JEWAN vs HUSSAIN BAKHSH
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioner's Regular Second Appeal regarding a dispute over the possession of two marlas of land. The petitioner had originally sued for possession based on a consent decree obtained against his father. The respondent contested the suit, claiming title through a purchase from a co-owner, Mehra. The trial court initially decreed the suit in the petitioner's favor, but the Additional District Judge reversed this, finding that the petitioner's father lacked exclusive 'Hissadari' possession, a finding upheld by the High Court. The core legal question was whether the petitioner could establish exclusive possession and title based on the consent decree despite the lack of evidence regarding his father's exclusive ownership. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact regarding the lack of exclusive possession by the petitioner's father and the validity of the respondent's purchase from a co-owner were correct. Finding no error in the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, affirming the dismissal of the petitioner's suit.
- Can a party claim exclusive possession of land based on a consent decree if the predecessor-in-interest did not have exclusive Hissadari possession?
- Does the sale of a share by a co-owner provide a valid title to a respondent in a suit for possession?
- Is the Supreme Court justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact regarding land possession in a petition for leave to appeal?
ORDER
1. ' USMAN ALI SHAH, J.--Leave to appeal has been sought through this petition from the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 20-10-83; whereby, R.SA. Of the petitioner against the judgment of the Addl. District Judge, Bhakkar was dismissed.
2. ' A suit for the recovery of possession of 2 marlas of land in dispute bearing Khasra No,5676, was brought by Jewan petitioner herein against Hussain Bakhsh respondent who obtained the possession of the disputed land from his father through a consent degree on 27-7-1977 in a suit instituted by him against his father on 14-7-1977. Hussain Bakhsh respondent contested the suit on the basis of a purchase from Mehra a co-owner of the land of which the land in dispute was formed a share. The suit was decreed in favour of the present petitioner by the learned Civil Judge, Bhakkar on 27-5-1982. In appeal filed by the respondent the learned Addl. District Judge Bhakkar reversed the finding and dismissed the suit of the petitioner on 19-6-1983, observing that Hissadari possession of the father of Hussain Bakhsh from whom the respondent claimed title was not established and therefore the respondent could not claim his exclusive possession. In regular second appeal of the petitioner before the Lahore High Court, a learned Single Judge who heard the appeal concluded that the petitioner who happened to be a Patwari, got himself recorded to be in possession of the disputed land in the Revenue record, on the basis of the consent degree. As the father of the petitioner was not proved to be in exclusive Hissadari possession, hence the petitioner could not become in exclusive possession on the basis of the said decree and thus dismissed the 2nd appeal.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and gone through the findings of the Courts below. We have observed that the finding of facts is against the petitioner that his father was not in an exclusive Hissadari possession of the land and there is evidence on record that Mehra a co- owner of the land of which the land in dispute formed a share, sold his share in the property to the respondent is proved, which fact is admitted by the learned Addl. District Judge in appeal and rightly not interfered by the learned High Court in R.SA. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to establish any error on account of which interference by the learned High Court would have been justified. For the same reason we do not find any justification for interference by this Court. Therefore, the petition is dismissed and leave refused.