MUHAMMAD ASLAM vs PHILIPS ELECTRICAL CO. OF PAKISTAN and others
This is a petition for special leave to appeal arising from an order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's constitutional petition against the judgment of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. The petitioner's services with respondent No. 1 were terminated following a resignation he allegedly tendered. The Labour Court initially reinstated the petitioner, but upon appeal, the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal set aside the reinstatement, holding that the resignation was voluntary and that the petitioner's application before the Labour Court was time-barred. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the voluntary nature of the resignation and the limitation bar suffered from any legal infirmity. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate any infirmity in the findings of the Appellate Tribunal. Consequently, the petition was found to be without merit and was dismissed.
- Whether the findings of the Labour Appellate Tribunal regarding the voluntary nature of a resignation can be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction?
- Is an application before the Labour Court maintainable if it is barred by time?
ORDER
' SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.-This is a petition for special leave to appeal from the order dated 11-6-83 of the Lahore High Court dismissing the constitutional petition of the petitioner from the judgment of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal.
2. The petitioner was an employee of respondent No,l. His services were terminated on the basis of resignation allegedly tendered by him. He challenged the order of termination of services before the Labour Court. By an order dated 24-11-1981, the Labour Court accepted the petition and directed his reinstatement in service. Respondent No,1 filed an appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. The learned Tribunal found that not only the petitioner had tendered his resignation on his own but that his petition before the Labour Court was barred by time.
Accordingly, it accepted the appeal of respondent No,1 and set aside the order of the Labour Court.
The petitioner invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to challege the legality of the order of the learned Appellate Tribunal but without any success. He now seeks leave to appeal from this Court.
3. As noticed earlier, the learned Appellate Tribunal has found that the application of the petitioner before the Labour Court was barred by time and that the order of termination was based upon his own resignation. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to persuade us that these findings suffer from any infirmity. The petition is without any merit and is hereby dismissed.