RIAZUDDIN QURESHI vs DIRECTOR (ESTI%) PAKISTAN NATIONAL CENTRE, DIRECTORATE GENERAL,ISLAMABAD and another
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, filed by a civil servant against a judgment of the Service Tribunal. The Tribunal had dismissed the petitioner's appeal against his removal from service, ruling it time-barred. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's appeal before the Service Tribunal was filed within the statutory limitation period, considering his departmental representation and subsequent appeal. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal correctly determined the appeal was time-barred. The Court reasoned that whether the petitioner's initial communication was treated as a representation or an appeal, the limitation period commenced on May 22, 1983. Consequently, the appeal filed on October 6, 1983, was beyond the permissible time limit. The Court affirmed that the Tribunal's factual findings regarding the limitation period were not erroneous and that no question of law of public importance existed to warrant granting leave to appeal. The petition was dismissed accordingly.
- Does a departmental representation made by a civil servant constitute the starting point for limitation if no right of appeal exists?
- Can a petition for leave to appeal be granted under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 if no question of law of public importance arises?
- Is an appeal before the Service Tribunal competent if it is filed beyond the statutory limitation period without a request for condonation of delay?
- Article 212(3), Constitution of Pakistan 1973
1. ' SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.--The petitioner a Civil Servant, seeks leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution against the judgment of the Service Tribunal dismissing his appeal on the ground that it was barred by time.
2. ' The petitioner was removed from service by an order dated 12-3-1983 which was notified in the Gazette and sent to his address. The Petitioner represented against it on 22-5-1983 and also claims to have filed a Regular Departmental Appeal on the 8th of June, 1983. He filed finally an Appeal before the Service Tribunal on 6th of October, 1983. The Tribunal held the Appeal to be incompetent and time-barred by observing as hereunder:-- "As said above, the impugned order was published in the official gazette and a copy thereof was sent by the Department at the given address of the appellant on 12-3-1983. It shall, therefore, normally be presumed that the impugned order came to the notice of the appellant during March, 1983. Be that as it may, even if the contention of the appellant is accepted time for filing appeal started running on expiry of ninety days from 22-5-1983, when, as averred in paragraph 14 of the memo. Of appeal, he made a departmental representation, and, therefore, expired on 19-9-1983.
3. Even then the present appeal having been filed on 6-101983 is barred by sixteen days for which neither any explanation is forthcoming nor condonation of delay has been sought. There is, therefore, no option for us to hold that the present appeal being barred by limitation, is incompetent."
4. ' The petitioner who has appeared in person has argued that in the first place he did not receive information of the order passed against him but came to know of it indirectly from sources where he had applied for another job. He had a right of appeal against that order and he did file one on 8th of June, 1983 and if limitation is computed from that date then his appeal before the Tribunal was quite competent.
5. ' We find that the argument advanced by the Petitioner is destructive of the plea which he has taken. If he had a right of appeal then his representation made on 22nd of May, 1983 has to be treated as an appeal. A representation will be competent only when no right of appeal existed. In either case the starting point of limitation would be 22-5-1983 and not 8th of June, 1983. Limitation computed from that date would necessarily make the appeal time-barred and it cannot be said on the facts held established by the Tribunal or as pleaded by the Petitioner that the conclusion on facts is erroneous. The appeal was time-barred and the Tribunal correctly treated it as time- barred.
6. No question of law of public importance as is provided for in Article 212(3) arises in the case and leave to appeal is refused.