MAQBOOL AHMAD and others vs ABDUL GHAFOOR and others
This matter concerns two petitions for leave to appeal filed by vendees in pre-emption cases, challenging the dismissal of their Civil Revision and Regular Second Appeal by the High Court. The core legal questions addressed were whether the absence of a specific vendee's signature on a court agreement invalidated the proceedings, whether the nature of the land as mortgaged exempted the transaction from pre-emption, and whether the suit was time-barred. The Supreme Court held that the petitions lacked merit and refused leave to appeal. Regarding the participation of the vendees in court agreements, the Court ruled that even if a technical defect existed, the party was effectively represented, and the absence of a written objection before the trial court precluded the argument. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the right of pre-emption in this context is one of substitution, not re-purchase, dismissing the argument regarding the nature of the land. Finally, the Court affirmed that proceedings signed by counsel on behalf of parties are valid, and the limitation argument was abandoned by the petitioner upon examination.
- Does the mere fact that only counsel signed court proceedings invalidate the agreement for the parties involved?
- Is a transaction involving mortgaged land exempt from the right of pre-emption?
- Can a party challenge the participation of a co-vendee in a court agreement if no written objection was filed before the trial court?
ORDER
1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--These are vendees' petitions for leave to appeal in pre-emption matters. In one petition (Civil Petition No,930 of 1985) leave has been sought against the dismissal of their Civil Revision and in the other (Civil Petition No,984 of 1985) leave to appeal has been sought against the dismissal of their Regular Second Appeal by the High Court. One question regarding participation of the vendees' side in separate respective agreements reached before the lower Courts, is common, therefore, they are being disposed of together.
2. ' Learned counsel (in Civil Petition No,930 of 1985) has raised three contentions: (i) that Noor Ahmad one of the vendees was not a party to the agreement reached before the lower Court; (ii) that the land was allotted as mortgaged land, therefore, the transaction was not subject to pre-emption; and (iii) that the sale being of 27-3-1968 the period of limitation expired on 26-3-1969, therefore, the suit was time-barred.
3. ' After hearing the learned counsel with regard to the first point, we feel satisfied that even if there is technical defect with regard to the participation of Noor Ahmad in the agreement, he was otherwise a party to it. Moreover, as admitted by the learned counsel no written objection was filed before the Court concerned in this behalf.
4. The second argument of the learned counsel is of no help to the petitioner as the respondents- pre-emptors' right of pre-emption in this case is not one of re-purchase but of substitution.
5. Therefore, the petitioner would not be able to avoid the decree on this technical ground.
6. The last argument of the learned counsel is also without force as after examining this question and the relevant dates in that behalf, he was unable to press it any further. Leave to appeal therefore is refused.
7. ' In the second petition (Civil Petition No, 984 of 1985) the same learned counsel has raised the point which is similar to the first point raised in Civil Petition No, 930 of 1985. The person concerned, we are satisfied, did participate in the agreement/Court proceedings. The mere fact that only the counsel signed the proceedings will not make any difference in so far as the validity of those proceedings, is concerned. This petition also merits dismissal and leave to appeal is refused therein.