ABDUL SATTAR QURESHI and others vs SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE and others
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by the vendees in a pre-emption case challenging a consent decree and the subsequent dismissal of their writ petition by the High Court. The core legal question concerned whether the petitioners' counsel possessed the authority to enter into a compromise agreement. The Supreme Court held that the compromise was in fact entered into directly by the parties themselves, and the counsel merely made a statement in proof of that existing agreement rather than negotiating it independently. Consequently, the Court found no justification for granting leave to appeal and dismissed the petition, establishing that where a compromise is established to be between the parties themselves and verified by counsel, the validity of the consent decree remains unimpaired.
- Whether a counsel has the power to enter into a compromise agreement on behalf of a party?
- Does a statement made by a counsel in proof of an agreement between parties validate a consent decree?
- Is leave to appeal maintainable against a consent decree where the compromise was settled directly by the parties?
ORDER
1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--Leave to appeal has been sought by vendees' side in a pre-emption matter against a consent decree, and dismissal of the petitioner's writ petition by the High Court, mainly on this ground.
2. ' Learned counsel contended that there was no power available with the counsel appearing for the petitioners to enter into an agreement with the opposite side.
3. Although it is a question of fact; still assuming for the sake of arguments that the counsel had no such power, it is not a case where two Advocates/counsel of the respective parties, have entered into a compromise. On the other hand the record shows that the compromise was between the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioners had only made a statement in proof of that agreement; stating that the parties had agreed. That being so, no justification has been made out for grant of leave to appeal. This petition accordingly is dismissed.