Hakim MUHAMMAD BASHIR vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE and another
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute regarding the appointment of a Lambardar, where the petitioner challenged the appointment of respondent No. 2. The petitioner's writ petition before the High Court had been dismissed, leading to the current proceedings before the Supreme Court. The core legal question was whether the High Court should have interfered with the administrative discretion exercised in appointing the respondent, given that the respondent had previously been convicted and sentenced by a Civil Court for contempt of court, though he was subsequently released after offering an unqualified apology. The Supreme Court held that the appointment was valid, noting that the petitioner failed to cite any legal provision prohibiting the appointment of an individual under these specific circumstances. The Court further reasoned that since the respondent had purged himself of contempt through an unqualified apology, there was no legal or principled bar to his appointment as a Lambardar. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal, affirming that the administrative discretion in such appointments remains undisturbed absent a clear legal violation.
- Does a prior conviction for contempt of court, where an unqualified apology was accepted, legally disqualify an individual from being appointed as a Lambardar?
- Should the High Court interfere in the exercise of administrative discretion regarding the appointment of a Lambardar when no specific law has been violated?
ORDER
1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--This petition for leave to appeal has arisen out of a Lambardari case. The respondent No,2 was preferred for the appointment. The petitioner's writ petition having been dismissed, he has now sought leave to appeal.
2. ' Despite the findings of fact that the said respondent was more suitable person for the appointment as a Lambardar, the learned counsel has contended that the discretion exercised in favour of the said respondent should have been interfered with by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. The ground urged in this behalf is that the said respondent was convicted and sentenced by a Civil Court for Contempt of Court, but was ultimately let off on accepting his unqualified apology.
3. Learned counsel was unable to rely on any law by virtue of which the respondent No,2, in the circumstances of this case, could not have been appointed as a Lambardar. Otherwise too, when he had perjured himself of contempt and his unqualified apology had been accepted, there was no bar in principle either, in so far as the question of appointment of a Lambardar is concerned.
4. ' Leave to appeal is, therefore, refused.