INSPECTORGENERAL OF POLICE, PUNJAB, LAHORE vs MUHAMMAD AMEER

' SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.---The Inspector-General Police Punjab, seeks leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution against the judgment dated 3-5-1986 (in C.Ps. 679 to 682 of 1986) and 24-5-1986 (in C.F. 767 of 1986) whereby the service appeals filed by Police Officers were allowed.

2. One Inspector-General of Police by orders passed, "as a special case in relaxation of relevant rules, in recognition of commendable performance" confirmed out of turn the respondents (made the appointment regular and on probation in C.P. 767 of 1986). The Inspector-General who succeeded him, a few months after, rescinded the orders without notice to and without hearing the affected Police Officers. They challenged the action by appeal to Service Tribunal which allowed the appeals observing as hereunder:-- "We have no hesitation to repel the contention of the learned District Attorney that the learned Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, was within its powers to rescind his order or of his predecessor on the plea that lot of heart burning would be caused among other colleagues of the appellants as they were senior to them and proceed to accept these appeals, set aside the impugned orders and restore the orders by which they were confirmed in the rank of Inspectors."

3. Mr. M.M. Saeed Beg, Advocate, the learned counsel for the Petitioner has contended that the orders of confirmation were nullities incapable of conferring any rights whatsoever and their rescission did not entail infringement of any of the rights of the respondents. Mr. Faiz Muhammad Bhatti Advocate, the learned counsel for the Petitioner in C.P. 767 of 1986 contended that the respondent was on probation and termination of probation could take place without resort to show cause procedure.

4. The Inspector-General who has rescinded the orders did not proceed on the ground of nullity, incompetence or absence of power of the authority passing the orders. He based his orders only on the ground of propriety and fairness. Where rights had come to vest, such or these grounds could not be sufficient to unilaterally justify the rescission of the orders, apparently passed competently. The Service Tribunal has, in insisting on the standard of minimum fairness in passing such orders, only reinforced the observance of rule of law by and in a disciplined force. The contention that, in C.P. 767 of 1986, it is the probation which has been terminated, is misconceived because it is basically the order of regular appointment to the post of Inspector which has been rescinded and consequently of the probation and the reasons had nothing to do with the performance during the period of or relatable to probation.

5. No case is made out for leave to appeal which is refused in all these cases.