JOHANN KELLER WORKERS AND EMPLOYEES UNION vs CHAIRMAN, THIRD
The petitioner, a recognized trade union, filed a labour dispute case before the Third Labour Court, Dacca, which was subsequently dismissed for default due to the non-appearance of the parties. An application for restoration of the case was dismissed by the Labour Court on the ground that there was no sufficient cause for the petitioner's absence, as the parties were expected to ascertain the hearing dates themselves and no separate notice of the hearing date was required to be served. A writ petition challenging the Labour Court's order was dismissed by the High Court. Upon a petition for special leave to appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the petitioner had sufficient cause for non-appearance and whether notice of the hearing date was mandatory under the rules. The Supreme Court held that the Labour Court was justified in concluding that no sufficient cause was shown for restoration and that the rules did not enjoin giving separate notice of the hearing date to the parties. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's order and dismissed the petition.
- Whether a party is entitled to a separate notice of the date of hearing in a labour dispute case under the applicable procedural rules?
- Does the failure to ascertain the date of hearing constitute sufficient cause for the restoration of a labour dispute case dismissed for default?
- Is interference warranted with the concurrent findings of the Labour Court and the High Court regarding the absence of sufficient cause for non-appearance?
- Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969
1. M. R. KHAN, J.-The petitioner, a recognised Trade Union filed Labour Dispute Case No. 94 of 1969 in the Third Labour Court, Dacca on the 13th August 1969. The petitioner thereafter received from the Labour Court a copy of the notice fixing 13-9-69 as the date for filing written statement. The petitioner went to the Labour Court and came to learn that the written statement was ultimately filed by the employer on the 11th October 1969. The said case was, however, dismissed on the 4th December 1969 for default, in the absence of both the parties. The petitioner then made an application before the Labour Court for restoration of the case on the ground that the date of hearing was not communicated to the petitioner by giving a notice. The Labour Court found that the petitioner attended the Court from time to time and was of the view that it was not required of the Court to give any notice to the petitioner, informing the date of hearing. In that view of the matter, the Labour Court held that there was no sufficient cause for the absence of the petitioner when the case was called on for hearing. The application for restoration of the case was accordingly dismissed. The petitioner then moved a writ petition in the High Court, calling in question the legality of the Labour Court's order dismissing the application for restoration. The High Court agreed with the view taken by the Labour Court and dismissed the writ petition. The petition for special leave .Is directed against the order of the High Court.
2. Mr. Amirul Islam, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Labour Court' was wrong in not holding that there was sufficient cause for non-appearance of the petitioner on the date of hearing and that the High Court erred in affirming the view of the Labour Court. It is not enjoined by the rules of procedure that whenever a labour dispute case is fixed for hearing, a notice of the date fixed should be given to either party to the case. The petitioner itself should have ascertained the date fixed for hearing of the Labour Dispute Case No. 94 of 1969. The petitioner, however, blamed the Labour Court and its Peshkar. It is no use blaming the Labour Court or its Peshkar, for not communicating to the petitioner the date of hearing of that case. The Labour Court, in the facts of this case, was right in holding that there was no sufficient cause for restoration of the case dismissed for default. Hence, no interference with the order of the High Court is called for.
3. It appears that the Labour Court took the further view that under the new Ordinance, namely, the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, the petitioner's Labour Dispute Case No. 94 of 1969 is no more maintainable. Mr. Amirul Islam contends that this view of the Labour Court is not correct. Since the special leave petition has no merits otherwise, it is not necessary to consider how for the above view of the Labour Court is correct.
4. The petition is dismissed.