MUHAMMAD WALAYAT And Another vs LIAQAT HAYAT And Another
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal filed by the vendees-defendants in a pre-emption suit, challenging an order passed by the trial Court which extended the deadline for the deposit of Zar-e-punjum. The petitioners sought to contest the validity of this extension, a decision which the High Court had previously declined to interfere with under its revisional jurisdiction. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the trial Court possessed the legal competence to extend the time for depositing the Zar-e-punjum. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial Court acted within its lawful authority in granting the extension. The Court affirmed that under the relevant statutory provisions, the trial Court is empowered to extend the time for making such deposits, provided sufficient cause is established. Finding that the trial Court had duly recorded a finding regarding the existence of sufficient cause and that this finding suffered from no legal infirmity, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, thereby upholding the lower court's discretion in procedural matters of pre-emption.
- Is the trial Court competent to extend the time for making the deposit of Zar-e-punjum in a pre-emption suit?
- Does the trial Court have the authority to grant an extension of time for deposit if sufficient cause is shown?
- Section 22(4), Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913
ORDER
1. SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.--This petition for special leave to appeal is by the vendees-defendants in a pre-emption suit. They were aggrieved by an order of the trial Court extending the date for making the deposit of Zar-e-punjum. The High Court in revisional jurisdiction has declined to interfere with its order.
2. There can be little doubt that under section 22 (4), Pre-emption Act, the trial Court was competent to extend time for making the deposit. See Hidayatullah v. Murad A.I PLD 1972 SC 69. Before making the impugned order the trial Court recorded a finding that sufficient cause existed for granting the extension. This finding does' not suffer from any infirmity. The petition is accordingly dismissed