Pakistan Case Law
1987 PLC 846

TRUSTEES OF THE PORT OF KARACHI vs MUHAMMAD KARIM And Another

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Citation1987 PLC 846
CourtSindh High Court
Case No.Constitutional Petitions Nos. S-90, 91 and 92 of 1985
Date1987-05-31
Judge(s)Mamoon Kazi
ResultAppeal dismissed
AI Summary — generated from this judgment; read the full text below and verify before relying on it.

This matter arises from constitutional petitions filed by the Trustees of the Port of Karachi challenging orders of the Labour Court, which assumed jurisdiction under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, over grievance applications filed by terminated workmen. The core legal question was whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain grievance applications of employees governed by statutory rules of service and the Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886, and whether a terminated employee ceases to be a workman under the Ordinance. The court held that the Labour Court maintained jurisdiction to hear the grievance petitions under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and dismissed the petitions. The key principle laid down is that terminated workmen retain the right to seek redress of their grievances before the Labour Court under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.

Questions settled in this judgment
  • Does a Labour Court have jurisdiction under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 to entertain a grievance application from a terminated employee?
  • Whether an employee whose services have been terminated ceases to be a worker or workman under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969?
Laws & provisions referred
  • Section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969
industrial relationsgrievance applicationworkmanjurisdictionLabour Court

The respondent No.1 in these petitions is a person who was employed by the petitioners as a workman and whose services had been terminated by .Them. Each of the respondents filed a grievance application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as "the Ordinance") before the learned Labour Court . An objection was raised on behalf of the petitioners that the jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court to hear the respondent's application was barred as the respondent had ceased to be a "worker" or "workman" under the Ordinance and the provisions of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter referred as to "the Standing Orders Ordinance") were also not applicable to him as the employees of the petitioners were admittedly governed by statutory rules of service conduct and discipline and the establishment of the petitioners was being run by and under the authority of the Federal Government having been established under the Karachi Port Trust Act, 1886. It may be pointed out that by virtue of the proviso to section 1 of the Standing Orders Ordinance the provisions of the Ordinance are not applicable to such person. However, the objection was overruled by the learned Labour Court , which held that the same had jurisdiction in the matter as the respondent could approach the Labour Court under section 25-A of the Ordinance and the provisions thereof did not stand ousted by the rules framed by the petitioners.

2. Mr. Muhammad Sharif, learned counsel for the petitioners in all these petitions while referring to the definition of "worker" in the Ordinance, has argued that a person whose services have been terminated by the employer ceases to be a "worker" under the Ordinance. Consequently, he can only approach the Labour Court b3 grievance petition of the respondent, under section 25-A , I . R .O. 1 1969.

7. For the reasons, stated by me above, I see no reasons to interfere with the impugned order and would maintain the same. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. The respondent workman, namely, C Muhammad Kamil Arzani, is directed to be reinstated in service of the appellants establishment with full back benefits forthwith.

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