MUHAMMAD YUSUF and another vs SAEED AKHTAR and another
This petition for leave to appeal arises out of a specific performance case where the petitioners sought to challenge the dismissal of their regular second appeal by the High Court. The trial court had rejected the petitioners' claim for specific performance in favor of a bona fide second vendee, and these concurrent findings of fact were affirmed by the District Judge and subsequently upheld by the High Court. The core legal question concerns whether interference with concurrent findings of fact is warranted in a second appeal, and whether an alternative plea of pre-emption could be sustained. The Supreme Court held that no infirmity existed in the concurrent findings of fact rendered by the lower courts, and noted that the alternative plea of pre-emption could not be pursued in light of the precedent in Sardar Ali's case. Consequently, the Court refused leave to appeal, establishing the principle that concurrent findings of fact of lower courts will not be disturbed in second appeal absent any legal infirmity or where not properly contested below.
- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact in a second appeal regarding specific performance?
- Can an alternative plea of pre-emption be granted when barred by established binding precedent of the Supreme Court?
- Is leave to appeal maintainable against the dismissal of a second appeal where concurrent findings of fact contain no legal infirmity?
ORDER
1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--The plaintiffs' side in a specific performance case has sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their regular second appeal by the High Court.
2. ' The learned trial Judge rejected petitioners' claim for specific performance as first vendee when compared to the bona fide claim of purchase by the second vendee-respondent No,
2. On appeal, the findings of fact were affirmed by the learned District Judge. The High Court dismissed the second appeal after noticing that the two lower Courts had rendered concurrent findings of fact against the petitioners. The High Court also took note of the argument of the learned counsel then appearing for the petitioners that the alternative plea for possession through pre-emption, was not properly dealt with. It was observed in the impugned judgment that this plea was not raised at the appellate stage.
3. The learned counsel now appearing in support of this petition stated that he cannot raise the question of pre-emption, because, no decree can now be passed through pre-emption in petitioners' favour on account of the judgment of this Court in the case of Sardar Ali and others (PLD 1988 SC 287). He, however, urged that the findings of fact by the two learned Courts below should have been interfered with in the second appeal.
4. We do not agree with him. Firstly, the learned counsel appearing in the High Court had not then advanced any argument against the said findings; and, secondly, after having heard the learned counsel before us we have not been able to find any infirmity in them.
5. Leave to appeal, accordingly, is refused.