GHULAM KHAN vs THE DISTRICT JUDGE, GUJRAT and 2 others
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that upheld an order by the District Judge, Gujrat, regarding the execution of a compromise decree for maintenance. The petitioner, a father, challenged his obligation to maintain his daughter, arguing that his liability ceased because she refused to marry. The daughter had refused marriage to care for her ailing mother. The core legal question was whether a father's obligation to maintain his daughter terminates upon her refusal to marry, particularly when that refusal is based on the care of an ailing parent. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's contention lacked force. The Court reasoned that the daughter's refusal to marry was temporary and based on a genuine, temporary disability (caring for her mother), and that the father's liability would only be exonerated upon her actual marriage. Consequently, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming that the maintenance obligation persists until the daughter marries, and a temporary refusal does not extinguish the father's legal duty.
- Does a father's obligation to maintain his daughter cease if she refuses to marry?
- Is a daughter's refusal to marry due to the care of an ailing parent a valid ground for a father to stop maintenance payments?
- Does a temporary refusal to marry by a daughter exonerate the father from his maintenance liability?
ORDER
' USMAN ALI SHAH, J.--Leave to appeal has been sought by the petitioner, against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 30th January, 1989, whereby his writ petition against the order of the District Judge, Gujrat dated 3rd July, 1986 was dismissed.
2. On the application of respondent No, 2, (i.e. Daughter of the petitioner) before the Judge Family Court, an ex parte decree was passed against the petitioner vide order dated 12th January, 1976.
The said decree was amended by the said Court on the application of the petitioner to the effect that the petitioner would pay 2/7th share of the produce from the land to his wife and his daughter whereas the rest of 5/7th share the petitioner himself will get and he would also arrange from his own pocket for the marriage of Mst. Ameer Bibi daughter of the petitioner. It was also ordered that the petitioner would pay 1/7th of his income from the land to Mst. Rasoolan Bibi respondent No, 3 after the marriage of respondent No,2, vide compromise decree dated 20th July, 1978.
3. On failure on the part of the petitioner to pay 1/7th share of income of his land to respondent No,2 she filed an execution application before the learned Civil Judge, Mandi Bahauddin, which was resisted by the petitioner. The learned Civil Judge, vide his order dated 16th March, 1986, dismissed the said application. On appeal filed by the respondent No,2 the learned District Judge Gujrat vide his order dated 3rd July, 1988 accepted the appeal, set aside the order under appeal of the Civil Judge and remitted the execution application to the Executing Court for its execution according to law. The petitioner filed a writ petition against the said appellate order before the Lahore High Court which was dismissed vide impugned judgment. Hence this petition for leave to appeal.
4. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the responsibility of the father for the maintenance of his daughter ends when she refuses to marry throughout her life. The learned counsel also urged that a marriage is a 'Sunnah' and he who refuses to marry, according to the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) is not amongst us. In the instant case the daughter of the petitioner has based her refusal to marry merely on the ground that she is to look after her old ailing mother. The law is very clear on the subject that the daughter is to be maintained by her father till her marriage. The reason given by the respondent No, 2 for not marrying in the lifetime of her old ailing mother is quite genuine because there is every likelihood that after some time when this disability on her part is removed and the circumstances become conducive, she may change her idea and get herself married -then the petitioner will be automatically exonerated from her liability.
5. After hearing the learned counsel, we are of the view that the contention raised by him has no force which calls for any interference in the impugned judgment of the High Court. This petition is, therefore, dismissed.
Cited by 1 case
- Mst. FARHAT NAZ vs UMAR HAYAT and others 1994 MLD 1771