Messrs BRITE SHOES and 2 others vs Mst. MUSARRAT JAVID and 2 others
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by tenants against the dismissal of their writ petition by the High Court, which had challenged an order of remand passed by the lower appellate court in a rent restriction case. The core legal question concerned the admissibility and evidentiary value of an unregistered rent deed and whether the appellate court erred in remanding the case. The Supreme Court held that despite theoretical arguments regarding the use of unregistered documents, the appellate court's remand order was justified primarily because the landlord side denied the existence, authenticity, and execution of the disputed deed, supported by the tenants' failure to rely on it in earlier litigation and the lack of direct evidence to prove its execution. The Court laid down the principle that where the execution of an unregistered document is genuinely disputed and unproven by direct evidence, the matter of its proof, authenticity, and evidentiary weight is properly left to the appraisal of evidence by the Rent Controller upon remand, rendering technical observations on registration inconsequential to the final outcome of the remand order.
- Can an unregistered rent deed be used as evidence when its execution and authenticity are expressly denied?
- Whether an order of remand by an appellate court is sustainable if independent grounds regarding the non-proof of a document exist?
- Is the appraisal of evidence regarding the execution of a disputed document within the domain of the Rent Controller upon remand?
- Section 49, Registration Act 1908
ORDER
1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.-Leave to appeal has been sought by tenant side in a rent restriction matter, against the dismissal by the High Court, of their writ petition, challenging an order of remand passed by the learned appeal Court.
2. ' The learned counsel contended that the appellate Court had refused to consider and examine an unregistered rent deed as being inadmissible piece of evidence and/or having no evidentiary value at all. This, as argued by him, is contrary to law. The document could be used still for some purpose.
3. Theoratically, learned counsel might be right; but, in the circumstances of this case we do not agree with him regarding analysis and import of the judgment of remand by the first appeal Court.
4. The respondents' side not having admitted the existence, the authenticity/execution of the deed itself, the learned Judge mentioned at least two circumstances which support the plea of denial of the respondents/landlord side. One, that the petitioners' side had not relied upon the deed in an earlier inter-partes litigation; and secondly, no direct evidence was led from the petitioners'side to prove the execution/existence of any such deed (R.I is only a copy). It was by way of only supporting material that the learned Judge after making reference to Section 49 of the Registeration Act observed that the rent deed could not be utilised by the petitioner in a particular manner, as it was not registered. Even if this part of the judgment impugned before the High Court is excluded, the remaining judgment would still be operative against the petitioners on the question of the execution, existence or authenticity of the disputed agreement. In this view of the matter it would be open to the parties in the remand proceedings to satisfy the learned Rent Controller, amongst other, on the above factual aspect of the case. The disputed deed being already on the record will be considered only an alleged piece of evidence relied upon from the petitioners'side. It will be for the learned Rent Controller to accept it as a document duly proved to have been executed or otherwise. The related questions including those of its authenticity and the weight of evidence led from both sides would also be within the domain of the learned Rent Controller's exercise, regarding appraisal of evidence.
5. ' With the foregoing observations we find no force in this petition for leave to appeal (in the circumstances of this case). The same accordingly is refused.