KHAIR DIN and others vs GHULAM MUHAMMAD and others
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order concerning the redemption of mortgaged land. The core legal dispute involved whether the respondents' application for redemption was time-barred under the Limitation Act. The property, originally mortgaged in 1896, had a portion redeemed in 1945. The respondents argued that this partial redemption triggered a fresh period of limitation under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1908, allowing for a sixty-year period from the date of the partial payment. The Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property, and subsequently the Custodian, found as a matter of fact that the partial redemption occurred in 1945, thereby extending the limitation period. The High Court dismissed the petitioners' writ petition, upholding these concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, noting that the petitioners failed to controvert the factual finding regarding the 1945 partial redemption. Consequently, the Court held that the application for redemption was within the statutory period and dismissed the petition, confirming the respondents' entitlement to redeem the disputed land.
- Does a partial redemption of mortgaged property trigger a fresh period of limitation under Section 19 of the Limitation Act 1908?
- Is the period for redemption of mortgaged property sixty years under Article 148 of the Limitation Act 1908?
- Can a finding of fact regarding the date of partial redemption be challenged in a petition for leave to appeal if it remains uncontroverted in lower courts?
- Section 19, Limitation Act 1908
- Article 148, Limitation Act 1908
1. ' JAVID IQBAL, J.--This petition for leave to appeal is directed against order, dated 8 April, 1981 passed by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, Lahore in writ petition filed by the petitioners.
2. ' Briefly the facts are that the respondents filed applications for the redemption of mortgage of two parcels of land situate in Village Hindwan Tehsil Shahpur District Sargodha. The property in dispute was mortgaged with possession with non-Muslim evacuee on 14 June, 1896 through registered mortgage deed. Out of the whole mortgaged land a portion measuring 92 Kanals so mortgaged was redeemed by the mortgagors in 1945. Since the property in question as a whole was not redeemed within the statutory period it was treated as evacuee property and was allotted to one Khair Din who sold it further to others. In the year 1947 the mortgagees had migrated to India and thereafter the mortgagors took possession of the said land and the same was in their possession uptodate. After consolidation operation the mortgaged land was adjusted into two plots and therefore two applications were tiled for redemption by the respondents before the Deputy Custodian Evacuee Property. It was contended before him on behalf of the respondents that the disputed land was originally mortgaged in 1896 and within sixty years it was separately redeemed to the extent of 1/4th share on 30 May, 1945. Therefore, under section 19 of the Limitation Act period would start running from the year 1945 and according to Article 148 of the Limitation Act the period of redemption was sixty years. Consequently both the applications were within time. Thus, factually the position was that within the statutory period of 60 years 1/4th share of the mortgaged land was redeemed in 1945 by way of making part payment. It was therefore held that under relevant section of the Limitatin Act fresh period of limitation would start from 30 May, 1945. On this question of fact the matter was decided by the Additional Custodian in favour of the respondents. In appeal by the petitioners the Custodian Evacuee Property vide his order, dated 20 January, 1981 confirmed the order of the Deputy Custodian. Thereafter, the writ petition of the petitioners against the aforesaid orders was dismissed mainly on the ground that the Deputy Custodian had found as a fact that 1/4th of the property mortgaged by the respondents had been redeemed in 1945 and that consequently the time stood extended under section 19 of the Limitation Act. And the mortgaged land could he redeemed within a further period of sixty years. Thus, the respondents were held entitled to redeem the disputed land. Learned counsel before us could not controvert this finding of fact in any of the Courts below as well as before us. Therefore, we do not find any substance in this petition which is accordingly dismissed.