PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through Collector Sialkot and others vs Ch. KHAN
This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Province of Punjab against the High Court's dismissal of their writ petition challenging an eviction order passed by a Rent Controller. The core legal question was whether the Government, having taken over a school under Martial Law Regulation 118, could be considered a tenant of the premises and thus subject to eviction proceedings, despite the Government's claim that it was not a tenant and that the underlying tenancy agreement was invalid due to lack of registration or proper stamping. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Government, by occupying the premises and assuming the liabilities of the previous school management, established a landlord-tenant relationship. The Court affirmed that the Government could not claim ownership of the building merely based on its occupation under the Martial Law Regulation. Furthermore, the Court held that the lack of registration or proper stamping of the lease agreement, or its formal expiration, did not absolve the Government of its status as a tenant or its liabilities under the existing legal arrangements.
- Does the government's occupation of a school building under Martial Law Regulation 118 create a landlord-tenant relationship with the building's owner?
- Can the government claim ownership of a building solely because it continues to occupy it as a school under Martial Law Regulation 118?
- Does the expiration or lack of registration of a lease agreement prevent the establishment of a landlord-tenant relationship between the government and the property owner?
- Martial Law Regulation 118
ORDER
1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--Leave to appeal has been sought by the Province of Punjab and others in a rent restriction matter relating to a taken-over School, run by the petitioners after the promulgation of Martial Law Regulation 118, against the dismissal by the High Court of their Writ Petition against the orders of eviction.
2. ' Learned counsel has contended that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant and if at all the remedy of the respondents side was to file a suit for possession.
3. ' On our questioning the learned counsel conceded that in view of the various judgments of this Court, the petitioner Government cannot claim to be the owner of the building in the circumstances of this case. He, however, vehemently contended that in a case like the present one, it cannot be said that if the occupant is not owner, their position is only that of a tenant. In other words, according to him, the petitioners are in possession of the premises not as tenants. Therefore, the order of ejectment could not have been passed against them by the learned Rent Controller.
4. He has contended that the agreement of tenancy relied upon from the respondents side was between the owner (landlord) and a previous tenant. The petitioners not being tenants are not bound by the agreement of tenancy. He further contended that in any case the said agreement of tenancy was neither lawfully stamped nor registered and in any case, the lease period thereunder had expired.
5. We do not agree with the learned counsel. It has now been determined in a number of cases that the buildings not owned by the Government, cannot be claimed in the ownership of the Government, merely because it continued to be occupied by a School run by the Government, under the relevant Martial Law Regulation. The position of the occupants ordinarily, would be that of tenants. It is not necessary to elaborate this point any further except to mention that all liabilities under the previous legal arrangements between the School/management and the landlord were transferred to the Government through their functionaries as also the relevant school. In this case there was relationship between landlord and tenant. It is more so because of the previous duly executed lease agreement. The mere fact that it was not registered or that it was not properly stamped would be of no assistance to the petitioners nor the fact that it had formally expired.
6. Learned counsel was told that the decided cases on these points go against him. Leave to appeal, therefore, cannot he granted in this case. The petition, accordingly, is dismissed.
7. ' Leave to .
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