NAWAB KHAN vs SAID MUHAMMAD and others
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment that set aside orders of Revenue authorities regarding the ejectment of respondents from a disputed Ihata. The petitioner, who had been allotted the Ihata, sought to eject the respondents, who were refugees from Jammu and Kashmir residing on the property. While the Revenue authorities initially ruled in favor of the petitioner, the High Court set aside these orders. The core legal question was whether the High Court correctly exercised its writ jurisdiction to overturn concurrent findings of Revenue authorities regarding the possession and entitlement of the disputed property. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the High Court's interference was justified. The Court relied on Board of Revenue instructions protecting refugees in continuous possession of an Ihata for over ten years from disturbance, particularly where the petitioner already possessed other property and sought the disputed Ihata merely for tethering cattle, whereas the respondents had constructed permanent homes thereon. The principle established is that equitable considerations and specific administrative instructions regarding refugee rehabilitation override strict ejectment claims in revenue proceedings.
- Can the High Court interfere with concurrent findings of Revenue authorities in the exercise of writ jurisdiction?
- Does the continuous possession of an Ihata by a refugee for over ten years grant protection against ejectment under Board of Revenue instructions?
ORDER
1. ' JAVID IQBAL, J.--This petition for leave to appeal is directed against judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 15th March, 1982 whereby writ petition filed by the respondents was accepted and the orders passed by the Revenue authorities in favour of the petitioner were set aside.
2. ' Briefly the facts are that the Ihata in dispute was allotted to the petitioner. The respondents came to the village as refugees from Jammu and Kashmir in 1970 and got the said Ihata on rent. They raised Pakka construction thereon and they were residing therein. On 17th April, 1974 the petitioner filed an application for ejectment of the respondents and this application was accepted by the Collector on 24th August, 1974. However on appeal of the respondents the Additional Commissioner remanded the case to the Collector to rehear the parties and then to decide the case afresh. On remand the Collector reiterated his previous order whereupon the respondents appealed but this time the Additional Commissioner dismissed their appeal and subsequently the Member Board of Revenue also dismissed their revision petition. The respondents consequently challenged the orders of the Revenue authorities by way of a writ petition which was accepted by the High Court as stated above. Hence the present petition.
3. ' Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the concurrent findings of all the revenue Courts should have not been upset by the High Court in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. It was submitted that the Ihata in dispute was given to the respondents on rent by the petitioner. Consequently they had no right to file the writ petition as they were not entitled to own the Ihata under any provision of the Revenue Law or instructions thereunder.
4. We have heard learned counsel at some length. The sworn statements placed on record by the respondents had indicated that they had been in possession of the disputed Ihata for more than 10 years. This position has not been controverted. The instructions of the Board of Revenue applicable to the present case provide that a person who was a refugee and had been in continuous possession of an Ihata for 10 years should not be disturbed and that furthermore the petitioner had already got an Ihata in the village and he was trying to get the Ihata which was in possession of the respondents only for tethering his cattle whereas the respondents who were refugees had constructed their houses thereon and were living there. Since this is the position in our view the judgment passed by the High Court calls for no interference. The petition is therefore dismissed.