HAQUE NAWAZ vs SULTAN and others
The petitioner, a vendee in a pre-emption matter, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his writ petition by the High Court. The original suit had been decreed against the petitioner on the basis of a statement made by his counsel, constituting a consent decree. In the petition for leave to appeal, the petitioner challenged the decree on the ground that his counsel had misconducted and made a false statement when conveying the consent. The core legal question was whether a writ petition is an appropriate remedy to challenge a consent decree based on the alleged misconduct of a counsel. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that while the petitioner might have a remedy against the counsel, the High Court acted rightly in declining to interfere in its writ jurisdiction regarding the consent decree. The key principle laid down is that a consent decree resulting from a statement of counsel cannot be effectively challenged through writ jurisdiction on the grounds of counsel misconduct, and the aggrieved party must pursue other appropriate remedies.
- Can a consent decree based on a statement of counsel be challenged in writ jurisdiction on the ground of counsel misconduct?
- What is the appropriate remedy for a party aggrieved by the alleged false statement or misconduct of their counsel in making a consent decree?
ORDER
1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--A vendee in a pre-emption matter has sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his writ petition. Questions of fact including that of collusion have been raised in the petition. The suit was decreed against the petitioner on the basis of statement made by his counsel. It was a consent decree. It has been challenged in the petition for leave to appeal mainly on the ground that the counsel of the petitioner when conveying the consent misconducted and made a false statement. If that is so, the petitioner might have a remedy against the counsel but in so far as the present petition is concerned, the High Court acted rightly in declining to interfere in its writ jurisdiction. For this reason and also that none has appeared to prosecute this petition, it is liable to be dismissed. We order accordingly.