously granted to the respondents facing prosecution for murder. The respondents were originally allowed bail by the Sessions Judge based on an interpretation of an amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure introduced by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, which interpretation was subsequently suspended by the Supreme Court. The core legal question is whether bail granted on a legal basis that has since been suspended or disappeared must be cancelled automatically without hearing the accused. The Supreme Court held that the curtailment of liberty through the cancellation of bail requires that the accused be given a right of being heard, and the High Court acted rightly in issuing a show-cause notice rather than hastily cancelling bail. The key principle laid down is that the cancellation of bail entails the curtailment of personal liberty, necessitating an opportunity of being heard for the accused regardless of the validity of the initial grounds for bail.
- Whether bail can be cancelled automatically upon the disappearance of the legal basis on which it was granted without hearing the accused?
- Is it obligatory for a court to pass an interim order for the cancellation of bail pending a full hearing?
- Does the curtailment of liberty through the cancellation of bail necessitate affording the accused a right of being heard?
- Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code
- Section 34, Pakistan Penal Code
- Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
- Law Reforms Ordinance 1972
ORDER
1. ANWARUL HAQ, J.-The respondents, Bashir Ahmed and Ghulam Farid, are facing prosecution for murder under section 302 read with section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. By identical orders made on the 7th of August 1972, they were allowed bail by the learned Sessions Judge at Sahiwal, on the ground that they could not be detained in custody without trial for a period exceeding one year in view of the amendment intro--duced in section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by item 163 of the Schedule to the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. In passing this order the learned Sessions Judge appears to have acted on a judgment delivered by the Lahore High Court to the effect that although the said Ordinance was to come into force on a date to be specified by the Provincial Government, yet the amendment in question being declaratory in nature should be deemed to have come into effect without such notification.
2. In Petition for Special Leave to Appeal bearing No. 185 of 1972, the said order of the High Court was suspended by the Supreme Court. The complainant Ghulam Ahmed thereupon made an application before the learned Sessions Judge for the cancellation of bail previously allowed by him, but the learned Sessions Judge rejected the application by his order dated 17-10-72. The petitioner then moved a similar application in the High Court which was admitted to a full hearing by a learned Single Judge of that Court on the 6th of November 1972, but the learned Judge refused to pass interim order for the cancel--lation of bail, observing that it is possible that the respondents may have something to urge on merits of the case.
3. Special leave to appeal is now sought by the complainant-- petitioner on the ground that the very basis on which bail was allowed to the respondents having disappeared with the suspension of the order of the High Court regarding the interpretation to be placed on item 163 of the Schedule to the Law Reforms Ordi--nance, it was obligatory on the part of the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court to immediately cancel the bail allowed to the respondents.
4. We are not impressed by this argument. The High Court has rightly issued notice to the respondents to show cause why their bail should not be cancelled. Whatever the reason for which bail had been allowed to the respondents, the cancellation of that bail) meant the curtailment of their liberty and, therefore, they had a, right of being heard.
5. For the foregoing reasons we see no merit in this petition which is accordingly dismissed.
Cited by 1 case
- JIWANO vs THE STATE 1991PCr.LJ 17