ABDUL MAJEED and 4 others vs MIRAN BAKHSH and 3 others
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment in a pre-emption suit where the petitioners challenged the concurrent findings of fact regarding the respondent's status as a tenant. The core legal question was whether the respondent, Miran Bakhsh, had established the ground of tenancy required to secure a pre-emption decree, specifically addressing the application of Section 60-A of the Punjab Tenancy Act regarding the succession of tenancy rights following the death of the previous tenant. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners failed to displace the concurrent findings of fact based on Khasra Girdawari and other evidence confirming the respondent's actual cultivating possession at the time of the sale. The Court clarified that the mere theoretical possibility of another heir inheriting tenancy rights under Section 60-A does not override established factual findings of actual tenancy. The key principle laid down is that where concurrent findings of fact establish a party's status as a tenant, the burden lies on the challenging party to produce material evidence at the trial stage to rebut that status, rather than relying on abstract statutory interpretations.
- Can a party challenge concurrent findings of fact regarding tenancy status by relying on abstract statutory succession rules without producing evidence of actual possession?
- Does the mere possibility of an eldest son becoming a tenant under Section 60-A of the Punjab Tenancy Act override evidence of another person's actual cultivating possession at the time of sale?
- Is the burden on the defendant to prove that a deceased tenant did not prefer a specific heir when the plaintiff has established actual tenancy through Khasra Girdawari?
- Section 60-A, Punjab Tenancy Act 1887
ORDER
1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--Leave to appeal has been sought in a pre-emption matter by the defendants' side; against the dismissal by the High Court, of their writ petition.
2. ' The controversy now left to be resolved is whether, Miran Bakhsh respondent/plaintiff/pre-emptor has been able to establish the ground of tenancy, on the basis of which, a decree has been passed in his favour and the petitioners have lost throughout.
3. ' Notwithstanding the fact there are concurrent findings of fact against the petitioners regarding the factum of tenancy at the time relevant in this case; namely, the date of the sale of the property, learned counsel raised what he thought was a point of law. Relying on section 60-A of the Punjab Tenancy Act he contended that the sale having taken place in 1982, the last tenant on the land the father of Miran Bakhsh, died in 1980. According to Section 60-A, learned counsel further contended, the "preferred" heir of Miran Bakhsh was to hold the tenancy in succession; failing which the eldest son was to become tenant on the death of Miran Bakhsh in 1980. The argument further proceeds that there was no "preferred" heir in this case and the eldest son being another brother of Miran Bakhsh, named Ghulam Rabbani, the former could not have been treated as tenant in law.
4. In so far as the facts of this case are concerned the argument is untenable. There are findings of fact with reference to Khasra Girdawari and other material that actually the land in question at the relevant time was under tenancy and cultivating possession of Miran Bakhsh. It was for the petitioners' side to have placed on record at the trial stage enough material; firstly, to show that the deceased tenant had not made a "preference" in favour of Miran Bakhsh who actually was found to be the tenant and further that in such an eventuality the elder brother had in fact become the tenant. The mere possibility of the eldest son becoming a tenant by virtue of operation of Section 60A, would not be of any use/help to the petitioners in this case.
5. ' In the light of the foregoing discussion on this petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.