AKBAR KHAN vs MUHAMMAD KHAN And OTHER

1. Application in revision is by the plaintiff in the suit filed by him to pre--empt sale of land measuring 14 kanals, 4 marlas by Abdullah Khan and Ghulam Ali in favour of Khan Mohammad and Niaz Ahmad at the sale price of Rs. 56,000 vide mutation of sale NOA99 sanctioned on 17-3-1982. The trial Court dismissed the pre-emption suit on 28-I1-1987. It was held that plaintiff was a co-sharer but he was estopped to sue and the pre-emption suit filed by him was barred by limitation and, therefore, could not succeed. Plaintiff preferred an appeal. It was heard by learned Additional District Judge, Pakpattan Sharif who found that in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court reported in PLD 1986 SC 300 and PLD 1988 SC 701, appeal could not succeed and consequently, without touching the merits, dismissed it on 22-1-1989. Against this judgment and decree, plaintiff filed a petition for revision, on 14-12-1989 in this Court. On the strength of decision in Ahmad v. Abdul Aziz PLD 1989 SC 771, it was admitted to hearing on16-12-1989.

2. Though the plaintiff had claimed pre-emption as collateral of the vendor and co-sharer in the land yet, at the trial, he could establish the latter qualification only. Learned counsel for the petitioner does not dispute this statement. There is no doubt that the decision relied upon helps the petitioner. It clearly holds that `talabs' could not have been engrafted upon surviving left-over statutory qualifications/preferences in Punjab Pre-emptions Act, 1913. View expressed in Ahmad's case is certainly a departure from the view earlier taken by the Supreme Court is this behalf and is binding by force of a constitutional mandate. That notwithstanding, civil revision cannot suceed because of having been filed after efflux of un preseribed period of 90 days from the date of the judgment and decree sought to lie revised and there is no explanation whatsoever for condonation of the delay caused in this behalf. It is correct that the Limitation Act did not prescribe any specific period for filing of applications in revision but despite this statutory omission, in absence of exceptional circumstances, all the High Courts are agreed to entertain the applications in revision only if filed within 9n days from the date of the order sought to be revised. This is so because 90 days are prescribed for an appeal to the High Court. Any time lapsing beyond that is the clear responsibility of the person invoking the revisional jurisdiction to explain to the satisfaction of the Court. Inaction, indolence or negligence may, disentitle the applicant from claiming relief in exercise of revisional jurisdiction which is essentially of a discretionary nature. Impugned judgment and decree oft learned Additional District Judge are dated 22-1-1989. These were pronounced in presence of the parties and in regard to period of limitation took effect immediately. Plaintiff applied for the certified copies of the impugned judgment and decree on 5-2-1989. Certified copies were prepared and delivered to the plaintiff, on 2-5-1989. Nonetheless, plaintiff waited for seven months and twelve days for filing of the application in revision. There is no explanation, whatsoever, refer taking this long time to invoke the revisional jurisdiction. Wait and see policy expecting a change in views of the Supreme Court for agitating the matter thereafter in accordance therewith may not be of much help to the plaintiff the day, the impugned judgment and' decree were passed, the view taken by learned Additional District Judge was correct and had the support of number of decisions from the supreme Court. If the plaintiff was not satisfied with the impugned judgment and decree, he was obliged to agitate their correctness in further appeal or revision, as the case may he by taking appropriate steps in time. Having delayed the filing of application in revision beyond 90 days, he forfeited his right to re-open the controversy which was then properly concluded by the learned Judge below. Pre-emption restricts the right of an owner of the property to dispose it of to a person of his choice on freely negotiated terms. For its successful exercise, the pre-emptor is obliged to act with promptitude and must avoid legal pitfalls. Any delay in this behalf creates some equities in favour of the vendee who cannot be kept in perpetual suspense about his title to the land purchased by him with a sword of pre-emption ever hanging on his head. In the time elapsing between the date of the impugned decree and the filing of civil revision in this Court, the vendee may have felt secure about his title to the land and free from a further risk of Court litigation. In building up such a feeling and a hope, he may not be found far wrong. Also there is difference of opinion on the application of section 12 (2) of Limitation Act, 1908; for extending benefit of the "time requisite" for obtaining the required copies in case of a civil revision, but there is no preponderance of views in any direction. See Tahir Ali and others v., Chief Judge, Karachi Small Causes Court and another PLD 1963 SC 147. Having regard to the nature of litigation, the time elapsed in filing the revision petition since the date of the impugned judgment and decree, in absence of p satisfactory explanation ought not to be excused. In my opinion, civil revision is barred by rule of laches. Accordingly, it fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.